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LOVE AND OBLIGATION: FAMILY LAW AND THE
ROMANCE OF ECONOMICS
ANN LAQUER ESTIN*
INTRODUCTION

The coupling of economic theory and family law seems, at first
glance, to be an odd one. Many traditions within both law and
economics have operated for generations to keep the family in a
class apart from the marketplace, sheltered from its principles
and values. But in recent years, the match is increasingly common, and, for many in the academy, the pairing has proved to be
quite fruitful.' The final legitimation of the union came in 1992,
when Professor Gary S. Becker of the University of Chicago was
awarded the Nobel Prize for his work applying microeconomic
theory to social problems, including various aspects of family
2
life.
Scholars like Becker have complicated and extended the way
economists think about the family. By conceiving of households

* Associate Professor of Law, University of Colorado. I am indebted to a number
of colleagues for their comments on earlier drafts, particularly Peg Brinig, Hiroshi
Motomura, Mitt Regan, and Art Travers, and to Karla McManamon and Joe Strella
for research assistance.
1. The early work in economics appeared in the mid-1960s. For a brief review of
these developments, see MARK BLAUG, THE METHODOLOGY OF ECONOMICS 220-21 (2d
ed. 1992); Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson, Introduction: The Social Construction of Economics and the Social Construction of Gender, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN
1, 6 (Marianne A. Ferber & Julie A. Nelson eds., 1993); Isabel V. Sawhill, Economic
Perspectives on the Family, 106 DAEDALUS 115 (1977); Robert J. Willis, What Have
We Learned from the Economics of the Family?, 77 AM. ECON. REV. 68 (1987). For a
general criticism, see MARILYN WARING, IF WOMEN COUNTED: A NEW FEMINIST ECONOMICS 37-39 (1988).

The original treatment of these issues for lawyers is probably Judge Posner's
"textbook-treatise," first published in 1973 and now in its fourth edition. See RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 139-61 (4th ed. 1992) (discussing family
law and sexual regulation).
2. See Gary S. Becker, When the Wake-up Call is from the Nobel Committee,
Bus. WE. Nov. 2, 1992, at 20. Becker's major work on the family was published in
1981 and revised in 1991. See GARY S. BECKER, A TREATISE ON THE FAMILY (1991).
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as economically productive, their work opens the way to filling
the conceptual gaps that have existed not only in economics but
also in law. Already, the cross-fertilization of family law and
economics has produced some vigorous hybrids.
This Article is an exploration of the intersection of economics
and the law of the family from the viewpoint of legal theory and
practice, rather than economics. Part I reviews the traditional
legal and economic understanding of the family and introduces
several important contributions of the new family economics.
These contributions include the analysis of specialization of
labor in households, household production theory, and theories
of human capital investment. Part I also considers the paradigms of exchange and altruism that have been a foundation for
family economics. It concludes that economic analysis is an inadequate basis for theorizing about family life and discusses the
reasons for this inadequacy.
Part II considers the application of economic theories in four
specific areas of the law: tort claims for injury or death of a
homemaker, contract and restitution claims between members of
shared households, property division in divorce, and child support. The Article demonstrates that the insights drawn from
economic theory are useful in each of these areas, but that there
are additional important legal and moral questions for which
economic theory has not provided useful answers. First, economic models offer reasons why household services should be valued
based on the opportunity costs of a homemaker's work, but the
models do not address the underlying question of how
entitlements in tort should be defined. Second, although the
economists' approach suggests that contract and restitution principles deserve application in family as well as commercial settings, the exchange norms economists apply do not address the
channeling policies reflected in the more traditional rules. Third,
economic theory provides a strong basis for the argument that
human capital assets should be valued and divided in divorce,
but these arguments do not address the concern with
commodification of intelligence and love that appears regularly
in the case law or the practical problems that would result if
this approach were enacted into law. Finally, where child rearing is concerned, economic analysis explains the need for sub-
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stantial private investment in the human capital of children, but
it does not address the dilemmas created when self-interest
overtakep the commitments of love and obligation.
I. LAw AND ECONOMICS AND FAMILY LIFE
In order to understand why the new family economics has had
such powerful appeal, it is useful to consider the traditional
views of the family reflected in economics and law. Both economics and law traditionally have represented the household or the
family as a fundamentally different sphere of'human behavior
than the marketplace.3 Economics and law have each constructed different norms to explain and govern behavior in each
sphere. In law, the boundary between the family and the marketplace sometimes is described as a distinction between status
and contract.4 In economics, the distinction is understood in
terms of the difference between altruistic and self-interested
motivations for behavior.5 Contemporary legal and economic
doctrines construct different understandings of these boundaries
and a new set of theories to define family life.
A. TraditionalApproaches to the Family
The intellectual dichotomy between family and market has
encouraged an assumption that family issues are not relevant to
economic and legal analysis. Economists and lawyers have not
treated work in the family as comparable to work in the marketplace.' Families or households are not seen as economically productive. Families do appear in the analysis of consumer behavior, but even in that analysis, economists and lawyers typically
assume that the family behaves as if it were a single individual.7 In both disciplines, the participants in market transactions

3. See Frances E. Olsen, The Family and the Market: A Study of Ideology and
Legal Reform, 96 HARV. L. REV. 1497 (1983).
4. This description is attributed to SIR HENRY SUMNER MAINE, ANCIENT LAW 165

(10th ed.
movement
5. See
6. See
7. See

1884) ("The movement of the progressive societies has hitherto been a
from Status to Contract.").
BECKER, supra note 2, at 277-78 (citing Adam Smith).
infra notes 9-24 and accompanying text.
infra notes 25-39 and accompanying text.
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are conceived as individuals without family attachments.8
1. Work in the Household
Statistical measures of economic production, such as Gross
National Product (GNP), reflect a narrow, neoclassical vision.
These indicators measure only market activities.9 The work of
maintaining a family-bearing and caring for children, housework, home maintenance, meal preparation, subsistence agriculture, and so on-is excluded unless performed for payment.' °
Public policies reflect this confusion of market activity with economic production. Income tax laws treat only remunerated work
as sufficiently productive to be taxed." Social insurance
schemes, including social security payments and a whole range
of unemployment, disability, and workers compensation benefits,
cover only workers in the wage labor economy and their dependents.12 Social insurance defined to meet the particular needs

8. See infra notes 25, 34-35 and accompanying text.
9. See SUSAN M. OKIN, JUSTICE, GENDER, AND THE FAMILY 204 n.48 (1989);
WALLACE C. PETERSON, INCOME, EMPLOYMENT, AND ECONOMIC GROWTH 5, 46-48, 7275 (6th ed. 1988); WARING, supra note 1, at 36-43, 187-223; Ferber & Nelson, supra
note 1, at 5.
10. In the words of political theorist Susan Moller Okin:
At the public policy level, the lack of recognition of the economic value of
housewives' work is indicated by the fact that housework is included in
the GNP only if it is paid work done by a housekeeper. . . . [I]t has
been estimated that, if it were included, unpaid housework done in the
industrialized countries would constitute between 25 and 40 percent of
the GNP.
OKIN, supra note 9, at 204 n.48 (citing DEBBIE TAYLOR, ET AL., WOMEN: A WORLD
REPORT (1985)); see WARING, supra note 1, at 276-87 (discussing the problem of imputing value to women's home production); see also JOHN K. GALBRAITH, ECONOMICS
AND THE PUBLIC PURPOSE 33 (1973) (characterizing women as a "crypto-servant
class"); Richard A. Posner, Conservative Feminism, 1989 U. CHI. LEGAL F. 191, 192
n.4 (citing other authorities on imputing value to home production).
11. The effect is to subsidize families with higher levels of household production,
principally those with traditional gender-based divisions of household labor. See Edward J. McCaffery, Taxation and the Family: A Fresh Look at Behavioral Gender
Biases in the Code, 40 UCLA L. REV. 983, 1001-05 (1993); Posner, supra note 10, at
192-95.
12. See Mary E. Becker, Obscuring the Struggle: Sex Discrimination,Social Security, and Stone, Seidman, Sunstein & Tushnet's Constitutional Law, 89 COLUM. L.
REv. 264, 276-85 (1989) (analyzing structural gender discrimination in the social
security system). See generally Grace G. Blumberg, Adult Derivative Benefits in So-
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of household producers without breadwinner partners-particularly the Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC)'3 program-pays much lower benefits than those available under the payroll programs.' 4
Some economists argue that the exclusion of nonmarket work
from public policy and plannifig creates a substantial distortion.
Policy decisions based on incomplete statistics may omit important values and areas of production from the planning pro-

cess.15 As economist Marilyn Waring has noted, the distinction
between market and nonmarket production is a heavily
gendered one; work done predominantly by women remains
invisible to economic policy makers. 6 Both the statistical indicators and the policies based upon these indicators privilege
market production and the types of economic activity most characteristic of modern, industrialized societies over household production and more traditional economies. 7 Reforming the treat-

cial Security, 32 STAN. L. REV. 233, 242-46 (1980).
13. 42 U.S.C. §§ 601-87 (1988 & Supp. V 1993).
14. See Judith Resnick, "Naturally" Without Gender: Women, Jurisdiction,and the
Federal Courts, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1682, 1725 (1991); William H. Simon, Rights and
Redistribution in the Welfare System, 38 STAN. L. REV. 1431, 1464 (1986).
15. E.g., WARING, supra note 1, at 1-4, 17-20.
16. Waring argues that economists use terms such as "labor" and "production" to
refer only to activities that produce profit in the market place.
So, for example, the labor of childbirth may be work for a paid surrogate
mother or for the paid midwife, nurse, doctor, and anaesthetist. Despite
the Oxford English Dictionary's description of labor as "the pains and
effort of childbirth: travail," the woman in labor-the reproducer,
sustainer, and nurturer of human life-does not "produce" anything. Similarly, all the other reproductive work that women do is widely viewed as
unproductive. Growing and processing food, nurturing, educating, and
running a household-all part of the complex process of reproduction-are
unacknowledged as part of the production system. A woman who supplies
such labor is not seen by economists as performing work of value.
Id. at 27-28; see also id. at 189-93 (describing the economics of surrogacy); id. at
206-10 (describing the economics of breast feeding). Waring's criticisms also apply to
Marxist economists. Id. at 29.
17. Characterizing market production as more significant than household or subsistence production is an evolutionary perspective that follows the conventional sociological wisdom that where families once served important economic purposes, their
functions in the modem world have diminished to those of nurturance of adults and
socialization of children. See, e.g., Talcott Parsons, The American Family: Its Relations to Personality and to the Social Structure, in FAMILY, SOCIALIZATION AND INTERACTION PROCESS 3 (Talcott Parsons & Robert F. Bales eds., 1955). Gary Becker's
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ment of household production has gained currency, in part because increasing portions of women's traditionally unpaid labor
in the home has been shifting to the market. Without better
information on household production, evaluating these types of
changes is difficult.
Of course, it is easier to collect information on market transactions than to estimate the productive value of work in the
home. Economists, however, routinely adjust their figures to
include other types of nonmarket activity, such as the rental
value of private home ownership."
The idea that "services" in the household are not equivalent to
"work" also appears in the common law tradition. Restitution
principles permit compensation only for services provided without a gratuitous intention, a rule that excludes most interactions
between family members. Moreover, the law has presumed that
work within a household is gratuitous. 9 Efforts to use law to
define and enforce contractual relationships between household
members also have been constrained.2" In more recent analyses, both economic and legal theorists have come to recognize

analysis shares this general perspective. See BECKER, supra note 2, at 342-58. The
dispute over the productive value of housework has deep roots. See Nancy Folbre,
The Unproductive Housewife: Her Evolution in Nineteenth Century Economic Thought,
16 SIGNS 463 (1991); Reva Siegel, Home as Work: The First Women's Rights Claims
Concerning Household Labor, 1850-1880, 103 YALE L.J. 1073 (1994); see also Diana
Strassman, Not a Free Market: The Rhetoric of Disciplinary Authority in Economics,
in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 1, at 59-60 (describing "the story of the
woman of leisure" in economic thought).
18. PETERSON, supra note 9, at 74-75; see also WARING, supra note 1, at 152-54
(discussing economic treatment of hidden or illegal economic activity). The distinction
is zealously guarded; efforts to reform the statistical measures maintained in the
United States have been strongly opposed in some circles. The Unremunerated Work
Act, sponsored by Rep. Barbara-Rose Collins (D-Mich.), would have required that
GNP be computed to include the monetary value of unremunerated work performed
in the United States "including household work, work related to child care and other
care services, agricultural work, work related to food production, work related to
family businesses, and volunteer work." H.R. 966, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 3(a)
(1993); H.R. 2790, 103d Cong., 1st Sess. § 803(a) (1993); see Constance Sommer,
Congress Again Asked To Put Price on Cooking, Diapering, L.A. TIMES, Mar. 25,
1993, at A5. For an example of opposition to the measure, see Daniel Seligman,
Mad About Housework, FORTUNE, June 1, 1992, at 163.
19. See infra notes 229-32 and accompanying text.
20. See infra notes 225-28 and accompanying text.
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that the activities of a household are economically productive.2 1
Economic theorists began to describe the productive role of families in the 1960s.22 In tort law, household services are acknowledged to have "pecuniary" value, although this value remains
difficult to quantify.' In divorce law, rules for property division
now require consideration of all contributions made by husband
and wife, including "the contribution of a spouse as homemaker."2 4
2. Families or Individuals?
In neoclassical economics, the individual is the unit of analysis. Individuals sell their labor, receive paychecks, and purchase
goods and services. Sometimes the prototypical rational economic man appears in the analysis abstracted and alone; sometimes
he is understood to represent a family or a household as the
breadwinner and "head" of a conventional nuclear family. "The
family" exists only parenthetically, as an appendage to the individual economic actor. Many aspects of public policy reflect
21. See infra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
22. Judge Richard A. Posner summarizes the new "household production theory" in
this way:
The food, clothing, furniture, medicines, and other market commodities
that the household purchases are inputs into the production of nourishment, warmth, affection, children, and the other tangible and intangible
goods that constitute the output of the household. A critical input into
this productive process is not a market commodity at all; it is the time
of the household members, in particular-in the traditional family-of the
wife.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 139; see infra notes 50-76 and accompanying text; see also
POSNER, supra note 1, at 192 (stating that "housewives do useful work, in the sense
of work for which families pay-as by forgoing the income that the housewife could
earn in the market").
The challenge of applying economic principles to family life has been welcomed
by law and economics theorists. As Judge Posner poses the question: 'The persistence of the family as a social institution suggests to an economist that the institution must have important economizing properties. What might these be?" POSNER,
supra note 1, at 139. His musings extend to two possibilities: economies of scale
derived from shared households and the potential for gains from a specialization of
labor.
23. See infra notes 155-90 and accompanying text.
24. UNIF. MARRIAGE AND DIVORCE ACT (UMDA) § 307(A), 9A U.L.A. 239 (1987). In
practice, this consideration often reduces to a conclusion that both parties' contributions were equal. See infra notes 265-78 and accompanying text.
25. Becker comments that "economists hardly noticed the family prior to the
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the assumption that families are attached to individual, usually
male, workers.26
Families began to appear in the economic analysis of consumer demand in the mid-1950s. Paul Samuelson is credited with
providing and justifying an economic model of family behavior
that treats the family as a unit with a single, unified "utility
function."2 7 This model, and the absence of empirical knowledge
about distributions within the family, have led economists-and
government policymakers-generally to assume that a family's
resources are equally distributed among its members.2 Al-

1950s." BECKER, supra note 2, at 2. For an early analysis, see MARGARET G. REID,
ECONOMICS OF HOUSEHOLD PRODUCTION (1934). On "economic man," see Ronald H.
Coase, Adam Smith's View of Man, 19 J.L. & ECON. 529, 545-46 (1976).
26. For example, the social security system presumes family dependence on a single primary wage earner. See supra note 12 and accompanying text.
John Kenneth Galbraith is sharply critical of the definition of the conventional
family as a mechanism for an "efficiently necessary division of labor." GALBRAITH,
supra note 10, at 234-35. Galbraith argues that the family is a "facilitating instrument for increased consumption." Id. at 235. He further observes that, although the
neoclassical system treats consumption as trouble-free and as something to be maximized, significant burdens accompany the possession and consumption of goods, particularly as more elaborate housing, dress, vehicles, and so on become available. Id.
at 29. He argues that housewives became necessary to manage the household consumption-replacing the servants required in an earlier era for maximal consumption. Id. at 29-30. As he notes, in some social classes, a suitable wife came to be an
important and expensive consumer good. Id. at 31-32. The concept of wife as status
symbol is not a relic of an earlier age, although what type of wife confers the greatest status has shifted over the decades. Compare id. at 32 with Julie Connelly, The
CEO's Second Wife, FORTUNE, Aug. 28, 1989, at 52.
27. See BLAUG, supra note 1, at 220 ("Traditional theory views the family as a
one-person household, maximizing a utility function that is defined on goods and
services bought in the market place."). See generally Shelly Lundberg & Robert A.
Pollak, Separate Spheres Bargaining and the Marriage Market, 101 J. POL. ECON.
988, 991 (1993) (citing Paul A. Samuelson, Social Indifference Curves, 70 Q.J. ECON.
1-22 (1956)) (discussing the fact that economic models traditionally ignored distribution within the family).
28. See EDWARD P. LAZEAR & ROBERT T. MICHAEL, ALLOCATION OF INCOME WITHIN THE HOUSEHOLD (1988). Lazear and Michael describe this assumption as analytically convenient but probably not correct. They emphasize that various models of
"decision rules" for allocation of goods within the family "are mute on the issues of
how, in fact, conflict is resolved and resources allocated after marriage," id. at 23,
and that the decision rules studies "do not investigate directly the nature of the
distribution of resources within the family," id. at 24.
Becker's theory is based on a slightly different assumption-that the wage earner acts altruistically toward other members of his family, allocating his money income to serve optimally all of the utility functions within the household. BECKER,
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though this approach has been characterized as analytically convenient, it has also been criticized for ignoring the significance
of what occurs within the family.2 9
Similarly, in the branches of economics concerned with the
distribution of income and wealth, the household is the basic
unit of analysis."0 As a result, the internal character of families
or households is again largely ignored, and comparisons of the
living standards of different households are distorted significantly.3 ' The problems this distortion poses are compounded by the
tendency of statistical measures and public policies to ignore
household production. As Edward Lazear and Robert Michael

supra note 2, at 296-97; see infra notes 109-13 and accompanying text.
29. As described by Lazear and Michael:
There is an honored tradition in economics of ignoring the distribution of
income within the household. Attention is typically focused on the distribution of resources among families, households, earners, or consumer
units. . . . The individualistic ethic that underlies the assumptions of
modern economics implies an interest in the person, not simply in the
family or household unit. Yet, in a number of matters of social policy,
economists and others have acted as if the family unit, not the individual, is at the heart of an issue, thereby conveniently skirting the problem
of what happens within the family.
LAZEAR & MICHAEL, supra note 28, at 12; see also GALBRAITH, supra note 10, at 35
(explaining that income distribution within the household "requires extensive subordination of preference by one member or another").
30. E.g., POSNER, supra note 1, at 455-56 (beginning a discussion about "measuring of inequality" with the phrase, "ti]f income were distributed evenly among all the
household units in the country . . .")
31. Posner explains the point in this way:
[Bleing limited to pecuniary income, the statistics on the distribution of
incomes ignore many factors that are highly important to economic welfare-even quite narrowly defined-but difficult to quantify. Compare two
households: In one both husband and wife work and each earns $20,000
per year; in the other only the husband works, and he earns $40,000.
The pecuniary income of the households is the same, but the real income
of the second household is greater. The wife stays home because her
services in the home are worth more to the household than the income
she would obtain from an outside job.
POSNER, supra note 1, at 456:
Posner argues elsewhere that the fact that a housewife's productivity is not
taxed (as imputed income) while the earnings of wives employed in the market are
fully taxable, creates distortions between households. Posner, supra note 10, at 19293.
32. Lazear and Michael note that
[m]ost studies of income distribution focus on money income, although a
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have argued, these issues pose a particular problem in analysis
of family policy, especially in the context of divorce.3 3
The law reflects a similar preoccupation with individuals.
With slight differences between traditional "community property" and "title" states,34 the individual wage earner, not the family, has the legal right to own and control the household's money
income and to determine how that income will be spent.
Courts will not second-guess a wage earner's decisions regarding
the allocation of income within the family.3" In fact, the law
traditionally gave a husband and father control over the money
income of his wife and children in addition to his own.3

few attempt to measure one or another of the broader concepts of income. . . . [Nionpecuniary resources or externalities . . . are uniquely
associated with knowing the utility function or preferences of the household members. . . . [W]ithout knowing about these preferences one cannot
speak to these externalities, and hence one cannot speak to the distribution of well-being or welfare.
LAZEAR & MICHAEL, supra note 28, at 22.
33. Id. at 13. These writers also devote a chapter to "Guidelines for Alimony and
Child Support," id. at 150, that examines the implications of several criteria typically used to determine these awards. See infra notes 338-47 and accompanying text.
34. Legal rules regulating management of marital or community property during
marriage are a current subject of debate. See, e.g., UNIF. MARITAL PROPERTY ACT, 9A
U.L.A. 97 (1987); Symposium, The Continuing Evolution of American Community
Property Law, 1990 WIS. L. REV. 583; see also GALBRAITH, supra note 10, at 34-35
(noting that the party who receives income gets basic authority over its use).
35. See generally PHILIP BLUMSTEIN & PEPPER SCHWARTZ, AMERICAN COUPLES:
MONEY, WORK, SEX 139 (1983) (arguing that the shift in control of income changes
family dynamics as well). In addition to the wife's control of an income, "the simple
fact that she has a job . . . gives a wife clout." Id. Other writers have recommended
that legal remedies be available to allow nonwage-earning spouses to reach a share
of a partner's paycheck during an intact marriage. E.g., Joan M. Krauskopf &
Rhonda C. Thomas, PartnershipMarriage: The Solution to an Ineffective and Inequitable Law of Support, 35 OHIO ST. L.J. 558, 586 (1974).
36. E.g., McGuire v. McGuire, 59 N.W.2d 336 (Neb. 1953); Commonwealth v.
George, 56 A.2d 228 (Pa. 1948). According to Galbraith, "[tihe economist does not invade the privacy of the household." GALBRAITH, supra note 10, at 35.
37. HOMER H. CLARK, JR., THE LAW OF DOMESTIC RELATIONS IN THE UNITED
STATES 299-303 (2d ed. 1988) (married women's contracts and earnings); id. at 314
(child's work and earnings). In the law, a wage earner is understood to be financially responsible for his household, at least where the claims of creditors are at stake.
See generally id. at 265 (discussing the doctrine of "family necessaries"). Several
recent cases have struggled to apply the rule in a gender-neutral fashion. See, e.g.,
Jersey Shore Medical Ctr.-Fitkin Hosp. v. Estate of Baum, 417 A.2d 1003 (N.J.
1980); North Carolina Baptist Hosps., Inc. v. Harris, 354 S.E.2d 471 (N.C. 1987);

1995]

FAMILY LAW AND ECONOMICS

999

By ignoring work in the household and treating families as
unitary and undifferentiated, traditional economic and legal
analysis is ill-equipped to respond to contemporary policy problems. In effect, by ignoring the internal characteristics of families, economics and law define all families as the same, and
many household types disappear into this theoretical void. Divorced families, single-parent families, and extended-kin families all vary significantly from the implicit legal and economic
norm. Many of the intractable policy problems in property division and child support relate directly to the problem of how
resources are allocated among different households in the same
"family."3 8 Controversies concerning public benefits law, and
the discrepancy between narrowly drawn economic policies and
the wide variety of family arrangements in society, repeatedly
have reached the United States Supreme Court.39
B. New Family Economic Theory
The new theory of family economics reconceptualizes family
life as a process of exchange between individual family members. Marriage, divorce, and decisions concerning the household
all are analyzed in terms of bargaining and rational choice.40
Economists recognize that exchange behavior in the family is
different from exchanges in the market, and they explain the
difference in terms of altruism, which serves to bond individual
family members' interests.4
With this theory, economists have developed a much richer
understanding of the productive aspects of family life. This theory offers vocabulary and a range of models to describe interactions within families and interactions between the market and
family spheres. Acknowledging these economic relationships is

Landmark Medical Ctr. v. Gauthier, 635 A.2d 1145 (R.I. 1994); Sharpe Furniture,
Inc. v. Buckstaff, 299 N.W.2d 219 (Wis. 1980).
38. See infra notes 341-53 and accompanying text.
39. E.g., Wengler v. Druggists Mut. Ins. Co., 446 U.S. 142 (1980); Orr v. Orr, 440
U.S. 268 (1979); Califano v. Webster, 430 U.S. 313 (1977); Califano v. Goldfarb, 430
U.S. 199 (1977); Stanton v. Stanton, 421 U.S. 7 (1975), vacated, 429 U.S. 501 (1977);
Weinberger v. Wiesenfeld, 420 U.S. 636 (1975); Kahn v. Shevin, 416 U.S. 351 (1974).
40. See infra notes 50-98, 102 and accompanying text.
41. See infra notes 102-18 and accompanying text.
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an important step toward correcting the oversights of traditional
economic theory, and it offers important lessons for the law. The
theory originated, however, when economists began to explore
issues of market behavior that could not be fully explained without consideration of family behavior.4 2 For the most part, this
investigation has operated within the same conceptual frameworks used to understand market production.4 3
For these scholars, "economic analysis" means viewing family
issues in terms of rational choices made by autonomous agents
seeking to maximize their individual welfare or profit." Professor Becker articulates his goal as the use of "a choice-theoretic
framework for analyzing many aspects of family life," based on
the assumptions "that individuals maximize their utility from
basic preferences that do not change rapidly over time, and that
the behavior of different individuals is coordinated by explicit
and implicit markets."4" As Becker writes, "an analysis based
on rational behavior provides a powerful framework for gaining
insights into family organization and structure under different
laws, circumstances, and cultures." 6 Over time, this framework
has led economists to consider a widening set of family issues,
and some now see their analysis as an alternative to other theories of family behavior.4 7

42. The movement toward application of microeconomic theory to the family, referred to as the "new home economics," began in the mid-1960s with economists,
concerned with labor supply questions, who began to understand that the family was
deeply significant to such issues as "investment in human capital (education), labor
force participation (labor-leisure choice), birth rates, morbidity, and mortality." Neil
K. Komesar, Toward a General Theory of Personal Injury Loss, 3 J. LEGAL STUD.
457 (1974); see also Willis, supra note 1, at 78 (stating that there has been "a rich
cross fertilization between family economics and other branches of economics that
has already borne fruit many times").
43. Komesar, supra note 42, at 461-62.
44. Julie A. Nelson, The Study of Choice or the Study of Provisioning? Gender and
the Definition of Economics, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 1, at 23, 25
(criticizing this view as a narrow and masculinist definition of economics and suggesting replacement of the exclusive focus on choice a broader concern with
provisioning).
45. BECKER, supra note 2, at ix.
46. Id. at 17.
47. See BLAUG, supra note 1, at 226-27. This school uses microeconomic theory to
analyze fertility patterns, marriage and divorce, and divisions of labor within the
home on the basis that because time and human resources are scarce, they are
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This Part will sketch the framework of the new theory and
note where its concepts interact with legal and policy questions.
Four aspects are particularly important. First, these theorists
explain the social institutions of marriage in positive economic
terms as a device to facilitate specialization and division of labor. In effect, this explanation is a defense of "traditional," gender-role divided marriage." Second, the theory investigates the
economic effects of this traditional type of marriage for husband
and wife and develops models for valuing the nonmarket work of
a homemaker in market terms. This work has potential significance for a wide range of family-related legal problems from
contract and tort to the financial regulation of divorce.4 9 A third
issue, which has been less neatly resolved in the theory, is the
economic role of children in family life. The fourth area of concern is a pair of assumptions about family life that have been
the foundation for the larger theoretical framework. One is the
use of exchange as a model for family relationships, and the
other is the concept of altruism as a motivation for individual
choices of family members.
1. Household Production
Household production theory treats the time and other resources of household members as inputs into the production of
various goods, ranging from food and shelter to children, leisure,
and love. This process occurs within a set of constraints established by the larger economic system that defines market values
for the time of household members and prices the commodities
that family members purchase. The theory assumes that resources available to the family are allocated efficiently in order
to maximize the total satisfaction or utility of household members.5" Although household members realize much of this satisfaction in the form of nonmarket goods, for purposes of the theotherefore appropriate for economic analysis. Sawhill, supra note 1, at 115-16.
48. See infra notes 52-57 and accompanying text.
49. These issues are discussed infra part II.
50. See generally BECKER, supra note 2 (utilizing an economic approach to analyze
distribution among the family). For a collection of much of the initial groundwork,
see ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY: MARRIAGE, CHILDREN, AND HUMAN CAPITAL (Theodore W. Schultz ed., 1974) thereinafter ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY].
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ry, this satisfaction is treated as if it could be monetarized.5 1
Economists explain the institution of marriage by the efficiencies that result from a specialization of labor. As Judge Posner
notes:
[T]he family facilitates the division of labor, yielding gains
from specialization. In the traditional family the husband
specializes in some market employment (for example, engineering) that yields income that can be used to purchase the
market commodities needed as inputs into the final production of the household, while the wife devotes her time to processing market commodities (for example, groceries) into
household output (for example, dinner).,2
Because husband and wife specialize in complementary activities, both are able to maximize the value of their time to produce a greater total output for the household.5 3
In his book, A Treatise on the Family, Professor Becker demonstrates that a division of labor within the household would be
efficient even without the overlay of a traditional marriage relationship, or, as he puts it, between an "intrinsically identical"
husband and wife.54 Next, he notes that women have a "comparative advantage" when it comes to the work of bearing and
rearing children55 and observes that even very small differences
in biological advantage (or small differences caused by other

51. See William J. Goode, Comment: The Economics of Nonmonetary Variables, in
ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY, supra note 50, at 345.
52. POSNER, supra note 1, at 140; see supra note 22 (quoting Posner).
53. POSNER, supra note 1, at 140.
54. See BECKER, supra note 2, at 30-37.
[Elven if a husband and wife are intrinsically identical, they gain from a
division of labor between market and household activities ....
The gain
comes from increasing returns to investments in sector-specific human
capital that raise productivity mainly in either the market or the
nonmarket sectors. Therefore, even small differences between men and
women-presumably related at least paltially to the advantages of women in the birth and rearing of children-would cause a division of labor
by gender, with wives more specialized to household activities and husbands more specialized to other work.
Id. at 3-4.
55. Becker views the primary purpose of marriage and the family as "the production and rearing of own children." Id. at 135; see also POSNER, supra note 1, at 140;
discussion accompanying infra notes 61-63.
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factors, such as market discrimination against women) can generate much greater differences in the activities of husband and
wife. 6 This relationship suggests an explanation for highly distinct gender roles-the greater the differences in the economic
attributes of men and women, the greater the benefits from marriage."
In economic theory, the benefits of specialization explain marriage, divorce, and fertility behavior. Thus, Becker views the
choice of a particular marriage partner as a highly significant
economic event because the potential for gains from specializa-

tion is different with different potential mates.58 His model depicts marriage decisions as occurring in a type of market which
operates to sort potential husbands and wives.59 Moreover, he
also describes divorce as an illustration of a type of market; the
decision to seek a divorce occurs when an individual compares
his or her current marital satisfaction with what he or she anticipates would be available in the remarriage market or in
56. BECKER, supra note 2, at 4.
57. Traditional gender roles facilitate the division of labor by increasing the distinction between male and female skills and interests and rooting those differences
in early experience. Id. at 37-39. On the other hand, the recent move toward greater
participation by women in the labor force decreases the difference between women
and men and decreases the economic advantage of marriage. See infra note 87 and
accompanying text.
Becker is careful to note that his argument does not preclude or deny the likelihood that women also have been exploited by the system. BECKER, supra note 2, at
4, 62. Although identifying the division of labor as a source of efficiency, Becker's
analysis does not suggest how the economic surplus should be allocated. Presumably,
however, the surplus is allocated among the household members by the breadwinner,
the presumptively altruistic head of the household. See infra notes 109-13.
58. Becker's work discusses the economics of positive "assortative mating," which
he suggests can explain social customs such as the tendency of relatively more attractive partners to marry each other. Id. at 112-18. Blaug refers to this as "the use
of a sledgehammer to crack a nut." BLAUG, supra note 1, at 224. Becker's analysis
draws on sociobiology as well, asserting that men search for wives to bear and raise
children and women search for husbands who will provide material support for them
and their children. He argues that, for these reasons, it is economically efficient for
high-income-producing men to marry lower-earning women, describing this as "negative associative mating." See BECKER, supra note 2, at 118-19. But see BLAUG, supra
note 1, at 225.
59. To an extent, the "market" in marriage partners is competitive, and, in theory,
an individual's decision to marry is based on the utility-maximizing conclusion that
the benefits from marriage will be greater than either continuing to search or remaining single. BECKER, supra note 2, at 83-84, 325-27.
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single life.6"
Raising children is central to the economists' view of marriage. Judge Posner writes that specialization of labor principles
do not alone explain marriage; in fact, he states that the efficient, role-divided marriage elaborated in economic theory could
be replaced by a "business partnership" if it were not for the
production of children. He concludes: "The key to the puzzle lies
in the nature of the major 'commodity' that marriage produces:
children.... [I]t is hard to believe that marriage would be a
common institution if most people didn't want children."6 Professor Becker's conclusion is similar; he argues that the "main
purpose of marriage and families is the production and rearing
of own children." 2 Posner describes rearing children as a process that demands substantial investments of the parents' resources, primarily "an enormous amount of parental (traditionally maternal) time." 3 Traditional family structures and
gender roles facilitate these investments.
The understanding of marriage as a device for efficient household production is central to the economic approach to family
policy. The models define efficiency, in the sense of resource
allocations that generate the maximum total level of satisfaction, as the measure of marital success. They view the economic
advantages of marriage as similar to the advantages of other
"organizations"; these advantages include a better flow of information between group members and various internal rewards
for working for the benefit of the group.'

60. Becker argues that early divorces are a result of the imperfect information
available to potential mates prior to marriage, and later divorces are "a response to
a demand for variety in mates or to life-cycle changes in traits." Id. at 327; see also
Lloyd Cohen, Marriage, Divorce, and Quasi Rents; or, "I Gave Him the Best Years of
My Life," 16 J. LEGAL STUD. 267 (1987) ('Over time, the utility functions, information, and opportunities of both marriage partners change.").
61. POSNER, supra note 1, at 140.
62. BECKER, supra note 2, at 135; see also id. at 44-48, 112, 14041 (discussing
the production and rearing of children).
63. POSNER, supra note 1, at 140.
64. Arthur B. Cornell, Jr., When Two Become One and Then Come Undone: An
OrganizationalApproach to Marriage and Its Implications for Divorce Law, 26 FAM.
L.Q. 103, 117-18 (1992); Gillian K. Hadfield, Households at Work: Beyond Labor
Market Policies to Remedy the Gender Gap, 82 GEO. L.J. 89, 96-98, 104-06 (1994)
(urging the development of alternative theories of household organization).
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A number of law and economics writers draw explicit analogies between marriage and various commercial relationships. 5
From this viewpoint, marriage, a relationship "dominated by
long-term repeated transactions that tie people together personally,"66 is similar to the relationship of a landlord and tenant
with a long-term lease,6 7 a parts supplier with one major client, 68 or a car owner and his regular auto mechanic.6 9 This
analysis builds on a body of economic writing developing the
concept of the "firm" and legal writing discussing long-term,
"relational" contracts." Likewise, the risks of marriage
correlate with those of other long-term economic relationships,
including the danger that one party may take advantage of the
others by cheating, shirking, or other dishonest behavior.7 For
these commentators, divorce is a problem because it may reflect
"opportunism" or exploitation of the economic effects of the joint
enterprise. 2

65. E.g., Margaret F. Brinig & Steven M. Crafton, Marriage and Opportunism, 23
J. LEGAL STUD. 869 (1994); Cohen, supra note 60, at 267; Cornell, supra note 64, at
109; Ira M. Ellman, The Theory of Alimony, 77 CAL. L. REV. 1 (1989).
66. Cornell, supra note 64, at 112.
67. Cohen, supra note 60, at 269, 287-88; Ellman, supra note 65, at 41-42, 54.
68. Ellman, supra note 65, at 41.
69. Cornell, supra note 64, at 109, 112.
70. Cohen, supra note 60, at 269-70; Cornell, supra note 64, at 107-20. According
to Mark Blaug: "The new economics of the family . . . view the family as a multiperson production unit, maximizing a production function whose inputs are market
goods and the time, skills, and knowledge of different members of the family."
BLAUG, supra note 1, at 220.
71. Cornell, supra note 64, at 107-08, 112, 119. In theory, the economic benefits of
forming such 'groups include "internal controls" on self-interested behavior.
72. The paradigm case is the divorce that occurs shortly after one partner has
completed a degree or received a professional license, an event that corresponds with
another central aspect of the new family economics-the study of "human capital"
formation. See infra notes 279-306 and accompanying text; Cohen, supra note 60, at
287-88; Cornell, supra note 64, at 120-21; see also Ellman, supra note 65, at 40-53
(describing alimony as a device for encouraging marital investment). Professor
Ellman, however, speaks of risks and burdens and the reallocation of financial consequences rather than the problems of opportunistic behavior. Some of these commentators appear to be suggesting a restitutionary remedy for opportunistic behavior.
See, e.g., Cornell, supra note 64, at 106. "Public remedies should readjust the gains
and losses that exist at the point of breakdown." Id. at 123. Ellman, however, rejects the use of unjust enrichment principles, Ellman, supra note 65, at 24-28, as
well as the relational contract model. Id. at 28-32. He argues that both approaches
require reference to established understandings of the terms governing parties' rela-
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2. Human Capital
In contemporary settings, many long-term benefits and risks
of marriage for individuals correlate with its effects on human
capital. Economic theories hold that along with the specialization of labor in households goes a differentiation, increasing over
time, in the "human capital" accumulations of household members. Human capital refers to a variety of factors that increase
or decrease the labor power of individuals. 3 It may be augmented by education, training, experience, and medical care, or
it can deteriorate from such causes as lack of current work experience or an addiction to heavy drinking.7 4 Empirical data suggest that human capital investments have a substantial impact
on earnings." In economic theory, work in the household as
well as the market can become more productive through increases in skills, experience, and good work habits.7 6
Human capital theory has led to new methods for valuing
household production. Starting from the premise that work in
the home is productive, and that it involves training, experience,
and a choice not to pursue work in the market, these methods
focus on the opportunity cost of the homemaker's time (the price
the wage labor market would pay for the time devoted to household services) as an indirect measure of the value of those sertionships and that such shared understandings no longer exist with respect to family. Id. at 24-32.
73. Gary S. Becker, Nobel Lecture: The Economic Way of Looking at Behavior, 101
J. POL. ECON. 385, 392-93 (1993). Becker was also a pioneer in this field, with publication of a book on the subject in 1964. See GARY S. BECKER, HUMAN CAPITAL (2d
ed. 1975).
74. Becker, supra note 73, at 392.
75. See id. at 393-94 (discussing JACOB MINCER, SCHOOLING, EXPERIENCE, AND
EARNINGS (1974) and other studies.)
76. Becker distinguishes "household" from "market" capital. He assumes that there
are increasing returns to scale from investments in either market or household capital and argues that this creates additional economic incentives for a division of labor
in households. BECKER, supra note 2, at 33-37. Traditionally, of course, this meant
that husbands specialized in market capital and wives did not. However, the economic significance of household and market capital are quite different because one
variety is of value beyond the confines of a particular household. In the event of
family breakdown, this difference may leave husband and wife in very different economic positions. See infra notes 269-76 and accompanying text. Some writers question the assumption that there are in fact increasing returns to scale. See infra note
130.
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vices." Using this approach, economists have tied the value of
time spent on household tasks to many different variables, including (1) the composition of the household, (2) the age, education, and wage rates of husband and wife, (3) the number and
ages of children, and even (4) the number of rooms in the
house."8 As the model becomes more sophisticated, some writ-

77. Some argue that even an opportunity cost method may seriously underestimate the actual value to the family of a homemaker's services. See, e.g., POSNER,
supra note 1, at 192-93. Work in the home may be considered less valuable than
work in most occupations in the marketplace, if the assumption is made that a
homemaker would be able to command only minimum wages. Thomas R. Ireland,
Valuing Homemaker Production by Implied Opportunity Cost: Using a Family Human Capital Methodology, J. LEGAL ECON., July 1991, at 1, 4. Although this assumption is not always correct, it is true that accumulations of household capital are
rarely valued highly in the workplace. As many writers have pointed out, however,
the homemaker's next best alternative in the paid-labor market suggests only the
minimum value of family care. In economic terms, the homemaker's time usually
generates greater returns in the household than it could in the marketplace. See
Komesar, supra note 42, at 481-82. This concept is known as "economic rents." Id.
at 482. The rational-choice model implies that, if this time were not more valuable
to the family, the family would choose instead to consume the homemaker's income.
But see Reuben Gronau, The Intrafamily Allocation of Time: The Value of the
Housewives' Time, 63 AM. ECON. REV. 634, 635 (1973). Reuben observes that labor
force statistics lend themselves to two differing interpretations: if those wives who
work outside the home are the least productive in the home sector, then the mean
price of housewives' time is greater than the average wage rate of working women,
but if those who work are those "most fit for market work, i.e. those who have
received the highest wage offers," then the mean price of household time is less
than the average wage rate of working women. Id.; cf infra notes 158-71 and accompanying text (discussing "replacement cost" measures of value applied in tort litigation).
78. See Reuben Gronau, Home Production-A Forgotten Industry, 62 REV. ECON. &
STAT. 408 (1980); see also Charles C. Fisher, Measuring Household Production: Methodological Considerations and Current Practice, J. LEGAL ECON., Mar. 1993, at 15,
20-21 (discussing method as "Family Profile Methodology"). The analysis suggests
that the value of a housewife's time increases not only with her potential wage rate,
but also with the size of the household and total family income. As the husband's
wage rate increases, family income increases, and there is an accompanying "increase in the demand for both wife's leisure and home goods." Gronau, supra note
77, at 639-40. Gronau writes: "[Wihile the value of time of working women equals
their wage rate, the value placed on the time of housewives exceeds their potential
wage rate and increases with family income." Id. at 642; see also BARBARA R.
BERGMANN, THE ECONOMIC EMERGENCE OF WOMEN 30 (1986) ("In households where
the husband . . . has an income that is considerably above average, a high proportion of the wives are still at home. The benefit of additional dollars to such a family
is relatively low. . . . Such families constitute the last bastion of the full-time housewife.").

1008

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:989

ers have added human capital considerations into the measurement of opportunity costs.
Because a homemaker's wage opportunities are limited by the
fact that she has specialized in domestic rather than market
labor, the opportunity costs of homemaking may be defined to
"include[] not only current foregone earnings but also loss of [the
homemaker's] market earning power, through depreciation of
market skills previously acquired, and foregone opportunities to
invest in market skills."' 9 As Posner describes the issue, an accurate measurement of these costs requires "estimating what
her probable market earnings would have been had she entered
the market at the time when instead she became a housewife. ,8 0
Household production and human capital theories have become important to the analysis of damages awards in tort when
a homemaker is killed or injured"1 and to financial remedies
between the parties to a divorce. s2 The theories also help to explain the demographic changes in family life over the last halfcentury. Economists postulate that the dramatic changes in
women's labor force participation, and the accompanying trend
toward greater investments by women in their own market-oriented human capital, have had significant effects on family behavior.8 3 They note that the opportunity cost of working in the

79. Elisabeth M. Landes, Economics of Alimony, 7 J. LEGAL STUD. 35, 41 (1978)
(citing Jacob Mincer & Soloman Polachek, Family Investments in Human Capital:
Earnings of Women, in ECONOMICS OF TIHE FAMILY, supra note 50, at 297). Although
research is sketchy, it shows that the potential for long term career depreciation
(and its costs) when a caregiver leaves the labor force can be substantial. An early
estimate of human capital depreciation for mothers who left the work force to care
for children, using 1967 data, suggested that earnings declined by an average of
1.5% per year of absence from the labor force. The depreciation rates were higher
for those with greater stores of market capital, increasing to 2.3% per year for women with 16 or more years of education. Mincer & Polachek, supra at 397, 415. These
writers attribute at least half of the wage gap between men and women to sex differences in length and continuity of their work histories.
80. POSNER, supra note 1, at 193; see also Fisher, supra note 78, at 19-20 (reviewing alternative methodology developed by Thomas R. Ireland).
81. See infra notes 146-209 and accompanying text.
82. See infra notes 26%-330 and accompanying text.
83. BECKER, supra note 2, at 350-56. There remain, of course, large differences
between the earnings of women and men. Economists explain these differences as
the effect of discrimination against women in the marketplace and the higher level
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home has increased as women's real wages and labor market
opportunities have increased." In economic theory, increases in
the "cost" of household labor translate into an increase in the
labor's value or utility to a family. 5 One result is a shift in
some aspects of housework into the market sector.8 6 Economists

of family responsibilities women continue to bear in the household. Id. at 64. As
Becker writes:
The earnings of women are adversely affected by household responsibilities even when they want to participate in the labor force as many hours
as men, because they become tired, must stay home to tend sick children
or other emergencies, and are less able to work odd hours or take jobs
requiring much travel.
Id. Victor Fuchs traces much of women's economic inequality to their actual or anticipated family obligations. See VICTOR R. FUCHS, WOMEN'S QUEST FOR ECONOMIC
EQUALITY (1988).

84. See BERGMANN, supra note 78, at 17-61; FUCHS, supra note 83, at 23-24.
There is a considerable debate in the literature concerning the causes and relationships of women's increased labor force participation, lower fertility rates, and higher
divorce rates. See, e.g., ANDREW J. CHERLIN, MARRIAGE, DIVORCE, REMARRIAGE 44-65
(1981).
85. The conclusion that caregiving work is more valuable today seems
counterintuitive from the perspective of family law, in which older housewives receive far greater economic recognition for their services than younger caregivers. See
Ann L. Estin, Maintenance, Alimony and the Rehabilitation of Family Care, 71 N.C.
L. REV. 721, 769-74 (1993).
Some economists argue that household labor has in fact become more productive
as the household has become industrialized: many tasks that once were contracted
out have became the responsibility of the housewife. RUTH S. COWAN, MORE WORK
FOR MOTHER: THE IRONIES OF HOUSEHOLD TECHNOLOGY (1983).
The rising opportunity cost of caregiving is also a problem because it means
that fewer families choose (or are able) to "purchase" the full time family care afforded by marriages of an earlier era. See infra notes 96-98 and accompanying text
(regarding the rising cost of parenthood).
86. In families without a full-time homemaker, increasing portions of household
work are routinely contracted out. See BERGMANN, supra note 78, at 282 (discussing
modest-sized growth of small, local business firms that offer housecleaning services);
GALBRAITH, supra note 10, at 58-59, 236 (regarding the transfer of household services to small firms and entrepreneurs).
Although the "expansion" of the service economy appears to be an increase in
economic activity, it may reflect a shift of some activities from the home into the
market. Child care for pay in a day-care center contributes to GNP, whereas the
same hours of child care by a housewife do not. See WARING, supra note 1, at 30-31
("Cooking, according to economists, is 'active labor' when cooked food is sold and
'economically inactive labor' when it is not. Housework is 'productive' when performed by a paid domestic servant and 'nonproductive' when no payment is involved.").
A number of economists have noted the increasing substitution of market goods
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argue that these changes also reduce the gains from gender-roledivided marriage relationships (which may contribute to lower
rates of marriage, increased rates of divorce, and significant
declines in fertility rates)."
Household members may devote significant resources of time,
effort, and money to particular human capital investments. Several patterns of family investment in adult human capital are
well recognized, including the "two person career"" and the

and services for parental time. E.g., Sawhill, supra note 1, at 118 (listing records,
books, television, and daycare as examples); see also BERGMANN, supra note 78, at
283-295 (discussing the movement toward use of out-of-home child care.) Isabel
Sawhill has suggested that this "dehumanization" of family life simply reflects the
economics of time. Sawhill, supra note 1, at 118. Gary Becker also argues along
these lines that, "[miany deplore individualism and lament the passing of the traditional family, but my analysis implies that individualism replaced familialism because many family functions in traditional societies are more effectively handled by
markets and other organizations of modern societies." BECKER, supra note 2, at 349.
"Families are much less closely-knit . . . primarily because market and government
mechanisms have evolved to train and educate young people, and to protect against
the hazards of old age, illness, premature death, prolonged unemployment, and other
economic disasters." Id. at 15.
The substitution of wage income and paid household services for a more traditional homemaker is complex. As Victor Fuchs writes, "no one should imagine that
when a man or woman substitutes a paid job for housework and childcare that the
household's economic well-being increases by the full value of the money income."
FUCHS, supra note 83, at 77. Most women and men who are employed also work in
the home. For many, the resulting "double burden" of responsibility carries a significant cost in terms of leisure. ARLIE HOCHSCHILD, THE SECOND SHIFT: WORKING PARENTS AND THE REVOLUTION AT HOME 3-4 (1989); see FUCHS, supra note 83, at 73-74
(comparing quantity of services of wives who work outside the home with those who
do not). The double burden may not be an economically efficient resolution of this
problem. Becker notes that human capacities are limited not only by time but by
the amount of effort an individual can muster. BECKER, supra note 2, at 64-79; see
also Hadfield, supra note 64, at 97-98.
87. BECKER, supra note 2, at 140. Analysis of fertility rates was one of the primary concerns of the "new home economics" at its inception. See generally ECONOMICS
OF THE FAMILY, supra note 50. Becker describes broad demographic trends toward
lower fertility and offers economic explanations for these changes, pointing out that
"[tihe relative cost of children is significantly affected by changes in the value of the
time of married women." BECKER, supra note 2, at 140. He argues that the increase
in women's earning power over the last century is a major cause of the drop in
fertility in developed countries over the same time period. Id. at 140, 352. Becker
further argues that the effective price of children rises with'household income. Id. at
144-54; see also FUCHS, supra note 83, at 24; Willis, supra note 1, at 74.
88. See generally MARTHA R. FOWLKES, BEHIND EVERY SUCCESSFUL MAN: WIVES
OF MEDICINE AND ACADEME 67-78 (1980).
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graduate school "PhT" marriage. 9 In economic theory, many of
the problems of divorce stem from the fact that a housewife's
human capital is rarely valued outside a particular family. Conversely, market types of human capital improve an individual's
earning potential regardless of whether a marriage continues."0
Virtually all of the activities and expenses of child rearing
represent investments in children's stock of capital;9 1 these parental investments are central to children's future income and
satisfaction as adults.2 Although economic analysis views raising children as the reason for marriage and family,93 it is no
longer so clear that parents consider the costs of raising children
as an economic investment. Posner notes that although children
once constituted an "income producing" investment for families,
the desire to have children is now more plausibly explained by
the pleasure adults receive from their children.94 Posner also
cites an "instinct or desire to preserve the species" or to perpetuate the parents' own characteristics, name, or memory.9 5

89. See Estin, supra note 85, at 757. "PhT" is used to describe "putting hubby
through" school. Id. at 757 n.135. In divorce cases, the "diploma dilemma" involves
one spouse putting the other through school, only to see the marriage end when the
diploma or professional license is achieved. See generally id. at 757-67. The divorce
aspects of human capital issbes are discussed infra notes 265-330 and accompanying
text.
90. See infra notes 279-85 and accompanying text.
91. Becker describes the investment in children's human capital as an investment
in their quality. BECKER, supra note 2, at 151-53. He analyzes the demand for children at some length, taking the view that, in wealthier families, investment in
greater quality substitutes for investment in a greater quantity of children. Id.
Blaug points out that this conclusion derives from Becker's assumption that "the
income elasticity of demand for the quality of children is substantially larger than
that for the quantity of children." BLAUG, supra note 1, at 222. Though plausible,
Blaug argues that this assumption is an example of a methodological problem that
Becker himself refers to elsewhere as "ad hocery." Id. at 23.
92. The quality of children's early family life has been associated with significant
effects on economically vital attributes. See, e.g., Arleen Leibowitz, Home Investments
in Children, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY, supra note 50, at 432. For the problems
of underinvestment in children's human capital, see Lynn A. Stout, Some Thoughts
on Poverty and Failure in the Market for Children's Human Capital, 81 GEO. L.J.
1945 (1993).
93. See supra notes 61-63 and accompanying text.
94. POSNER, supra note 1, at 141-42.
95. Id. at 141. Economists describe children either as "producer durables'--a
source of a stream of future income for their parents--or as "consumer durables'--a
source of a stream of future satisfactions for their parents. Sawhill, supra note 1, at
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The decision to have children has become a question of consumer choice, a question of personal taste. Raising children is
very expensive," and, in our economic system, children have no
productive role. For women in particular, parenthood presents a
variety of personal and financial risks that are increasingly severe.97 Acting rationally, a couple will choose to have children
only if they perceive parenthood as more enjoyable than the
other pleasures their time and money can buy."
Children also greatly complicate the economic analysis of divorce. 9 In a family with young children, divorce dissolves the
organization that was specialized to provide for their care and
replaces it with a much less efficient system. Divorce significant-

117. See generally Theodore W. Schultz, Fertility and Economic Values, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY, supra note 50, at 3 (arguing that the cost of having children
increases as human time becomes more valuable).
96. See infra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
97. As women's wages have increased, the time they devote to rearing children
comes at a greater personal cost, both in terms of participation in the labor force
and other uses of time, including leisure. See generally supra notes 84-87 and accompanying text. Victor Fuchs' work and that of other theorists demonstrate that
women increasingly are choosing not to invest in children. FUCHS, supra note 83, at
96-104; CHERLIN, supra note 84, at 19-21; see also KATHLEEN GERSON, HARD CHOICES: How WOMEN DECIDE ABOUT WORK, CAREER AND MOTHERHOOD 138-57 (1985).

For women who do bear children, the economically prudent course is to avoid
dependence and maintain connections to the workplace by strategies such as limiting
their family size, spending only short periods at home with children, or continuing
to work part-time or on a "mommy track." See Estin, supra note 85, at 785-91.
98. Becker argues that parents determine how many children to bear, and how
much of their time and other resources to invest in their children, and that these
decisions are related. His treatise includes a significant discussion of the demand for
children and the interaction between quantity and quality of children in a family.
BECKER, supra note 2, at 135-54. His theory suggests that as families have fewer
children, however, they invest more in them. Id. at 135-54, 155-78.
Isabel Sawhill makes this point in the context of baking bread rather than buying it. Sawhill, supra note 1, at 117. Victor Fuchs observes the growing attraction of
pets as a cheaper and less demanding substitute for children. He notes that as birth
rates have declined, the rate of pet ownership has increased. FUCHS, supra note 83,
at 101-02.
Of course, in the case of poor families, the investment in children is much more
difficult to make. Economists have also debated the effects on fertility rates of lack
of opportunity and programs such as AFDC. See BECKER, supra note 2, at 139, 152,
356-57.
99. See infra notes 341-72 and accompanying text. In turn, economic analysis suggests that increased rates of divorce influence significantly the decision to have children. See BECKER, supra note 2, at 355.
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ly reduces the resources of time and money available for children.' 0 Although economic theory has been applied to issues of
child support and custody after divorce, 1 what is most revealing about the economic approach is what it suggests about a
transformation of attitudes toward parenthood. Particularly in
the setting of divorce, these attitudes are rooted increasingly in
parental self-interest and separated from more traditional conceptions of love and obligation.
3. Exchange and Altruism
Economic analysis of family behavior redefines family life as a
process of exchange.102 The theory is built with models in
which members of a household interact in the ways that strangers do in the marketplace: contracting around allocations of resources, using stores of wealth and power to make deals to increase each player's utility or personal happiness. In this work,
however, economists have begun to investigate the role of altruism, which is described as a distinctive characteristic of family
economic behavior.0 3 Altruism complicates the models of exchange within the family, but it does not displace the understanding of behavior as ultimately rational and self-interested.
According to Judge Posner, "[t]here is a substitute in marriage

100. See Yoram Weiss & Robert J. Willis, Children as Collective Goods and Divorce
Settlements, 3 J. LABOR ECON. 268, 269 (1985).
101. See infra notes 331-410 and accompanying text.
102. As James Boyd White has pointed out, economic analysis is based on exchange, and, where no actual exchange takes place, the analysis is based on "an
imagined exchange, the one the actor has foregone." James B. White, Economics and
Law: Two Cultures in Tension, 54 TENN. L. REV. 161, 167 (1986).
Milton Regan describes the growing use of "market discourse" about family relationships and identifies ways this discourse has shaped our thinking in family law.
Among the examples he cites are the economic partnership view of marriage and the
view of children as a commodity "produced" by marriage. Milton C. Regan, Jr., Market Discourse and Market Neutrality in Divorce Law, 1994 UTAH L. REV. 605, 629.
Regan elaborates the reasons why we should be wary of adopting market language
"as our official account of family life." Id. at 668-84.
103. Becker traces the distinction between selfishness and altruism to Adam Smith.
See BECKER, supra note 2, at 277-78. In his more recent work, Becker has gone
even further, arguing that economists should look into the role of many other factors, including such motivations for behavior as loyalty, spite, and duty. See Becker,
supra note 73, at 386, 398-400.
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for the control mechanisms within a business firm. Economists
naturally do not call this factor 'love,' but describe it as a form of
altruism." °4 Posner defines altruism as "the condition in which
the welfare of one person is a positive function of the welfare of
another.""°5
The paradigms of exchange and altruism are especially important to questions of how resources are allocated within the family. This literature, which began with Paul Samuelson's "consensus" model,' has seen the appearance of two newer models.
One is based on the premise of an altruistic head of the household with power to make transfers within the family in order to
achieve optimal allocations of various goods.' The other model envisions explicit or implicit bargaining among family members over these questions.'
Professor Becker defines an altruistic person as one whose
utility function depends positively on the well-being of another. ' 9 He demonstrates that in families with an altruistic head,
the preferences of different family members will be maximized." In an altruistically controlled organization, each
person's "happiness or utility or welfare""' will be experienced
by all members of the organization. As Judge Posner argues, it
is a "cheap and efficacious substitute for (formal) contracting.""' Other economists are critical, however, of the uses to

104. POSNER, supra note 1, at 141.
105. Id.
106. See supra note 27 and accompanying text.
107. Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 27, at 991.
108. Id. at 992. In the bargaining model, the family becomes a firm, a device for
organizing and coordinating the production of individual family members. Economic
literature on the "firm" is influential here. See supra note 70 and accompanying text.
109. BECKER, supra note 2, at 278. Becker also notes that "slince an altruist maximizes his own utility (subject to family income constraint), he might be called selfish, not altruistic, in terms of his utility. Perhaps-but note that h also raises w's
utility through his transfers to w." Id. at 279.
110. Id. at 277-306. For criticism of this general approach, see, for example, Paula
England, The Separative Self Androcentric Bias in Neoclassical Assumptions, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 1, at 37, 47-48; Ferber & Nelson, supra note 1, at
5; Hadfield, supra note 64, at 97; Strassman, supra note 17, in BEYOND ECONOMIC
MAN, supra note 1, at 54, 58 (describing and criticizing the "Story of the Benevolent
Patriarch").
111. POSNER, supra note 1, at 141.
112. Id.
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which altruism is put in this analysis. They argue that family
members' interests are often in conflict and present the altruism
hypothesis as a more sophisticated version of the old consensus
model."'
Economic models of family behavior have become part of the
legal framework for understanding marriage and divorce." 4
Increasingly, the paradigms of exchange and altruism have
begun to define parenthood as well. Becker and other economists
assume that parents act altruistically with respect to children.'15 "The utility of parents depends not only on their own
consumption, but also on the utility of each child and the number of children."" 6 Therefore, parents invest in the human capital of their children by spending money, time, and effort on
child care, education, health care, gifts, and bequests."7 At the
same time, economists note that expenditures on children also
reduce the consumption opportunities of parents, and families
(and family members) vary widely in the degree of altruism they
demonstrate."' Increasingly, bargaining models appear in the
analysis of parent-child relationships, with children viewed either as objects of parental bargaining. 9 or participants in a

113. See Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 27, at 992. Becker sees his model as a
significant improvement over Samuelson's formulation of family utility functions.
BECKER, supra note 2, at 296-99.
Another economic perspective on family behavior draws on organizational or
transaction cost theories that view marriage as an institution that structures the
complex, long-term relationship of husband and wife. These models place much
greater emphasis on bargaining between husband and wife over the allocation of
resources during marriage or over the decision to divorce. See Robert A. Pollak, A
Transaction Cost Approach to Families and Households, 23 J. ECON. LIT. 581, 581-83
(1985); see also Hadfield, supra note 64, at 96-98.
114. See generally Regan, supra note 102, at 629-59.
115. E.g., BECKER supra note 2, at 8-9, 156, 277-306, 364. It is assumed that at
least one parent can be counted on to act altruistically. See, e.g., POSNER, supra note
1, at 143-44; Landes, supra note 79, at 36 n.3.
116. BECKER, supra note 2, at 155-56. For Becker's analysis of "Altruism in the
Family," see id. at 277-306.
117. Id. at 163, 364-65. Becker devotes considerable attention to an economic theory
of bequests in family life. See id. at 366-69. On the investment in children's human
capital, see Stout, supra note 92; Willis, supra note 1, at 74-76.
118. See, e.g., BECKER, supra note 2, at 8-9, 277-306 (discussing the "Rotten Kid
Theorem"), 364-66; POSNER, supra note 1, at 149.
119. E.g., Weiss & Willis, supra note 100. Weiss and Willis characterize children as
a "couple-specific public or collective good." Id. at 270; see also Martin Zelder, Ineffi-
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process of exchanges with their parents. 20
C. Limits of Economic Analysis
The new economic theories of family life present a useful
remedy for many of the conceptual ills of older law and economic
analysis. New theories are especially significant in their recognition of the importance of the work that occurs in households.
However, constructing a legal theory of marriage and divorce on
purely economic foundations would be enormously problematic.
Many criticisms of law and economics appear in the
literature, 12' but these issues take on special significance in
the setting of family law problems.
One issue is the very neutrality attempted by economic theorists. As James Boyd White argues, the translation of human
activity into economic terms erases important values and distinctions, such as the difference between selfishness and generosity or the personal characteristics of individuals. 122 To econo-

cient Dissolutions as a Consequence of Public Goods: The Case of No-Fault Divorce,
22 J. LEGAL STUD. 503 (1993).
For an early discussion of the conceptual problem children pose to the new
home economics, see Marc Nerlove, Toward a New Theory of Population and Economic Growth, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY, supra note 50, at 527, 531-33. "When,
for example, are children members of the family, and thus codeterminers of the
utility function, and when are they just arguments in the utility function determined
for the family not including them?" Id. at 531; see also infra notes 376-81 and accompanying text.
120. E.g., Gary S. Becker & Kevin M. Murphy, The Family and the State, 31 J.L.
& ECON. 1, 1 (1988) ([A] surprising number of state interventions [in families] mimic the agreements that would occur if children were capable of arranging for their
care.").
Becker and others suggest that parents may "underinvest" in their children's
education and care in order to save resources for their own support in old age. They
argue that children and parents would both be better off if they could make binding
agreements exchanging investment in children for old age support. Becker, supra
note 73, at 399; Becker & Murphy, supra at 8-12. Since such contracts are not feasible, some of the same efficiencies are achieved by different means such as laws
requiring certain levels of parental support for children. Id. at 1-3.
121. See, e.g., C. Edwin Baker, The Ideology of the Economic Analysis of Law, 5
PHIL. & PUB. AFF. 1 (1975); Frank I. Michelman, Norms and Normativity in the
Economic Theory of Law, 62 MINN. L. REV. 1015 (1978); Robin West, Authority, Autonomy and Choice: The Role of Consent in the Moral and Political Visions of Franz
Kofka and Richard Posner, 99 HARV. L. REV. 384 (1985); White, supra note 102.
122. White, supra note 102, at 174.
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mists, even those interested in family life, these matters lie
entirely outside their analysis, which is not concerned with the
various "tastes" or "preferences" of individual economic actors.
The new home economics follows this tradition, examining only
certain economic implications of the choice of whether to work in
the home or the market, to raise children or pets, or the preferences for either fidelity or variety in sexual partners. Although
these "preferences" may be exogenous in economic theory, they
remain very significant in the social and legal regulation of
families. A legal theory that ignored these questions would be
seriously deficient.123
The problems that this limitation creates are most dramatic
when it comes to parent-child relationships. Despite the fact
that these analysts describe child rearing as the purpose of marriage, economic theories of the family cannot-and do not try
to-explain why some couples choose to have children and some
2 4 Some economists have made this criticism. Zvi
do not."
Griliches observes that the economic analysis of fertility begins
with three premises: "[Clhildren are goods, that all goods are
subject to two constraints-time and money-and that children
are relatively time-intensive goods."'25 Griliches points out that
this analysis does not distinguish children from hi-fi sets, and he
goes on to argue that:
[I]f we want to study the demand for children, we have to put
more content into the theory and start asking why do people
want to have children; what are the returns and not just the
costs of this activity?... If we are studying the demand for
children rather than for hi-fi sets, we have to ask ourselves

123. To an extent, ignoring the effect of these preferences is what the no-fault re-

forms are believed to have attempted, and this aspect remains somewhat controversial, even among the economically inclined. See, e.g., Carl E. Schneider, Moral Discourse and the Transformation of American Family Law, 83 MICH. L. REV. 1803
(1985); Elizabeth S. Scott, Rational Decision Making About Marriage and Divorce, 76
VA. L. REV. 9, 91 (1990); Judith T. Younger, Light Thoughts and Night Thoughts on
the American Family, 76 MINN. L. REV. 891, 900-11 (1992).
124. E.g., BECKER, supra note 2, at 8 ("Economists almost never discuss why consumers like bananas or other goods, but it is not hard to understand why parents
are altruistic toward children.").
125. Zvi Griliches, Comment, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY, supra note 50, at 54647.
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what it is about children that distinguishes them from other
time-intensive durable goods.'26
For family law, it is essential to be able to distinguish children
from stereo equipment.
A second problem concerns the particulars of the economic
models being offered. Legal theorists need to question both the
positive and normative aspects of these models.127 Are efficiency principles a useful normative base for family regulation?1 28
Are exchange norms adequate to represent the full range of
values at stake? Can these models be extended to nonmonetary
goals of families? How broadly can we assume that people live in
the family types which these models describe?
Theories premised on unelaborated assumptions about family
composition, opportunities, and values may be seriously deficient
when applied to different types of families. Economic theory has
been preoccupied with a single type of household, marked by a
traditional, gender-based division of roles.129 We can question

126. Id.
127. Many economists have also begun debating these points. See, e.g., Nelson, supra note 44, at 23. See generally BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 1 (discussing
the failure of historical economic theories to consider feminist perspectives).

128. E.g., Margaret F. Brinig, Comment on Jana Singer's Alimony and Efficiency,
82 GEO. L.J. 2461 (1994); Hadfield, supra note 64; Carl E. Schneider, Rethinking

Alimony: Marital Decisions and Moral Discourse, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 197, 217-27;
Jana Singer, Alimony and Efficiency: The Gendered Costs and Benefits of the Economic Justification for Alimony, 82 GEO. L.J. 2423 (1994).

129. There is substantial irony in the fact that the economic analysis of the family
tends to assume a "traditional" nuclear family. New home economics has developed
during the same period that has seen the traditional family largely consigned to the
dustbin of history. Deep tension and concern surround these developments. This concern is apparent in the popular debate over whether 'the family" is disappearing
and the recent academic interest in diverse family forms. This interest has influenced the legal literature, in which the problems involved in defining what 'the
family" is, have gained new attention. See Martha Minow, Redefining Families:
Who's In and Who's Out?, 62 U. COLO. L. REV. 269, 272-76 (1991); Note, Looking for
a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Functional Approach to the Legal Definition
of the Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1642-48 (1991). Compare MARY JO BANE,
HERE TO STAY (1976) (arguing that although the traditional family structure has

undergone change, the American family remains strong and a vital part of society)
with CHRISTOPHER LASCH, HAVEN IN A HEARTLESS WORLD: THE FAMILY BESIEGED
(1977) (writing that the status and significance of the family has been in demise

since the late 19th century).
Because the theory assumes a particular model of family life, it may be more
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how accurately this model describes the reality of family circumstances. 30 Moreover, while it may work well in theory, this
model may not work as well for devising a generalized system of
legal rules.
One illustration of this narrow vision is the choice of research
problems. The new family economics has paid serious attention
to the problems of divorce in a certain type of household, while
ignoring a wide range of economic issues of desperate importance for many other types of families. For example, one of the
premises of the analysis of specialization and division of labor is
that the parties in fact have opportunities for paid work. In view
of the extremely limited employment opportunity for men in
some sectors of our society, this suggests an issue of enormous
importance to poor and minority families.' 3' It has been, however, all but invisible in the economic theory of family life.
Another limitation of economic theory as a model for law results from its emphasis on individual behavior and rational
choice. Rational choice theory largely ignores the social construction of "the family" and of individual choices.' 32 The analysis
does not address issues of gender and issues of power. Family
law doctrines have often served protective functions for women

readily applicable in particular divorce or tort actions and broadly applicable to rules
for tax, social security, family leave, adoption, or divorce.
130. For example, Margaret Brinig points out that the household production model
assumes unrealistically that there are increasing returns to scale from both market
and home production. Margaret F. Brinig, The Law and Economics of No-Fault Divorce, 26 FAMI.L.Q. 453, 456-57 (1993) (reviewing ALLEN M. PARKMAN, No-FAULT
DIVORCE (1992)). Gillian Hadfield notes empirical evidence that women continue to
be responsible for household work even when their market income exceeds that of
men and argues that this suggests a problem of inefficiency within households.
Hadfield, supra note 64, at 97-98.
131. See, e.g., RUTH SIDEL, WOMEN AND CHILDREN LAST: THE PLIGHT OF POOR
WOMEN IN AFFLUENT AMERICA 106-14 (1992) (discussing correlation between lack of
economic opportunities for men and lack of male commitment to and steady participation in family life); see Helen E. Longino, Economics for Whom?, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN, supra note 1, at 162 ("One might ask, for example, how the new home
economics would treat the economic behavior of women and men who, like members
of many inner-city African-American families, confront situations in which the usual
gender asymmetry of job opportunities is reversed.").
132. But see Becker, supra note 73, at 399 (describing new work which 'carries the
economic approach to the family onto unchartered ground related to the rational
formulation of preferences within families").
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and children, both within and outside of marriage, 1 3 in large
part because men have tended to have more choices and greater
allocations of power and resources than their female part' Economic theories of the household have not yet incorners. 34
porated these concerns.' 35
Legal theorists must recognize that the divide between family
and market still runs deep. The new household economics has
had limited effect, even in those areas of family policy and law
that raise the most directly economic issues. There has been no
move toward broad reforms of tax and social insurance laws to
recognize the value of household labor. Opportunity cost measures of the value of household services are controversial, as are
rules that would treat earnings during marriage as shared resources, or human capital changes as compensable at divorce.
Even when homemaking and child-rearing work are transferred
to paid domestic employees, popular opinion and practice keeps
' Moreover,
this work outside the mainstream of economic life. 36
133. The rules surrounding common law marriage and the "putative spouse" traditionally have been available to protect women who rely on quasimarital relationships. In some cases, whether or not these doctrines are made available, the
gendered nature of the power differential in the household is apparent. See, e.g.,
Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207-08 (Ill. 1979); see infra note 236.
134. See generally Joan Williams, Gender Wars: Selfless Women in the Republic of
Choice, 66 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1559, 1596-1605 (1991) (concluding that society forces
mothers to be selfless while permitting others to have self-interest).
135. Cf. Lundberg & Pollak, supra note 27 (investigating marital bargaining and issues of intrafamily distribution). See generally Rebecca M. Blank, What Should
Mainstream Economics Learn from Feminist Theory?, in BEYOND ECONOMIC MAN,
supra note 1, at 133-43 (discussing the incorporation of feminist theory into modern
examinations of economic behavior). Issues of gender are so pervasive in the social,
economic and legal organization of family life that any theory that ignores such
questions is probably fatally incomplete. For a number of points at which these issues raise serious problems for economic analysis, see supra notes 16, 17, 37, 54-57,
127-31 and infra notes 182, 213-14, 234, 257-59, 345 and accompanying text.
136. Many home employers routinely ignore the commands of immigration, tax, and
other laws that regulate other types of labor markets. One common explanation is
that compliance would increase the cost of such services beyond what families can
afford to pay, clearly reflecting a view that work in the home is simply worth less
than the minimum prices paid for other kinds of work. These issues drew sudden
and enormous public attention in the wake of President Clinton's nomination of Zoe
Baird to be Attorney General. See, e.g., David Johnston, Clinton's Choice for Justice
Dept. Hired Illegal Aliens for Household, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 14, 1993, at Al. For an
example of the treatment of these issues before the Baird flap, see Lucinda Harper,
The Yuppie Secret: Many Flout the Law on Reporting Taxes for Domestic Help, WALL
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the controversy surrounding the inclusion of household production in the nation's GNP suggests that many dissenters continue
to challenge the view that household work is economically significant." '
In a previous article, I argued that maintenance law reflects a
struggle to understand marriage in both economic and moral
terms. 8 I suggested that the difficulty was greatest "in those
areas of family life defined by tangles of love and obligation:
raising children, preparing family meals, working to be a 'good
provider'-keeping groceries on the table and a roof
overhead."3 9 These difficulties are expressed in the hesitation
of some courts to allow compensation for one spouse's disproportionate contributions to a marriage. " In law and economics,
there is an opposite tendency to conceive relationships in solely
economic terms and ignore the dangers of subjecting all aspects
of family life to market discourse."
A vision based on exchange and altruism is not sufficient to
discern the full spectrum of behavior within families. Altruism,
defined as the interdependence of utility functions, is actually a
type of self-interest.'
Economic theory fails to recognize both
love, which does not assume self-interest, and obligation, which
exists despite self-interest.'
It also ignores the wide range of

ST. J., Apr. 15, 1992, at Al. The most common policy argument in response to this
episode was that the laws should not include household workers. See, e.g., David
Lerner, Families Simply Are Not Businesses, So Repeal the Law on Domestic Help,
ATLANTA CONST., Feb. 10, 1993, at A. Congress has moved in this direction. See
House Panel Votes to Alter Taxes on Domestic Workers, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 30, 1993, at
14A.
137. See supra notes 15-18 and accompanying text.
138. Estin, supra note 85, at 721.
139. Id. at 767.
140. Id. at 764-67.
141. See CAROLE PATEMAN, THE SEXUAL CONTRACT (1988); Margaret J. Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARV. L. REV. 1849, 1851 (1987); Regan, supra note 102.
142. See supra note 109 and accompanying text.
143. There is a growing body of literature in political theory exploring self-interest
and altruism and the tensions that connect them. See generally Jon Elster, Selfishness and Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST 44 (Jane J. Mansbridge, ed. 1990);
Christopher Jencks, Varieties of Altruism, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra at 53;
Jane J. Mansbridge, The Rise and Fall of Self-Interest in the Explanation of Political
Life, in BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra, at 3.
These writers distinguish between love and obligation as two distinct forms of
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less admirable motivations in family behavior such as spite,
rage, and guilt.'4 4
The most difficult family law problems prove that altruism is
undependable and that self-interest does not always further
family and social needs. Custody disputes, marital violence,
child support payments, and divorce reflect failures of altruism.
The concept of altruism as defined by economic theory has not
been useful in understanding these failures. Rather, it serves as
a rationalization for the older economic notions that viewed the
family uncritically as a single unit.4 5 Perhaps more than anything, what legal theory requires is a set of principles to employ
when the power of self-interest overtakes the commitments of
family life.
II. ECONOMICS IN THE LAW OF FAMILY LIFE
In order to illustrate both the potential and the limitations of
economic theory for the law, this Part of the Article examines
four substantive areas in which legal theory and practice overlap
with concerns of the new family economics. These areas include
several old problems in applying tort and contract law to fami-

altruism. Love refers to the situation in which people make another's good their
own, and duty implies that an individual is committed to a principle or course of
action. See Jane J. Mansbridge, On the Relation of Altruism and Self Interest, in
BEYOND SELF-INTEREST, supra, at 133 [hereinafter Mansbridge, Altruism].
Mansbridge writes that "[tlhese two distinct motivations, which I together call the
'unselfish' or 'altruistic' motivations . . . , have been variously labeled 'sympathy' and
'commitment' (Sen), 'love' and 'duty' (Elster), 'empathy' and 'morality' (Jencks), 'wefeeling' and 'conscience' (Dawes, van de Kragt, and Orbell), or 'affection' and
'principle' (Hume)." Id. at 135.
Acts motivated by love or obligation need not be reciprocated, but neither can
they be taken for granted. Self-interest can at times reinforce altruistic behavior, but
it also has the potential to undermine it. See infra notes 373-402 and accompanying
text.
144. In his more recent work, Professor Becker describes a version of this problem,
arguing that economists have not paid sufficient attention to factors such as anger,
loyalty, spite, guilt, obligation, and masochism. Becker, supra note 73, at 386, 398400.
145. See supra notes 25-39, 106-13 and accompanying text. This premise has generated serious criticism from feminist economists. With the assumption of a benevolent head of the household and interdependent utility functions, inequalities of power
and financial resources and the conflicting interests of family members, are rendered
insignificant or at least invisible to the analysis.
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lies, as well as more recent questions concerning property division and child support in divorce that have generated enormous
policy debate in family law. In each of the four areas discussed
below, the insights and methodologies developed in economics
offer substantial benefits for legal analysis. In each area, however, there are also important aspects of these problems that economics does not reach. In general, household production and
human capital theories can be usefully employed against the
tradition which denies the productive value of work in the home.
Economic theory is much less helpful in addressing the set of
problems that arise from ongoing redefinitions of marriage and
family life.
A. Tort Claims
Tort law offers opportunities for direct legal application of
household production and human capital theories. In cases involving the injury or death of a full- or part-time homemaker,
the conventional techniques for computing damages based on
lost earnings are not useful. Although liability may be clear, and
despite the fact that the victim's role as wife and mother is venerated in the case law,146 a homemaker's life is routinely valued at a much lower figure than that of a comparable person
working for wages instead of within the family.
Empirical data and anecdotal evidence suggest that jury
awards for wrongful death of a homemaker are considerably
lower than awards for wage earners. One recent report, describing results in Southern California, noted that settlements and
verdicts in housewife cases tend to reach a ceiling at around
$450,000, whereas awards more typically ran in the millions of
dollars for those with regular outside earnings.'4 7 The case law
reflects a similar pattern, " and nationwide samples of jury

146. See infra notes 208-09 and accompanying text.
147. Gail D. Cox, Juries Place Less Value on Homemakers, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 14,
1992, at 1, 38. But see High Settlement for Housewife, CHI. DAILY L. BULL., May 4,
1992, at 14 (reporting $5 million settlement in suit over wrongful death of unemployed 44-year-old housewife and noting that, in Cook County, "verdicts and settlements for women employed in the home took a substantial jump a few years ago,
but have leveled off in recent years").
148. Even jury verdicts that appear to have valued the homemaking and wage-
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verdicts also suggest that wrongful death awards generally are
lower for women than for men of comparable age and family
status. 149
In effect, these awards represent a judgment that women are
worth less than men because women's work in the home does
not carry the same financial rewards as work in the marketplace. There are two significant components of this judgment:
the legal framework for tort recoveries and the valuation practices used by experts testifying in the courtroom. New economic
theories suggest different methods for valuation of household
services with the potential to increase recoveries in these cases.

earning functions comparably result in higher figures for wage earners. See Schmitt
v. Jenkins Truck Line, Inc., 170 N.W.2d 632, 639, 663-64 (Iowa 1969). In Schmitt,
the deceased's estate sought damages on behalf of six children for the wrongful
death of their mother and father. Id. at 639. Damages for the father's death, based
on lost earnings, were set at $302,577.94. Id. Damages for the mother's death, based
on lost future earning capacity and value of services lost by children, were set at
$264,162.74. Id.
149. A handbook prepared by Jury Verdict Research, Inc., (JVR) based upon actual
verdicts, states "base values" for wrongful death actions and a formula for "economic
adjustment" to reflect a decedent's annual income at the time of death, with separate figures given for men and women. 4 JVR, PERSONAL INJURY VALUATION HANDBOOKS § 4.10.0, at 3 (1993) (men); id. § 4.20.0, at 3 (women). Awards for women are
very strongly influenced by age. Id. Awards for men are very strongly influenced by
both age and earning level. Id. The verdicts reported had higher midpoints for men
than for women in every age category. Id. at 8-9 (men); id. at 7-8 (women). In lower
age groups, single women, and married women with children, start at significantly
higher "base values." Id. at 1. When the required adjustment for earnings is made,
the male values increase by as much as 111% for those with high earnings and decrease by as much as 72% for those with relatively lower earnings. Id. Accordingly,
a young man earning $42,000 per year would likely be valued by a jury at twice
the base amount, and a young man earning minimum wage would likely be valued
at half the base amount. The adjustment for earnings for women is only positive,
but it increases base awards only by up to 76%. Id. These figures suggest that in
lower-income families, women have greater value to a jury than do men.
Using the formulas, if a single man and single woman, without children and
age 28, each earned $10,000 a year, the man's life would be valued at $175,200 and
the woman's at $676,910. Id. at 1-3. If married, the same individuals would be valued at $365,000 and $825,500, respectively. Id.
With higher earnings, however, the husband's relative value increases. If each
earned $30,000, the husband's value would increase to $735,000 and the wife's to
$1,144,000. If the husband earned $60,000 and the wife earned nothing, the figures
become $1,055,000 for him and $650,000 for her. Id.
With children added to the equation, the patterns remain the same, although
the base figures increase for men and for women. See id.
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Economic theories are less useful, however, to the larger questions posed by the set of legal entitlements that define and limit
rights of recovery.
The different forms that entitlements might take are illustrated by the two distinct types of tort actions that require valuation
of a homemaker. One is a spouse's claim for loss of consortium,
and the other is the claim for "pecuniary damages" in a homemaker death case. At common law, a husband's claim for loss of
consortium included recovery for the loss of his wife's services,
as well as her society, companionship, and affection.15 In the
context of wrongful death actions, however, state statutes provide a narrower basis for recovery.15 ' These statutes typically

150. See CLARK, supra note 37, at 382 (discussing fact that the husband's common
law recovery for his wife's injuries parallels the master's recovery for loss of his
servants services); see also Evans Holbrook, The Change in the Meaning of Consortium, 22 MICH. L. REV. 1 (1923) (noting that under common law, the husband has
an interest in the wife's custody, affection, and services); Jacob Lippman, The Breakdown of Consortium, 30 COLUM. L. REV. 651 (1930) (writing that the common law
considered women to be "servants" to their husbands, thus entitling the husband to
recover for loss of her services in addition to loss of consortium); Susan G.
Ridgeway, Loss of Consortium and Loss of Services Actions: A Legacy of Separate
Spheres, 50 MONT. L. REV. 349 (1989) (writing that, historically, loss of consortium
was available only to the husband).
The loss of a wife's household services is sometimes characterized as a "material" or "tangible" loss. Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 814 (D.C. Cir.), cert.
denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950). The other aspects of consortium, such as love, affection,
and sexual relations were distinguished as "sentimental" or "intangible." Id.; see
Ridgeway, supra at 350, 359-60 (discussing Hitaffer). As described by Homer H.
Clark, Jr., the action for loss of consortium "included but was by no means limited
to the value of the wife's services." CLARK, supra note 37, at 390; see also Lippman,
supra, at 667 (writing that the wife's services go beyond material services and labor
to include the companionship of domestic life). By contrast, under the common law a
wife had no claim for either aspect of consortium in the wake of an injury negligently inflicted upon her husband. Ridgeway, supra at 356-57. Her only protectible
interest was conceptualized narrowly, based on the right to her husband's financial
support, and this interest was part of his direct claim for lost earnings. CLARK,
supra note 37, at 391; Ridgeway, supra at 356-59.
Since the Hitaffer holding in 1950, the law has moved toward recognition of a
wife's right of action for loss of consortium, but the cases demonstrate some judicial
difficulty reconceptualizing consortium in a gender-neutral manner. See generally
CLARK, supra note 37, at 391-92; WILLIAM L. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS 895 (4th ed. 1971); Ridgeway, supra at 359-60.
151. For a survey of wrongful death statutes, see DAN B. DOBBS, HANDBOOK ON
THE LAW OF REMEDIES 552-56 (1973). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §
925 (1979) (noting that most state statutes measure damages by determining the
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limit the damages to "pecuniary losses," generally measured by
the decedent's lost earnings over her life expectancy,"' and exclude recovery for any of the relational interests that may be
compensated in a consortium action. 113 The data for economic
loss computations offered at trial typically are obtained from the
actual work history of the injured party or from statistical evidence of wages in general."' For a worker who has not received salary or wages, the process is much more complex.
1. Valuation
Because a housewife's contribution to the household was not a
monetary one, wrongful death cases involving wives and mothers historically have posed a conceptual difficulty. Over time,
courts began to define the loss of unremunerated household
services as a "pecuniary" loss if those services, "when obtained
by others, must be for financial compensation."' 55 This approach created a distinction between a housewife's "services" and
other aspects of the marital relationship such as society and
affection.' 56 Along with this distinction came a shift toward use

present value of the victim's future services).
152. DOBBS, supra note 151, at 556-67; PROSSER, supra note 150, at 905-07; see
also Komesar, supra note 42, at 468-77, (outlining the different effects of these varieties of statutes on claims for damages for nonmarket time). Where the suit is on
behalf of beneficiaries, such as the spouse or children of the deceased, such recoveries often are characterized as payment for lost support or inheritance. Id. at 463-72.
153. DOBBS, supra note 151, at 557-62; PROSSER, supra note 150, at 907. These
laws also do not allow recovery for time spent in most nonwork activities. See
Komesar, supra note 42, at 474-75 (arguing against these limits and suggesting that
the law of personal injury damages should not conceive of "full-time" as limited to
"the eight-hour segment of a 24-hour day for which the person would have received
wages").
154. See, e.g., WILLIAM G. BAKER & MICHAEL K. SECK, DETERMINING ECONOMIC
Loss IN INJURY AND DEATH CASES 130-45 (1987).
155. Michigan Cent. Ry. v. Vreeland, 227 U.S. 59, 73 (1913), quoted in First Wisconsin Trust Co. v. Schmidt, 180 N.W. 832, 834 (Wis. 1921); see also Stejeskal v.
Darrow, 215 N.W. 83, 84-85 (N.D. 1927) (stating that damages may be measured by
the reasonably expected pecuniary value of the victim's lost services).
156. In some jurisdictions, consortium losses are compensable in wrongful death
actions, and, in these cases, there are separate awards for "services" and "consortium." E.g., Lithgow v. Hamilton, 69 So. 2d 776, 779 (Fla. 1954).
Ridgeway argues that courts viewed a wife's society and affection as having
"material" value to the husband, but a husband's society and affection as of only
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of evidence intended to establish the pecuniary value of household services."'
In early cases, the value of a caregiver was determined by the
cost of hiring one or more workers to replace the housewife: a
governess, a cook, a housekeeper.'5 8 The plaintiffs testimony
would include a description of the quantity of housecleaning,
child care, meal preparation, and so on required to replace the
caregiver.'5 9 In addition, the evidence might include testimony
from employment agency personnel or home economists as to the
market cost of such services, or evidence of the actual expenditures the family made for a replacement.'60

sentimental value to a wife. Ridgeway, supra note 150, at 359. Over time, a similar
distinction has emerged between the more quantifiable components of consortium,
which are more readily compensated, and the intangible or sentimental aspects of
the marital relationship, which are not. Lippman, supra note 150, at 666-67;
Ridgeway, supra note 150, at 359 (citing Hitaffer v. Argonne Co., 183 F.2d 811, 81314 (D.C. Cir), cert. denied, 340 U.S. 852 (1950)).
157. As a result, where once the courts upheld jury verdicts without evidence attaching a specific value to the marital relationship, there has been a movement toward use of expert evidence and various statistical methods for this purpose. See
generally BAKER & SECK, supra note 154. Earlier approaches did not rely on the
evidence of experts. See, e.g., Bridenstine v. Iowa City Elec. R. Co., 165 N.W. 435,
439 (Iowa 1917) (noting that "it would seem almost frivolous to call witnesses to
estimate their monetary value"). In addition to the claim for lost services in the
home, some death cases involving housewives have approved recoveries for lost earning capacity, even where there was no evidence the homemaker had intended to
work for wages. E.g., Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc. v. Mills, 378 F.2d 705 (5th Cir.
1967); Florida Greyhound Lines v. Jones, 60 So. 2d 396, 397-98 (Fla. 1952); Schmitt
v. Jenkins Truck Lines, Inc., 170 N.W.2d 632, 655 (Iowa 1969). Where a spouse has
provided both earnings and services to a household, both may be compensated. E.g.,
Fabrizi v. Griffin, 162 F. Supp. 276, 278 (W.D. Pa.), affd, 261 F.2d 594 (3d Cir.
1958); Lujan v. Gonzales, 501 P.2d 673, 685 (N.M. 1972); Merced v. City of New
York, 534 N.Y.S.2d 60, 63 (Sup. Ct. 1987), affd, 530 N.Y.S.2d 423 (App. Div. 1988),
reu'd on other grounds, 552 N.Y.S.2d 96 (N.Y. 1990); Spangler v. Helm's New YorkPittsburgh Motor Express, 153 A.2d 490, 493 (Pa. 1959).
158. E.g., Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557 (S.D. Fla. 1961) (award based
on $8500 per year cost for a housekeeper of 18 years). See generally Michael J.
Daniels & Elise R. Arno, Valuing the Services of the Homemaker in Personal Injury
and Wrongful Death Cases, 15 TRIAL DIPL. J. 285, 285-87 (1992); Fisher, supra note
78, at 17-18; Robert P. Wolf, Assessing the Value of Household Services, 22 TRIAL 81,
81-83 (1986); Comment, Tort Damages for the Injured Homemaker, 50 U. COLO. L.
REV. 59, 59 (1978).
159. See, e.g., Legare, 195 F. Supp. at 560-61; Lithgow, 69 So. 2d at 779-80;
Stejeskal, 215 N.W. at 84-85.
160. E.g., Legare, 195 F. Supp. at 560-61; Lithgow, 69 So. 2d at 779-80; Stejeskal,
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A variation of this replacement cost measure involved breaking down the housewife's job description into a variety of categories and determining the number of hours she spent on each
type of work. After determining these figures, labor market data
supplied wage rates applicable to each service, a cost was computed for each function, and the various figures were totalled to
reach a composite value. Typically, plaintiffs counsel offered
testimony by an expert forensic economist on this point.16 '
In these cases, experts often attempted to individualize the
computation with respect to the structure of a particular household or the services of the particular housewife. Thus, the opinions are replete with references to whether the family usually
hired babysitters or brought their children along to social
functions and whether the wife sewed clothing for family members and canned produce from her garden.'62 The methods described in the current literature are often far less individualized,
based on statistics concerning the average value of services contributed to a household by husbands and wives.'6 3

215 N.W. at 84-85. Other labels for this are "equivalent homemaker methodology"
and "general replacement cost." Fisher, supra note 78, at 17; see also Janet Yale,
The Valuation of Household Services in Wrongful Death Actions, 34 U. TORONTO L.J.
283, 297-300 (1984) (applying the "substitute parent" method to measure the replacement cost of a deceased parent). This method requires a consideration not only of
salary, but fringe benefits, including workers' compensation and unemployment insurance that would not be provided for a housewife. Id.
161. E.g., Har-Pen Truck Lines, Inc., 378 F.2d at 710-12; Merrill v. United Air
Lines, 177 F. Supp. 704, 705 (S.D.N.Y. 1959). Other names for this method are the
"sum-of-the-services" methodology and "specific services replacement cost." Fisher,
supra note 78, at 17; see also Yale, supra note 160, at 293 ("itemized services"
method). Courts have permitted a variety of types of experts to testify. See generally
Patricia J. Lamkin, Annotation, Admissibility and Sufficiency of Proof of Value of
Housewife's Services in Wrongful Death Action, 77 A.L.R.3d 1175 (1977) (writing that,
although some have argued that experts interfere with the fact finder's role in a
personal injury case, testimony from economic and other experts is generally found
to be admissible).
162. E.g., Legare, 195 F. Supp. at 560; Lithgow, 69 So. 2d at 778-79; Spangler, 153
A.2d at 491-92.
163. BAKER & SECK, supra note 154, at 191-208. The data these writers rely on
come from two sources. The first, described as the "Sylvia Porter Study," estimates
that a housewife spends 99.6 hours per week in domestic work and attributes to
those hours an annual value of $18,862.48 (in 1979 dollars). Id. at 191-92. The other, called the "Gauger-Walker Study," computes the dollar value of household work
in families of different compositions, based on the time actually spent on household
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Replacement cost measures raise characteristic problems,
however. The social context of family and market render comparisons of work inside the home with outside work difficult.
Work in the home is structured and understood differently:
hiring an employee who will perform the services of a housewife
and mother under the same working conditions generally is
impossible." Comparisons to different categories of market
occupations are also difficult. Are a parent's hours spent in preparing family meals equal in value to the time of a head chef or
more comparable to a minimum wage prep assistant? Moreover,
how should the computation evaluate different tasks performed
simultaneously, such as watching children and weeding the
garden or preparing a meal and starting loads of laundry?16 5
What about the "job" of coordinating the many different tasks

work by 1378 families surveyed in 1967-68. Id. at 192-94. According to this study,
the annual value of household services provided by unemployed wives ranged from
$7000 to $15,200 (in 1979 dollars). Id. at 193.
Computations using these aggregate statistical data are not very persuasive. A
single average figure for the work hours of all housewives in the nation and the
value of that work will almost always be wide of the mark in any individual case.
Even those statistics that recognize different household types are too broad to be
meaningful. For example, one approach defines a single category of "employed wife"
households, in which the "employed wife" may be anything from a part-time sales
clerk to a professional working 60-hour weeks. In addition, the use of data 25 years
out-of-date to establish the numbers of hours husbands and wives devote to household tasks suggests a substantial issue that is apparently not addressed. In their
handbook, Baker and Seck indicate a methodology for adjusting the dollar values of
these services to reflect inflation, but retain time use data based on 1968 research.
Id. at 199.
Some of these data attempt to identify statistically similar families, based on
variables such as the number of children, the age of the youngest child, and whether the wife is employed. See id. at 192-94. In general, more and younger children
increase the value of a wife's household services, and employment outside the home
decreases it somewhat. Id.
164. The "substitute mother" will need to be paid fringe benefits, including vacation
and sick leave, and will generate additional costs for social security, workers' compensation, and unemployment insurance. She may not be able or willing to perform
several functions simultaneously, such as housecleaning and child care. Moreover, as
many old cases have noted, the services will not be performed with the "tender
solicitude" that ideally characterizes family relationships. See Ireland, supra note 77,
at 304. See generally Fisher, supra note 78, at 23-25 (discussing literature concerning problems with replacement cost).
165. Identifying the time spent on individual tasks is complicated due to "joint production of various household services." Yale, supra note 160, at 294; see id. at 29899.
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and functions of the household? 6 '
Evidence of the actual practices of forensic economists confirms that their practice, even when testifying on behalf of plaintiffs, is to estimate the value of household services conservatively.'67 In applying these methods, experts tend toward comparisons that constitute the work of a "housewife" as a job category
at the low end of the occupational scale. 6 ' The result of these
methodological judgments is to keep expert valuations of
housewives relatively low. As Neil Komesar has argued, although replacement cost measures could in theory provide an
accurate measure of these losses,'69 "in practice, the valuation
is limited to a few basic domestic services that have easily identifiable market substitutes." 7 ' Komesar concludes that "while
such a system is superior to no evaluation, it is likely to underestimate seriously many losses." 7 '
New family economic theories suggest an alternative method,
in which a homemaker's work is valued based on the opportunity cost of her time. 7 ' At a more theoretical level, economists

166. See Fisher, supra note 78, at 23-25; Ireland, supra note 77, at 4.
167. Fisher, supra note 78, at 25-28. The economists also indicated that they utilize
very simple valuation techniques in order to be cost-effective and more readily understood by a jury.
168. Typically, experts utilize minimum-wage pay rates, on the theory that job categories in the low range of skill and pay best reflect the value of household work.
E.g., Wolf, supra note 158, at 82. "Overestimation can be minimized if competitive
job categories in the low range of skill and pay-e.g. kitchen helper and laundry
worker-are used." Id. Some experts view it as impossible to perform two occupations at the same time, pronouncing that an analysis that gives credit for tasks performed simultaneously is a source of error. See Fisher, supra note 78, at 23-24. But
see WARING, supra note 1, at 281-82 (discussing problems in the use of this replacement measure, including the choice of categories of workers with wages among the
lowest of all those in the market, and the fact that many household tasks are done
simultaneously).
169. The measure would be accurate "to the extent that (1) all services were enumerated, (2) each was adjusted for the quality of performance, and (3) a substitute
market service could be identified." Komesar, supra note 42, at 480. Professor
Komesar continues: "In fact, each of these conditions for accuracy presents substantial problems, especially the last two." Id.
170. Id.
171. Id.
172. See supra notes 77-80 and accompanying text. Opportunity costs are discussed
in Reuben Gronau, The Effect of Children on the Housewife's Value of Time, in ECONOMICS OF THE FAMILY, supra note 50, at 457 (discussing the shadow price of time
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view this method as obviously correct,'73 but forensic economic
literature disputes the methodology,'7 4 and it apparently is not
used widely in the courtroom.'75
The reasons that experts do not use opportunity cost analysis
more widely are both methodological and strategic. Depending
on the wage figures used, such methods may produce a lower
value for the housewife's time than the replacement measures.'76 Unless recent employment history is available, the
determination of earnings a homemaker could have received in

and methods for estimation of its price); see POSNER, supra note 1, at 6.
173. For example, Judge Posner argues that replacement measures of damages in
cases involving disabled housewives are incorrect because "the minimum value of a
housewife's services, and hence the cost to the family if those services are eliminated, is the price that her time would have commanded in its next best use." POSNER,
supra note 1, at 177-78. But see WARING, supra note 1, at 280-81 (describing problems in use of the opportunity cost approach to tort recoveries).
174. As Fisher puts the issue, "in addition to the inherent difficulties encountered
in quantifying the value of household production, the profession itself cannot agree
on a proper methodological approach. Furthermore, for any given methodology, there
is much disagreement over how to execute it." Fisher, supra note 78, at 16; see also
Ireland, supra note 77, at 1 (outlining the manner in which the value of a
homemaker's utility can be estimated and measured). Properly applied, the opportunity cost methods are more complex than the computations involved in calculating a
replacement cost. Among other issues, computations should reflect the economic effects of incentives for work in the home created by federal tax and benefit laws. See
supra notes 11-14 and accompanying text.
175. Fisher, supra note 78, at 22. Fisher points out that defendants rarely offer
expert testimony on this point as it has the effect of appearing to concede liability
or putting a "floor" on the damages award. Id. Reports of actual verdicts based on
opportunity cost methods are conspicuously absent from the case law. Opportunity
cost concepts, however, have generated more interest in the context of divorce litigation. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 177-78, 194-95; Ellman, supra note 65, at 53-55;
Landes, supra note 79, at 49-50.
176. In the forensic literature, opportunity cost is sometimes described as yielding a
"lower-bound" value for lost household production resulting in its higher popularity
among defense attorneys. See Fisher, supra note 78, at 19.
In a world in which women have few job opportunities, it may turn out that
the substitute mother will cost more than the housewife could have earned by working for a wage. In this situation, opportunity cost theories may be used to argue
that replacement cost measures of value are too high. Of course, when women have
greater job opportunities, the opportunity cost measure will be challenged as too
high, on the theory that homemaking is not as productive as the work available in
the paid labor force. One writer argues for a "no-nonsense approach" in which household services are valued based on whichever measure generates the lower result. L.
Keith Larimore, Evaluating Household Services and Other Nonmarket Production, J.
LEGAL ECON., Mar. 1991, at 63, 63-65.
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the wage labor market involves a significant level of speculation.177 Some commentators have argued that a correct determination of opportunity costs requires "returning to the decision
point at which a homemaker began investing in household human capital rather than fully pursuing a labor market career."'7 8 However, as the analysis becomes more sophisticated,
it also becomes more speculative and raises the potential for
serious problems of evidence and persuasion.17 9 Given the perceived difficulty of using sophisticated economic theory in the
courtroom, professional norms counsel against more complicated
methods, even though they may be more theoretically accurate.8' Ultimately, both replacement and opportunity cost approaches require controversial judgments about the correlation
between work in the household and work in the market. These
choices are value judgments in every sense. Use of labor markets as a reference point permits a plaintiffs lawyer to argue
that a homemaker has "pecuniary" value, but it also incorporates into the valuation process the economic effects of discrimination in the workplace against women and women's work roles.
Because damages for economic loss in injury and death cases

177. Treating housework as unskilled labor ignores the homemaker's accumulation
of household oriented human capital and other factors that increase the productivity
and value of the time devoted to household work. Ireland, supra note 77, at 4. Approached in this manner, the method "implicitly treats the occupation of homemaker
as if it involves only unskilled labor with no educational requirements of significant
skill development." Id.
178. Ireland, supra note 77, at 6; see supra notes 79-80 and accompanying text.
179. The Restatement rule is that a plaintiff seeking compensatory damages must
prove "the extent of the harm and the amount of money representing adequate compensation with as much certainty as the nature of the tort and the circumstances
permit." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 912 (1979); see also id. § 924(b), cmt. c
(noting that an injured person can receive damages for lost earnings despite not
working at the time of the accident). Measurement of damages in child death cases
poses similar problems. See VIVIANA A. ZELIZER, PRICING THE PRICELESS CHILD: TIlE
CHANGING SOCIAL VALUE OF CHILDREN 138-68 (1985).
180. See Fisher, supra note 78, at 27.
Woven throughout . . . is a commitment to keeping the valuation process
as simple as is reasonably possible. Forensic economists must be good
pragmatists, both in terms of what is cost-effective and what is credible
to a lay jury. Sophisticated, complex measurement methodologies found in
some of the literature . . . are not likely to have strong appeal among
those who must convince the lay public of the validity of their work.
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are premised on lost earnings, the low market values accorded
to the types of work done by homemakers, and to women as
workers, result in lower verdicts when a homemaker is killed or
injured.' 8 ' The salient economic feature of household work is
that it exists outside the market. Employing the market as the
determinant of the value of household production assumes that
market commodities can be compared meaningfully to those
produced in the family."2
Replacement cost measures define "housewife" as a job classification, a category comprised of fungible workers with a fixed
market value. Such categorization compensates the family's losses in terms of unmade beds, babysitters, and home-cooked
meals. The difference between the value of services performed
by a family member rather than by a collection of part-time,
minimum-wage servants and contractors is not considered. However, if the value of household work is based on the housewife's
other employment opportunities, then the household chores
performed by a teacher-mother are worth more than those of a
factory worker mother." Although there are economic arguments to suggest that a caregiver with more education contributes more to the human capital accumulations of her husband
and children,TM it is difficult to imagine that this effect is well
measured by the wage differential between a doctor and a nurse
or a lawyer and a secretary. It is even more difficult to accept
that this analysis could extend across the spectrum of homemaking activities. Does clean laundry have different values depending on the education of the laundress or the wealth of her partner?..5

181. See supra notes 146-49 and accompanying text.
182. Other value judgments are hidden in these methods as well. WARING, supra
note 1, at 21-25. This phenomenon is all the more troubling given that the usual
approach to the household in both economics and law is itself substantially responsible for creating the "gender gap" in the market's treatment of women workers. See
Hadfield, supra note 64.
183. This objection is discussed in Comment, supra note 158, at 71; see also Wolf,
supra note 158, at 82-83 (recommending that the value of the housewife equals the
cost of acquiring various individuals from the market to perform her services).
184. Lee Benham, Benefits of Women's Education Within Marriage, in ECONOMICS
OF THE FAMILY, supra note 50, at 375; Leibowitz, supra note 92, at 432.
185. See supra note 78 and accompanying text.
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With a broad approach to either opportunity cost or replacement cost measures, tort damages shift toward recoveries for the
more intangible aspects of household services. This shift moves
the law well beyond the limits of most wrongful death statutes,
which limit recoveries to "pecuniary" losses."l 6 Is it appropriate
to require a tortfeasor to pay compensation based on what might
have been, on the value of a career or education that was, in
fact, rejected?18 ' Human capital and household production theories suggest that it is appropriate. Because the decision to specialize in household work is rational, that work must be at least
equivalent in value to alternative career paths.
One commentator's defense of the opportunity cost measure is
based on distributive justice norms: similarly situated claimants
should be treated alike.'
She argues that opportunity cost
measures would "achieve consistency with the treatment of the
loss to a family occasioned by the death of an income-earning
spouse and/or parent."" 9 Of course, the judgment as to which
claimants should be treated comparably could be made differently. If the principle is that those who perform similar work
should be treated similarly, then the replacement cost measure

186. We might understand such a rule as preventing a windfall to defendants who
injure or kill less accomplished (or less talented, ambitious, or privileged) persons.
Conversely, we might view it as either an appropriate subsidy for housewives that is
intended to encourage socially important behavior or a disincentive for potential
tortfeasors that is intended to achieve full insurance for the personal and social
costs of accidents. This problem is not unique to household services. Komesar argues
that the present wrongful death statutes generally undercompensate the losses of
families because of the rules limiting recoveries to lost earnings. Komesar, supra
note 42, at 457-59. In effect law only recognizes the loss of 40 hours per week. Id.
at 466; cf id. at 457 (noting the "strong policy grounds" for setting tort damages
below actual losses).
187. Dobbs's treatise cites a tort case in which the court approved a recovery based
on lost earning capacity for an injured priest who had taken a vow of poverty.
DOBBS, supra note 151, at 541 (discussing McLaughlin v. Chicago M., St., P. & Pac.
R.R. Co., 143 N.W.2d 32 (Wis. 1966)). The issue framed in the text is not a question
of measuring the housewife's earning capacity, which is clearly recoverable in a tort
action. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. Rather, the question is
whether for a priest or a housewife, the rules of recovery in tort should permit
recoveries that ignore life choices that may have reduced a person's earning potential.
188. See Yale, supra note 160, at 304-06.
189. Id. at 289.
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would be more just.19
These questions are not questions of economic methods. Although the choice of methodology has clear policy implications,
the policy questions are not themselves answerable from the
domain of economic theory. These problems are legal and moral,
and they concern the individual and family interests that society
will recognize and how those entitlements, once recognized,
should be protected.
2. Entitlements
The question of how entitlements should be defined and protected is a recurring theme in tort law and is not easily answered. More generally, the question is whether tort recoveries
should be available only for injuries to tangible interests-damages that can be readily quantified. "9 ' Wrongful
death statutes supply one set of answers to this question, but
tort law reflects wide diversity on this point.'9 2
Law and economics scholarship outside the "new family economics" has often been concerned with issues of tort liability. In
particular, the literature reflects substantial debate and many
proposals intended to define liability rules to promote socially
efficient levels of risk-taking.'9 3 Although these arguments
have been less concerned with the specifics of damages rules, it
is important to the larger project that damages should accurately measure the harms caused.' The literature reflects concern
that over- and under-compensation defeat the normative goal of
encouraging efficient levels of risk and care.'9 5 In addition, al190. Id. at 306.
191. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 903 cmt. a (1979) (distinguishing

harm to pecuniary interests from bodily harm or emotional distress and prescribing
different purposes for compensation in these two settings); id. at § 905 (describing
award of "Compensatory Damages for Nonpecuniary Harm").
192. See, e.g., the discussion supra note 160.
193. E.g., GuiDo CALABRESI, THE COSTS OF ACCIDENTS (1970); Richard A. Posner, A

Theory of Negligence, 1 J. LEGAL STUD. 29 (1972).
194. E.g., POSNER, supra note 1. Calabresi refers to the societal costs that result
from accidents as secondary costs. See CALABRESI, supra note 193, at 27. See generally POSNER, supra note 1, at 195-201 (discussing the economics of providing substitute services); Posner, supra note 193, at 46-48 (arguing that damages should equal
the real and social costs of the accident).
195. Posner, supra note 193, at 33, 46-48; see also Komesar, supra note 42 (dis-
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though Judge Posner and others treat items such as pain and
suffering and grief as real costs, they recognize the problem that
monetizing these costs creates.' 9' Recently, proposals for new
methods of quantification for ever-wider ranges of nonpecuniary
losses have appeared, 97 as have arguments questioning financial awards for nonmonetary losses.' 9
At its frontiers, this economic analysis bears out the objections
of theorists, including Richard Abel and Margaret Radin, who
argue that tort recoveries defined in this way foster the
commodification of important aspects of human life. 99 In
Radin's usage, the term commodity describes "something that is
thought appropriate to buy and sell through a market,"0 0 and
"commodification" refers to "market rhetoric, the practice of
thinking about interactions as if they were sale transactions,
and market methodology, the use of monetary cost-benefit analysis to judge these interactions.""' Radin characterizes the debate over whether to quantify and compensate injuries for loss of
consortium as a debate over the commodification of love." 2

cussing the meaning of personal injury losses).
196. See CALABRESI, supra note 193, at 215-25; Posner, supra note 193, at 46-48.
Calabresi writes that "ex hypothesis such items are only very inaccurately converted
into money terms," and this uncertainty adds expense to the process of compensation. CALABRESI, supra note 193, at 215-16. He concludes that "to the extent that
some such costs are relatively nonindividual, i.e. shared by most potential victims,
collective valuations are feasible." Id. at 222. However, "[sluch valuations will always
be expensive and may not be worthwhile because the tertiary costs may be greater
than the expected general deterrence benefits." Id. This conclusion suggests an economic argument against the use of extensive expert testimony.
197. See, e.g., Andrew J. McClurg, It's a Wonderful Life: The Case for Hedonic
Damages in Wrongful Death Cases, 66 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 57 (1990); Jerome C.
Darnell, Hedonic Value-Economists Put Price on a Life, NAT'L L.J., Oct. 16, 1989,
at 15.
198. E.g., Alan Schwartz, Proposals for Products Liability Reform: A Theoretical
Synthesis, 97 YALE L.J. 353, 364-67, 408-11 (1988) (arguing for damages rules that
conform to consumer behavior in insurance markets).
199. Richard L. Abel, A Critique of Torts, 37 UCLA L. REV. 785 (1990); Margaret
J. Radin, Compensation and Commensurability, 43 DUKE L.J. 56 (1993); see also
Radin, supra note 141, at 1876-77 (discussing Abel's arguments); Schwartz, supra
note 198, at 411 n.116 (same).
200. Radin, supra note 141, at 1855 n.24.
201. Id. at 1859.
202. Id. at 1876-77. Radin, also discusses Richard Abel's arguments that portray
the tort recovery system as fostering the universal commodification of human life.
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As Professor Radin's insight suggests, the equation of what a
wife and mother does for her family with services sold in the
market is not only difficult on a quantitative level; it is also an
extremely complex moral and emotional problem. Attempting
this valuation is all the more troublesome when the process
takes place after her death or serious injury-an entirely involuntary "exchange" of caregiving for the possibility of financial
damages.
The solution is not to abandon the goal of setting tort recoveries. As Radin points out, it is not necessary to understand compensation for injuries as a process of equating harms with dollar
values.0 3 Damages can be viewed as a form of redress that affirms the existence of a right and recognizes the fault with regard to disrespecting that right rather than as a quid pro quo
awarded in exchange for the right.'0 4 Compensation becomes a
question of corrective justice intended to restore a moral balance
between the parties.0 5 Radin's arguments suggest that when a
deeply personal quality or relationship is to be compensated, the
process must be very carefully circumscribed to prevent equating
the harms suffered with the money used for compensation.0 6
To fail to carefully balance these factors risks further harm to
important aspects of personhood and family life. 0 7
To deny substantial financial recoveries to families who have
Id. at 1876-77.
203. Radin, supra note 199, at 56.
204. Id. at 57.
205. Id. at 60.
206. See Radin, supra note 141, at 1877-86.
207. See id. Michael Trebilcock recognizes the force of Radin's argument, although
he responds that it offers little help in defining when legal constraints on
commodification are appropriate. MICHAEL J. TREBILCOCK, THE LIMITS OF FREEDOM
OF CONTRACT 29-47 (1993). Trebilcock has a very sophisticated and subtle analysis of
the exchange aspects of family relationships. He argues that commodification problems arise in areas of market failure and that an adequate framework of background legal entitlements can serve to limit these risks. Id. Trebilcock acknowledges
that economics conventionally takes these entitlements as givens and therefore offers
little direct input on the issue of how entitlements should be defined. Id. at 44.
Trebilcock also asserts that feminist theorists are inconsistent on this point: In the
context of divorce entitlements, feminists see recognition and remuneration for household production as essential to women's equality and dignity, while in the context of
surrogacy arrangements, feminists oppose compensation on commodification grounds.
Id. at 48.
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lost a caregiver seems to deny the redress of a deep moral injury. The feeling that such redress is important is attested to in
the language of older judicial opinions which enshrine a wife
and mother as something of immeasurable value. As one court
asks: "Who can value the love and companionship, the strength
and solace in times of sorrow, the joyous partnership in times of
happiness, of a steadfast and devoted wife?""' Or, in the words
of another: "The loss of a wife's services are imponderables
which, indeed, command almost inestimable values."0 9
The new family economics is important because it affirms
these truths, lending new words and techniques to older forms of
knowledge. Paradoxically, although this theory has the potential
to bring law toward a faller understanding of family productivity, it also risks pulling our practice in the wrong direction. The
challenge for law is to determine whether a system that does not
attempt to quantify the value of lost love and nurture is ultimately preferable to one that measures these values in explicitly
monetary terms.
B. Contract and Restitution
Contract and restitution law present another arena for the
application of the new family economics. One argument, made
regularly in law reviews, is that enforcement of agreements between family members can serve the same social functions that
contract has filled in the commercial world: encouraging and
protecting reliance and promoting efficient exchanges and allocations of resources."W In addition, commentators argue that con-

208. Legare v. United States, 195 F. Supp. 557, 561 (S.D. Fla. 1961). The court
went on, quoting Proverbs: "Her price is 'far above rubies,' and no figure in dollars
can be set down as adequate compensation." Id. Nonetheless, the court sustained an
admittedly "arbitrary" award of $25,000 for a husband's lost consortium. Id.
209. Fabrizi v. Griffin, 162 F. Supp. 276, 278 (W.D. Pa.), affd sub nom. Fabrizi v.
Kramer Bros. Freight Lines, 261 F.2d 594 (3d Cir. 1958). The same feeling is demonstrated in arguments to extend the law to allow recoveries for new varieties of
consortium. See, e.g., Ridgeway, supra note 150, at 349, 364-70 (advocating expanded
recognition and compensation for loss of parent-child relational interests).
210. E.g., Brinig & Crafton, supra note 65; Cohen, supra note 60; Maijorie M.
Shultz, Contractual Ordering of Marriage:A New Model for State Policy, 70 CAL. L.
REV. 204 (1982); Michael J. Trebilcock & Rosemin Keshvani, The Role of Private
Ordering in Family Law: A Law and Economics Perspective, 41 U. TORONTO L.J.
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tractual approaches to marriage and family life offer individuals
the potential for greater autonomy and freedom in designing the
terms of their private life.2 '
Despite common talk of the "marriage contract," family and
contract law doctrines historically have served primarily to prevent the use of contract rules and exchange norms in the family.212 The common law viewed husband and wife as one person
upon their marriage," ' lacking the legal and economic individuality required for market transactions or relationships with
each other.21 4 Although the spousal unity doctrine has waned,
divorce courts continue to treat legal arguments asking a court
to look at the real exchanges and contributions within a particular marriage with ambivalence or even hostility.2" 5

533, 549-50 (1991).
211. See, e.g., LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE MARRIAGE CONTRACT (1981); Shultz, supra
note 210.
212. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS §§ 189-91 (1981) (mandating that promises in restraint of marriage, changing the essential nature of the
marital relationship, or affecting the right to custody of a minor are unenforceable
on grounds of public policy); RESTATEMENT OF CONTRACTS § 581-87 (1932) (establishing the illegality of certain bargains concerning domestic relations); E. ALLAN
FARNSWORTH, CONTRACTS §§ 3.7, 5.4 (2d ed. 1990) (discussing policies against enforcement of family or social promises or agreements that might impair family relations).
213. 1 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND (1979)
(facsimile of First Edition of 1765-69). See generally CLARK, supra note 37, at 286-88
(discussing the common law position of married women). As restated by Justice
Hugo Black, "though the husband and wife are one, the one is the husband." United
States v. Yazell, 382 U.S. 341, 361 (1966) (Black, J., dissenting).
214. Of course, their positions were not symmetric: married women had no independent legal existence in the common law. See CLARK, supra note 37, at 289-90, 293305 (discussing married women's property acts). Yet even after the passage of statutes in the mid-19th century granting married women civil personhood, a variety of
legal principles continued to restrict the ability of husband and wife to contract with
each other, especially where the core aspects of their relationship were concerned.
Id. at 301-03; see, e.g., Graham v. Graham, 33 F. Supp. 936 (E.D. Mich. 1940). Significantly, despite the claims of early feminists that women also should be deemed
to own the fruits of their labors in the home, these statutes preserved the tradition
that made a husband the owner of his wife's household services. See Siegel, supra
note 17.
215. See infra note 219 and accompanying text. In a number of cases, courts have
even refused to recognize contracts between husbands and wives outside the home,
for example, where one spouse employs the other in a business. CLARK, supra note
37, at 302-03. But see Romeo v. Romeo, 418 A.2d 258 (N.J. 1980) (rejecting common
law rule against enforcement of interspousal contracts in context of workers' compen-
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Historically, family relationships also have generated analytic
tensions in other areas of private law. Among the most difficult
problems have been those that arise in the context of informal
families: unmarried couples, extended families, parents, and
stepchildren. If these relationships were recognized by law, the
disputes would be regulated by family property rules. Instead,
they reach the courts as claims based in contract, restitution, or
estoppel-sometimes with an overlay of fraud, duress, and undue influence. The judicial reaction to these claims also has been
mixed. Some courts recognized contract and restitution claims,
while others denied relief, often based significantly on the fact
that the relationship
fell outside the traditional boundaries of
"the family."21 6
Although the market paradigm has had significant influence
on family law, the tensions between contract principles and
family policies have not abated.2 17 The scope of contracting permitted within the family has increased significantly in the past
two decades," 8 yet contractual modifications of most family obligations are still prohibited, 2 19 and courts routinely decline to

sation claim by wife/employer after death of husband/employee).
216. See infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text.
217. See generally Olsen, supra note 3; Regan, supra note 102.
218. Courts now routinely accept and enforce prenuptial agreements both in divorce
and inheritance cases. E.g., Posner v. Posner, 233 So. 2d 381 (Fla. 1970) (prenuptial
agreement enforceable); see UNIF. PREMARITAL AGREEMENT ACT, 9B U.L.A. 369
(1987); CLARK, supra note 37, at 1-20; Judith T. Younger, Perspectives on Antenuptial
Agreements, 40 RUTGERS L. REV. 1059, 1065-71 (1988); see also UMDA § 306, 9A
U.L.A. 216-17 (1987) (separation agreements enforceable). Courts also in some cases
have recognized agreements between spouses concerning educational support during
marriage. E.g., Pyeatte v. Pyeatte, 661 P.2d 196 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982). Claims based
on the agreement of one family member to provide support or services to another in
exchange for an inheritance are sometimes recognized as well. See Harold C.
Havighurst, Services in the Home-A Study of Contract Concepts in Domestic Relations, 41 YALE L.J. 386 (1932). Compare In re Grossman's Estate, 27 N.W.2d 365
(Wis. 1947) (recovery allowed) with Harrison v. Harrison, 75 So. 2d 620 (Ala. 1954)
(no recovery) and West v. West, 229 S.W.2d 451 (Ky. Ct. App. 1950) (same).
219. See generally CLARK, supra note 37, at 14-15 nn.88-94. "Notwithstanding the
existence of a general power of husband and wife to contract with each other, at
least some courts seem still to be unwilling to recognize their contracts when they
relate to what are regarded as essential aspects of the marital relationship." Id. at
302; see also Younger, supra note 218, at 1071-73 ("[Sluch agreements have been
thought to be unenforceable because they run afoul of the well-established rule that
it is improper for courts to intervene in the married couple's daily domestic af-
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intervene in the financial disputes of both married and unmarried couples. There is also resistance to contractual models in
settings where family law principles have not historically been
available to regulate family-type relations. Individuals in these
settings often turn to exchange norms to structure their relationships, but exchange-based rules continue to be defined in a manner that precludes legal protection. In effect, these relationships
are deemed too contractual to be tolerated within the framework
of family law and too much like the family to be subsumed into
rules of contract and restitution. These problems demonstrate
that it is not a simple matter to substitute contract and market
principles into the framework of family policy. Many of the difficulties courts encounter in applying contract and restitution
doctrines to family disputes trace to the vastly different structures that constitute family and exchange relationships.220

fairs."). For example, in Mathiasen v. Mathiasen, 219 Cal. App. 3d 1428 (Ct. App.
1990), the California Court of Appeals denied enforcement of a prenuptial agreement
providing that the parties would contribute equally to their shared support and
requiring that, if one party had made excess contributions, these would be reimbursed in the event of divorce. See also Kuder v. Schroeder, 430 S.E.2d 271 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1993) (discussing contract and unjust enrichment claims in case where
husband breached promise to support family after completing undergraduate and law
degrees). Where children are concerned, the barriers to contract are even more strenuously maintained. See generally Younger, supra note 218, at 1072-73 (discussing
close scrutiny of antenuptial provisions providing for custody of children).
220. This difference and the problems it causes are reflected in the language of
courts struggling to create new equitable remedies in the domestic relations context.
See Estin, supra note 85, at 773-76.
The problem has two dimensions. First, contract rules developed in commercial
settings are difficult to apply to household relations. Second, to the extent contract
law rules have been applied in this setting, they serve the larger purpose of directing individual behavior into the channels of established social institutions. At the
very least, the commercial nature and effect of contract law suggests the need for a
set of special contract and exchange norms consistent with the purposes and experience of family life. For an excellent discussion of these problems in the context of
bargaining over the terms of separation agreements, see Sally B. Sharp, Fairness
Standards and Separation Agreements: A Word of Caution on Contractual Freedom,
132 U. PA. L. REV. 1399 (1984).
Even in the setting of the market, contract and restitution principles are not
purely devoted to fostering autonomy and choice, but extend as well to the creation
and enforcement of commercial norms. See Shultz, supra note 210, at 213-16; see
also Marsha Garrison, Marriage: The Status of Contract, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1039
(1983) (reviewing WEITZMAN, supra, note 211). In commerce and in the family, these
background entitlements are an important precondition to private ordering.
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There is a tendency to ignore this problem in positive economic
analysis, which treats both spheres as characterized by utility
maximizing, "efficient" behavior.22 ' However, the fact that society views the market and the family as occupying separate
spheres, each based on entirely different normative premises
and employing different institutional frameworks, dramatically
alters the project of applying contractual norms in household
settings.
1. Exchange Relationships
An exchange or market system necessarily operates within an
institutional framework. The framework includes a large set of
ground rules and entitlements established by the law of property
and contract. Law defines (1) who is capable of entering into
agreements, (2) when an agreement is formed and enforceable,
(3) what limits might be placed around bargaining behavior and
results, (4) what terms to supply when parties fail to negotiate
fully, and (5) what social means will be made available for contract enforcement. Without this framework, we are at a loss
to determine when an agreement has formed or what terms

Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 210, at 551.
221. See supra notes 44-46. Positive economic analysis describes family law principles as operating as if directed by an underlying economic logic to foster the maximum potential gain from the exchanges of family life. Traditional gender roles increase the gain from specialization, rules governing divorce provide protections
against termination, and protections for children prevent externalization of costs of
divorce. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 143-46. This commentary does not suggest
that family law rules be replaced by more general exchange norms. Instead, it understands family law principles as specially adapted to the types of behavior involved.
Other writers suggest that family law rules frustrate relationships that norms
of contract would permit. This leads to the argument that the standard terms the
law dictates are too restrictive, preventing other arrangements that individuals
might prefer. See supra notes 210-11 and accompanying text. This literature suggests
an evolutionary approach, conjured by ubiquitous quotations of Henry Sumner
Maine's famous "status to contract" maxim. See supra note 4.
Recognizing that the law imposes a fairly uniform, standardized marriage contract, Douglas Allen argues that this standardization can be seen as economically
useful. The standard-form marriage contract eliminates the large transaction costs
that would be necessary if every couple negotiated from scratch. Douglas W. Allen,
An Inquiry into the State's Role in Marriage, 13 J. ECON. BEHAv. & ORGAN. 171,
177-79 (1990).
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it includes.
The new economic theory depicts the family in terms of economic goals: efficient production of goods and services covering a
spectrum from meals, clean laundry, and transportation to love,
sex, and children.22 2 Each member of a household has different
skills and resources to offer this project, and over time it will be
rational for household members to specialize in different aspects
of household production. The more distinct family members are
or become, the more they have to gain and lose from their relationship." In order to protect themselves and their enterprise,
they will negotiate terms to govern the dissolution of their enterprise and terms for allocations of household production among
the membership. 4
In the law, however, exchange rules rarely are broad enough
to embrace family behaviors. Contract norms in family law apply
only to those situations in which family members come closest to
imitating arm's-length, commercial relationships. Thus, where
members of marital and nonmarital households reach explicit
written agreements, their contracts are typically enforced.225
Conversely, where terms for their exchange have not been formalized, contract claims are far less readily accepted.
Courts are quite clear about their inability to extrapolate contractual intent from everyday family behavior.22 Because such

222. See supra notes 50-72 and accompanying text.
223. See supra notes 54-57 and accompanying text.
224. See supra notes 66-72 and accompanying text.
225. See, e.g., Cook v. Cook, 691 P.2d 664 (Ariz. 1984); see also supra note 218
(regarding enforcement of prenuptial agreements). Courts may reject even express
contract claims on policy grounds, most notably by finding that some portion of the
consideration is meretricious. See, e.g., Jones v. Daly, 176 Cal. Rptr. 130 (Ct. App.
1981); Timmons v. Timmons, 222 S.W.2d 339, 341 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949). In Illinois,
the state policy against recognition of common-law marriage is the basis for refusing
to consider contract claims arising from a long marriage-like relationship. See Hewitt
v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204, 1207-09 (Ill. 1979); see also infra notes 237-38 and accompanying text (discussing greater judicial protection for traditional families than
for nontraditional families).
226. Compare Morone v. Morone, 413 N.E.2d 1154, 1158 (N.Y. 1980) ("decin[ing] to
recognize an action based upon on implied contract for personal services between
unmarried persons living together") with Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976)
(recognizing an implied contract claim between unmarried cohabitants); see also
Carroll v. Lee, 712 P.2d 923 (Ariz. 1986) (holding that homemaking services were
consideration in exchange for agreement to acquire and jointly own property); Boland
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behavior falls outside the social, economic, and legal framework
of exchange, there are no reference points or rules to delineate
enforceable agreements. As a result, the only successful impliedcontract claims are those in which household behavior mimics
commercial exchange relationships. Recovery is often available
based on evidence that one household member made direct financial contributions to another member's individual property
interests. Proof that the household member contributed services
or materials also may establish a claim.2 2 ' Recovery is much
less likely where there is proof of household or "personal" services because the norms of sharing and altruism, treated as paramount in the household, serve to defeat the inference that the
parties intended to be legally bound.2
Restitution claims are even more difficult to bring. Here,
courts must determine whether particular exchanges within a
household were unjust, using a standard that is explicitly rooted

v. Catalano, 521 A.2d 142 (Conn. 1987) (finding an implied contract between unmarried cohabitants); Hay v. Hay, 678 P.2d 672 (Nev. 1984) (finding that express contracts between unmarried cohabitants are enforceable unless they are for meritorious
services); Kozlowski v. Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1979) (enforcing an agreement
between unmarried cohabitants not founded explicitly on sexual services). In
Whorton v. Dillingham, 248 Cal. Rptr. 405 (Ct. App. 1988), the Marvin rule was
extended to homosexual cohabitants.
Courts and commentators struggle to apply general principles of contract formation to implied contract claims in the family, particularly the requirement that the
parties manifest their intention to be legally bound to an exchange. See
FARNSWORTH, supra note 212, at §§ 3.7, 3.10. The existence of a family relationship
or shared household is usually sufficient to defeat the effort to imply an agreement
to compensate for household or "personal" services, such as in Gibson v. McCraw,
332 S.E.2d 269 (W. Va. 1985), unless the services are unusual or other facts indicate
that the recipient intended to pay, as in Worley v. Worley, 388 So. 2d 502 (Ala.
1980). The problem is sometimes described as whether a "reasonable person in the
position of the [party who received services] would understand that . . . the services . . . were not gratuitous." FARNSWORTH, supra note 212, at § 3.10.
227. When a specific asset is involved, a claimant may seek imposition of a constructive trust. See, e.g., Mike McCurley, Same Sex CohabitationAgreements, in PREMARITAL AND MARITAL CONTRACTS 195, 201-02 (Edward L. Winer & Lewis Becker
eds., 1993) (citing cases).
228. See Carol S. Bruch, Property Rights of DeFacto Spouses Including Thoughts on
the Value of Homemakers' Services, 10 FAM. L.Q. 101, 105 n.17 (1976); Havighurst,
supra note 218.
According to the Restatement of the Law of Restitution, it is unjust for a party
to go without compensation where he has conferred a benefit in order to protect the
life, health, or property of another. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 112-17 (1937).
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in commercial norms.229 The heart of an unjust enrichment
claim is the fact that one party has received something of value
without payment or reciprocation."0 The issue of whether
household services have monetary value is settled quickly under
the new economic theory.2 3' The steady evolution of tort law
has led to the same conclusion. In the setting of family life, however, norms of reciprocation are different, based on deeply held
conceptions of what family relationships demand. Acts seen as
rooted in love or obligation need not be reciprocated because by
definition they have already been compensated by the relation-

229. Traditionally, the law of restitution drew content for the term "unjust" from
tort and contract norms that exclude the family. Although the law deems it "unjust"
for one party to retain without payment a benefit conferred by another in reliance
on an agreement where the agreement later proves unenforceable as a contract, RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 107-11 (1937), restitution for failed family agreements
is restricted by the rules prohibiting family members from contracting around support or the provision of services, see supra note 219, as well as the presumption
that household services are rendered gratuitously. Restitution on theories of fraud,
duress, and mistake is similarly limited in scope. It is understood to be unjust to
allow someone to retain a benefit received from another as a result of fraud, mistake, duress, or undue influence. RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 15, 55, 70. But
only some types of mistakes or pressures count. When services are performed because of a mistaken or coerced understanding that the services in time will be reciprocated or that the relationship is one that will continue, there is no recognized
claim in restitution. Id. §§ 57-58; see, e.g., Kuder v. Schroeder, 430 S.E.2d 271 (N.C.
Ct. App. 1993). However, mistake or fraud pertaining to the validity of a marriage
may be the basis for restitutionary remedies in addition to other protections for a
"putative spouse." E.g., Santos v. Santos, 89 P.2d 164 (Cal. Ct. App. 1939); Roberts
v. Roberts, 196 P.2d 361 (Wy. 1948).
230. Restitution for personal services and support traditionally has been denied
where services are rendered either gratuitously, without any expectation of compensation, or as a matter of legal obligation. Even outside the household, locating the
requisite commercial intent poses difficulties. In the rescue and salvage cases, familiar from first-year law school courses, restitution is available only to a party who
can assert that he intended to charge for his services. E.g., Glenn v. Savage, 13 P.
442, 448 (Or. 1887); see also RESTATEMENT OF RESTITUTION §§ 116, 117 (1937) (concerning restitution for supplying services to another or protecting another's property
without that person's knowledge or consent); cf Cotnam v. Wisdom, 104 S.W. 164
(Ark. 1907) (physician entitled to recover for emergency medical services); Chase v.
Corcoran, 106 Mass. 286 (1871) (plaintiff entitled to recover his expenses for saving
and repairing lost boat).
231. See supra notes 155-57 and accompanying text. In more recent family contract
and restitution cases, household services are more generally understood to have
value measured with reference to economic or market value. See Bruch, supra note
228, at 110-14; Robert C. Casad, Unmarried Couples and Unjust Enrichment: From
Status to Contract and Back Again?, 77 MICH. L. REV. 47, 52-53 (1978).
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ship itself. Therefore, they fall outside the realm of restitution. 2 ' The closer the family or household relationship between the parties, the more likely any services will be seen as
gratuitously provided.
The distinction in law between services for which compensation is generally expected and those seen as rooted in love or
obligation is closely connected to the distinction in economics
between altruistic and selfish behavior. 3 There seems to be
no inquiry in either law or economics as to whether exchanges
based on love and obligation could be enforced or compensated
on the same terms as those that are selfishly induced. Rather,
the legal, economic, and social approach to altruistic behavior
constructs it entirely outside the domain of exchange." 4
The traditional means of protecting behavior motivated by
love and obligation is to differentiate a separate sphere of family
life and to define particular rights and duties that accompany
family roles. In effect, law and economics address the problems

232. See In re Estate of Beecham, 361 N.W.2d 86 (Minn. Ct. App. 1985). In
Beecham, a 60-year-old woman married a 70-year-old man and spent more than six
years caring for his aged mother. She sought recovery for her services, including
'preparing her meals, doing her laundry and ironing, cleaning her room, doing her
hair, taking her on errands, cleaning up after her due to her incontinent situation,
and being with her 24 hours a day." Id. at 87. Despite precedent allowing recovery
for nursing care provided to a family member, the daughter-in-law's claim was denied. Id. at 89-90. Noting that she had "welcomed the in-laws into her home and
cared for them as a natural and family-type thing to do," id. at 88, the court found
reciprocity in their relationship based upon the older woman's "companionship, affection and respect" for her daughter-in-law. Id. at 89.
233. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
234. This approach to altruism seems closely related to the conception of families
in both law and economics that views the (male) household head as a benevolent
individual with power to allocate the family resources among family members. These
allocations cost him nothing-by definition, being altruistic, his own utility is increased when he allocates some portion of family resources to the wants or satisfaction of other family members. See supra notes 109-10 and accompanying text. Because the law expects altruism, it refuses to recognize commercial motives in these
circumstances. At the same time, the law is only rarely available to correct failures
of altruism within the family.
The problem of uncompensated household services usually reflects "altruism" of
a different sort. Our norms of family life demand that family members without power over household resources behave in a selfless manner, often by providing uncompensated labor for various family purposes. These services also fall outside the
framework of exchange.
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of altruism by separating family and market, private and public.
An example of the effort to define and maintain the boundaries
of the family sphere is the restrictive approach to contract and
restitution in family settings. 5 Another example is the broad
range of doctrines that extend the protections of family status in
particularly compelling cases." 6 These rules reflect the importance of sustaining certain normative boundaries even as courts
create exceptions to the rules. Thus, those who believe themselves to be married receive greater judicial and legislative solicitude than those who know that their family arrangements fall
outside the approved forms.237 The same goal is clear in the
language that judges employ, particularly the concern that permitting proof of "commercial intent" would demean the relationship within which the services were provided.3
235. Carl E. Schneider, The Channelling Function in Family Law, 20 HOFSTRA L.
REV. 495, 503 (1992) ("Sometimes competing institutions are merely disadvantaged.
For instance, the rule making contracts for meretricious consideration unenforceable
traditionally denied unmarried couples the law's help in resolving some disputes.").
236. Examples of such compelling cases include the rules governing common-law
and putative marriage and equitable adoption. See also Alvin E. Evans, Property
Interests Arising from Quasi-MaritalRelationships, 9 CORNELL L.Q. 246, 262 (1924)
(contrasting putative marriage and "concubinage"). See generally CLARK, supra note
37, at 45-62, 625-27 (discussing common-law, putative marriage, and equitable adoption).
In a few recent cases, courts have held that the statutes governing divorce may
be used as a basis for financial remedies granted to unmarried cohabitants. See, e.g.,
Connell v. Francisco, 872 P.2d 1150 (Wash. Ct. App. 1994).
237. The struggle to allow compensation while retaining these norms has meant
that the same services may be valued and compensated in one context but not in
another. Compare Stejeskal v. Darrow, 215 N.W. 83 (N.D. 1927) (father compensated
in tort for loss of adult daughter's housekeeping services, which he stated had a
value of $40 per month beyond the room and board she received from him) with
Harrison v. Harrison, 75 So. 2d 620 (Ala. 1954) (daughter-in-law denied restitution
from mother-in-law's estate for housekeeping services on the basis of presumption
that her services had been rendered gratuitously).
238. E.g., Wright v. Wright, 289 S.E.2d 347 (N.C. 1982) (husband's extensive improvements to wife's separate real estate presumed to be gratuitous); Dade v. Anderson, 439 S.E.2d 353, 356 (Va. 1994) (wife denied recovery from husband's estate
for health care services with value of $69,480). See generally Havighurst, supra note
218, at 390; Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Establishment of "Family"Relationship to
Raise Presumption That Services Were Rendered Gratuitously, As Between Persons
Living in Same Household but not Related by Blood or Affinity, 92 A.L.R.3d 726
(1979). The element of gratuity may be presumed even between those who do not
share a household. See, e.g., Glenn v. Savage, 13 P. 442, 448 (Or. 1887). Ironically,
although contract and restitution remedies traditionally have been unavailable to en-
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These examples illustrate the channelling function of family
law, which Carl Schneider describes as "the law's work in building and sustaining social institutions." 9 He points out that,
over time, the law has constructed and reflected the normative
characteristics that define "marriage" and "parenthood," deploying a variety of incentives and sanctions to move people into the
established patterns of marriage and parenthood.24 ° Professor
Schneider points out that this function is not unique to family
law; in the commercial setting as well, law provides channels
that facilitate the process of exchange.24 '
Milton Regan describes the traditional definitions of family

force the agreements of spouses because of a reluctance to demean the marriage
relationship, they also have been unavailable to enforce agreements between unmarried cohabitants because of the taint of their "meretricious" sexual relationship. See
supra note 225 and accompanying text; see, e.g., Hewitt v. Hewitt, 394 N.E.2d 1204,
1207-09 (Ill. 1979). But see Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976); Kozlowski v.
Kozlowski, 403 A.2d 902 (N.J. 1979); Rolle v. Rolle, 530 A.2d 847 (N.J. Super. 1987);
Watts v. Watts, 405 N.W.2d 303, 311-13 (Wis. 1987). See generally Casad, supra
note 231; Jane M. Draper, Annotation, Recovery for Services Rendered by Persons
Living in Apparent Relation of Husband and Wife Without Express Agreement for
Compensation, 94 A.L.R.3d 552, 559-67 (1979).
239. Carl E. Schneider, State-Interest Analysis and the Channelling Function in
Family Law, 55 ALB. L. REV. 669 (1992); see also Schneider, supra note 235.
Schneider's channelling idea is distinct from the concept as developed in Lon Fuller,
Consideration and Form, 41 COLUM. L. REV. 799 (1941), which is discussed in
Schneider, supra note 235, at 496 n.2. Both uses reflect a concern with the law's
role in facilitating human relationships. Compare Schneider, supra note 235, at 507
with Fuller, supra, at 801-03. In Schneider's usage, "social institutions" are predefined patterns of conduct for types of actors, enforced by social sanctions. Schneider,
supra note 235, at 498.
240. Schneider, supra note 239, at 671. Schneider describes the normative mode of
marriage as "monogamous, heterosexual, and permanent. It rests on love. Husbands
and wives are expected to treat each other affectionately, considerately, and fairly.
They are to be animated by mutual concern and willing to sacrifice for each other."
Id. Parenthood has these key normative characteristics:
Parents should be married to each other. They are preferably the biological father and mother of the child. They have authority over their children and can make decisions for them. Like spouses, parents are expected to love their children and to be affectionate, considerate and fair.
They must support their children during their minority. They should try
to assure them a stable home. In particular, they should stay married to
each other, so that the child lives with both parents.
Id.; see also Schneider, supra note 235, at 500-01.
241. Schneider, supra note 235, at 505-06 (arguing that the corporation also serves
as a channelling institution).
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roles as a reflection of status principles. 42 The notion of family
relations as based on status rather than contract is in part a
reflection of the power of the rules that define the legal channels
of family life.243 Professor Regan proposes a balance between
contract and status principles as a means to foster norms of responsibility and relationship that can allow richer emotional and
family life.244 Regan argues for a "new model of status" that
can "attend to the desire for greater equality and the fact of
more diversity in family life,"245 and he makes specific and persuasive suggestions as to how his model might play out in a
number of family law settings, including the regulation of unmarried cohabitation.2 46
What both Professors Schneider and Regan demonstrate is
that an expanded role for contract and individual autonomy in
family life must be balanced against the wide variety of functions served by family law and by the family as a social institution.247 While enormous debate surrounds the specifics of these
rules, there seems to be. a broad consensus on the need to preserve and protect the social institutions of family life in some
form.

248

2. Institutions
The functions of channelling rules are readily described in
economic terms. One purpose is protective,249 which an economist might describe in terms of preventing market and contracting failures." Another purpose is facilitative,25 1 which an
242. MILTON C. REGAN, JR., FAMILY LAW AND THE PURSUIT OF INTIMACY 3-5 (1993).
243. Id.
244. Id. at 3.
245. Id. at 3-4.
246. Id. at 122-28.
247. One of Schneider's central points is that law's role in sustaining institutions
should be understood as part of the state interests at stake when family legislation
is subjected to constitutional challenge. Schneider, supra note 235, at 524-29 (discussing Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989)).
248. See id. at 506; Karl N. Llewellyn, Behind the Law of Divorce (Part 1), 32
COLUM. L. REV. 1281, 1288 (1932).
249. Channelling rules serve an important protective function. Schneider, supra
note 239, at 674; Schneider, supra note 235, at 506-07.
250. E.g., TREBILCOCK, supra note 207.
251. Schneider, supra note 235, at 505-08 (referring to the facilitative role as an
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economist could view as a means of reducing transaction
costs.252 Even if these rules can be said to serve economic purposes, economic theory has not offered a sufficient basis on
which to define such institutions as marriage and parenthood.
Arguably, contract and exchange principles can foster the social institutions of family life. In the family as well as the marketplace, there are strong arguments for protecting the parties'
expectations when agreements are shown or for implying agreement in the face of an uneven exchange. However, the specific
location of these boundaries is difficult to address from economics. From an economic perspective, specialization and division of
labor in the household serve important purposes whatever the
household type." 3 One argument for broadening the recognition of household types is that it would permit and encourage
economically and socially useful exchanges to occur. Although
the old boundaries, based on a rigid dichotomy between family
and market life, seem no longer tenable, the new family economics appears almost entirely agnostic on the complex normative
problems implied in redrawing these lines.254
Social institutions are constituted by mandatory moral norms,
derived from the broader social context and collectively established and enforced.255 Economists work from individual, con-

'efficiency" function).
252. See supra notes 64-70, 221 and accompanying text.
253. Becker's analysis can be applied to a wide variety of family types, even those
that fall far outside what the law has traditionally been willing to tolerate. For example, he demonstrates that polygamous households produce interesting economic
benefits for their members. BECKER, supra note 2, at 80-107.
254. Although many family law scholars have argued for expanded use of contract
principles in family law for these reasons, different understandings of family roles
might also serve this purpose.
255. According to Regan:
The content of these obligations derives from norms that are specific to
marriage as a particular social practice, rather than from terms that are
a product of rational bargaining. On this view, divorce deals with spouses
who are exiting an institution; as such, scrutiny of the substantive terms
of a marital agreement is not simply an attempt to replicate what selfinterested parties would have done had they had perfect knowledge or
bargained with adequate background legal entitlements. Instead, the law
seeks to affirm that marriage involves shared norms that may sometimes
require the subordination of self-interest for the sake of another.
Regan, supra note 102, at 646.
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tractually determined norms, based ultimately on individual
self-interest, and their discourse conceives family responsibilities
as "flowing from implicit contract terms accepted by a self interested bargainer." 6 While the goal of contract is to foster individual autonomy, the point of institutional frameworks is to
moderate the play of self-interest.
This contrast presents a number of dilemmas. Although economics attempts to be value neutral, channelling rules are not.
The traditional contract and restitution principles evince significant gender bias. 7 Thus, although the notion that services
within the family are gratuitous is applied to men and women,
to carpentry as well as housecleaning, 8 the doctrine has a
much heavier impact on those in a conventional housewife role
because their work is more likely to go uncompensated. 9
These rules also have significant effects on gay and lesbian couples, who are denied access to the established channels of family
life. For such untraditional families, there is particular interest
in using contract and restitution as secondary legal frameworks.

260

The tension concerning the boundaries of family institutions
has contributed to significant changes in the legal definition of
family life over the past thirty years, such as increased
protections for unmarried cohabitants, no-fault divorce rules,
and new approaches to illegitimacy and the rights of unwed
fathers. These dramatic shifts in the law arise from new understandings of the appropriate range of family membership and
behavior.2 6 ' They also reflect the underlying protective purpos256. Id.
257. See, for example, the criticisms levied in Paul Finkelman, Family, Crime, and
Government Interests: Commentary on Schneider and Stith, 55 ALB. L. REV. 689,
690-96, 700-11 (1992) (including the remarks of Professor Finkelman in a panel
discussion).
258. Where a household member can prove a contribution of money or services to
another's property, compensation is more likely. See, e.g., Lawlis v. Thompson, 405
N.W.2d 317, 320 (Wis. 1987). But see Wright v. Wright, 289 S.E.2d 347 (N.C. 1982)
(husband's extensive improvements to wife's separate real estate presumed to be
gratuitous).
259. The Wisconsin Supreme Court also has noted that denying compensation to
one party of a meretricious relationship serves to enrich the other, who may be
equally culpable. See In re Estate of Steffes, 290 N.W.2d 697, 706 (Wis. 1980).
260. McCurley, supra note 227.
261. Schneider, supra note 235, at 514-15. Schneider notes the tendency to see the

1052

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:989

es of channelling rules. 26 2 When courts extend statutory inheritance rights to children unlucky enough to be born out of wedlock, they recognize that these children would also benefit from
the protection otherwise considered important for other children.
When courts consider property and support claims brought by
unmarried cohabitants, they apply the same policies concerning
compensation for family exchanges that are structured into
divorce rules.263
If the point of social institutions is to balance the claims of
individual self-interest against the need to protect a zone in
which love and obligation can operate, it is essential that channelling rules define the boundaries of the family with reference
to a broader set of norms than economic efficiency. To the extent
exchange processes operate in the family, they operate within a
set of gendered social and market rules that determine which
arrangements are "efficient" and which may seriously disadvantage certain family members. 264 Albeit imperfectly, family law
rules traditionally have sought to limit the potential for this
type of disadvantage.
C. Property Division in Divorce
With the advent of no-fault divorce statutes, the financial aspects of family dissolution have shifted as well. As described by
Michael Trebilcock and Rosemin Keshvani, the "evolving marriage paradigm that has driven reform" is the model of a joint
economic venture with two equal partners "in which the division
of functions-financial provision, household management, and
child care-are the result of mutual agreement between the
partners.'265 The law now emphasizes equitable division of a

law's channels as socially conservative, but he emphasizes that the channelling machinery may also be used to push social change. Id. at 523, 531.
262. Carl Schneider points out that we can question whether society is well served
where one form of institution is promoted by disadvantaging its alternatives. Id. at
519-21.
263. Finkelman argues that this type of problem shows that channelling does not
work. Finkelman, supra note 257, at 693.
264. See Myra M. Ferree, Beyond Separate Spheres: Feminism and Family Research, 52 J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 866, 878-79 (1990) (literature review).
265. Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 210, at 540.
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broad category of "marital property"26 6 and more limited
spousal support payments based on need and dependence rather
than fault and obligation.2 67 These concepts have created a new
legal ethic of marriage that fits neatly with the new economic
view of the family.2 6
Where property division is concerned, the image of marriage
as a partnership has been deployed in support of relatively equal
division of "marital assets." The theory presumes that husband
and wife both have made significant contributions during their
marriage. In some states, marital property divisions are presumptively equal.2 69 In many others, statutory language requires that the court begin by considering various factors, including each party's contributions to the marital enterprise.2 70
Among those factors, it is commonly provided that the "contribution of a spouse as homemaker" must be considered.'
The official comment to the Uniform Marriage and Divorce
Act refers to the homemaker contribution provision as a "new
concept in Anglo-American law."272 This language was readily
adopted by courts, which read the statutes to define a homemaker as an "equal partner" in a marriage. 3 Early decisions and

266. E.g., UMDA § 307 (Alternative A), 9A U.L.A. 239 (1987).
267. E.g., UMDA § 308(a), 9A U.L.A. 347-48 (1987).
268. Equitable distribution principles emerged in some jurisdictions during the 19th
century. See Elizabeth A. Cheadle, Comment, The Development of Sharing Principles
in Common Law Property States, 28 UCLA L. REV. 1269 (1981).
Spousal support baged on need (rather than fault, obligation, or expectation)
existed before the shift to pure no-fault divorce grounds in states such as Washington. See Marsha Garrison, The Economics of Divorce: Changing Rules, Changing
Results, in DIVORCE REFORM AT THE CROSSROADS 75, 90-93, 245 n.107 (Stephen D.
Sugarman & Herma H. Kay eds., 1990) [collection as a whole hereinafter DIVORCE
REFORM].
269. E.g., CAL. FAM. CODE § 2550 (West 1992); WIS. STAT. ANN. § 767.255 (West
1993).
270. E.g., UMDA § 307, 9A U.L.A. 238-39 (1987).
271. Id.
272. UMDA § 307 cmt., 9A U.L.A. 239 (1987).
273. E.g., In re Marriage of Smith, 427 N.E.2d 1239, 1244 (Ill. 1981). This interpretation probably was not intended in any technical, legal sense. As Ira Ellman points
out: "Marriage is often colloquially referred to as a partnership ....
" Ellman, supra
note 65, at 33.
Other partnership discussions in the case law include: Julsen v. Julsen, 741
P.2d 642, 648 (Alaska 1987); In re Marriage of Rogers, 422 N.E.2d 635, 638 (Ill.
1981); In re Marriage of Calisoff, 531 N.E.2d 810, 814 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988); Kaye v.
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commentary emphasized the need to value a homemaker's contributions comparably with those of a breadwinner; in some cases, the language of economics is used to defend these rules." 4
The partnership metaphor and a more extensive division of
property have been readily assimilated into family law. Disagreement persists over the adequacy of these principles for doing justice between the parties, particularly given the often
disparate financial condition of two partners at the end of their
marriage."' Increasingly, the debate suggests that a partnership approach to marriage is inadequate without a greatly expanded definition of marital property. In particular, the case is
made that the parties' career and earning potential should be
treated as subject to division." 6 The need to redefine marital
property is often explained in economic terms with the argument
that a career or degree represents a significant increase in one
spouse's "human capital."
The treatment of human capital issues in divorce has created

Kaye, 538 A.2d 288, 289 (Me. 1988); Price v. Price, 503 N.E.2d 684, 687 (N.Y. 1986);
O'Brien v. O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712, 716 (N.Y. 1985); Blickstein v. Blickstein, 472
N.Y.S.2d 110, 113 (App. Div. 1984).
274. E.g., In re Marriage of Franks, 542 P.2d 845, 852 (Colo. 1975) (en banc), stay
denied, 423 U.S. 1043 (1976); Rieger v. Christensen, 529 P.2d 1362, 1364-65 (Colo.
Ct. App. 1974); In re Marriage of Rothbardt, 425 N.E.2d 1146, 1147-48 (Ill. App. Ct.
1981); Anderson v. Anderson, 656 S.W.2d 826, 827-28 (Mo. Ct. App. 1983); Kowis v.
Kowis, 658 P.2d 1084, 1087 (Mont. 1983); Wilberscheid v. Wilberscheid, 252 N.W.2d
76, 80-81 (Wis. 1977); Bussewitz v. Bussewitz, 248 N.W.2d 417, 422 (Wis. 1977).
275. Articles debating the partnership approach include: Ellman, supra note 65, at
33-40; Krauskopf & Thomas, supra note 35; Jane Rutheford, Duty in Divorce: Shared
Income as a Path to Equality, 58 FORDHAM L. REV. 539, 553-59 (1990); Bea A.
Smith, The Partnership Theory of Marriage: A Borrowed Solution Fails, 68 TEX. L.
REV. 689 (1990); Stephen D. Sugarman, Dividing Financial Interests on Divorce, in
DIVORCE REFORM, supra note 268, at 139-141.
Much of the writing attempts to draw directly from the law of business organizations, such as the statutory and common law rules that provide for winding up
a partnership and distributing its assets. See Ellman, supra note 65, at 33-40;
Rutheford, supra, at 553-59; Sugarman, supra, at 139-41. As these writers note,
these rules are "default" rules, which may be varied by agreement of the parties.
Divorce law in effect offers a similar set of default rules governing the division of
marital assets at the end of a marriage. Trebilcock & Keshvani, supra note 210, at
551-54, argue that the current "background entitlements" in divorce are inadequate
on two counts: they are not sufficiently clear and certain, and they do not reflect
"entitlements that rational parties would have chosen ex ante."
276. See, e.g., WEITZMAN, supra note 211, at 89-97.
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an opening for economic argumentation more generally in family
law. In addition to the literature on human capital investments
and divorce," ' there is a growing body of normative literature
based in economic theory.2"8 These writings suggest, implicitly
or explicitly, that the answers to questions concerning the legal
entitlements of family life can be derived from the norms of economics.
1. Human Capital
Decisional law in divorce cases reflects the economic insight
that marriage and the economic organization of family life can
have significant effects on human capital.7 9 The issue surfaced
in many states within a few years after the enactment of divorce
reform legislation280 and reached the pages of law reviews
shortly thereafter.2 8 ' The law has developed somewhat independently in five areas: career or celebrity goodwill, academic
degrees, goodwill in professional practices, pension benefits, and
goodwill in other businesses. Each of these subjects now boasts a
significant body of literature.2 2
277. The legal literature applying human capital theory to property division begins
with E. Raedene Combs, The Human Capital Concept as a Basis for Property Settlement at Divorce, 2 J. DIVORCE 329 (1979), and Joan Krauskopf, Recompense for Financing Spouse's Education: Legal Protection for the Marital Investor in Human
Capital, 28 KAN. L. REV. 379 (1980). Economists have also addressed divorce aspects
of this issue. See, e.g., Severin Borenstein & Paul N. Courant, How to Carve a Medical Degree: Human Capital Assets in Divorce Settlements, 79 AM. ECON. REV. 992
(1989).
278. See, e.g., Zelder, supra note 119.
279. See generally supra notes 73-90 and accompanying text.
280. Early cases debating human capital issues in divorce include: In re Marriage
of Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976) (pension); In re Marriage of Lopez, 113 Cal. Rptr
58 (Ct. App. 1974) (professional goodwill); Todd v. Todd, 78 Cal. Rptr. 131, 133-35
(Ct. App. 1969) (law degree); Mueller v. Mueller, 301 P.2d 90 (Cal. Dist. Ct. App.
1956) (goodwill of dental laboratory); In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75 (Colo.
1978) (M.B.A. degree); In re Marriage of Mitchell, 579 P.2d 613 (Colo. 1978) (pension); Ellis v. Ellis, 552 P.2d 506 (Colo. 1976) (pension plan); In re the Marriage of
Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1978) (law degree); Inman v. Inman, 578 S.W.2d
266 (Ky. 1979) (professional degree); Kruger v. Kruger, 375 A.2d 659 (N.J. 1977)
(pension); Stern v. Stern, 331 A.2d 257 (N.J. 1975) (professional goodwill); In re
Muckleroy v. Muckleroy, 498 P.2d 1357 (N.M. 1972) (medical license); Nail v. Nail,
486 S.W.2d 761 (Tex. 1972) (goodwill in medical practice).
281. Krauskopf, supra note 277; Combs, supra note 277.
282. Numerous cases and articles have discussed these issues. For example, on the
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In all five areas, a tension exists between two definitions of
"property." Some courts interpret the term "property" as used in
divorce statutes to refer only to assets that are exchangeable
with a value determined by the market."3 Other courts interpret "property" to include everything that has the potential to

issue of celebrity goodwill, see Piscopo v. Piscopo, 557 A.2d 1040 (N.J. Super. Ct.
App. Div. 1989); Elkus v. Elkus, 572 N.Y.S.2d 901 (N.Y. App. Div. 1991), appeal dismissed, 588 N.E.2d 99 (N.Y. 1992).
On the issue of academic degrees, see In re Marriage of Sullivan, 184 Cal. Rptr
796 (Ct. App. 1982), vacated, 691 P.2d 1020 (Cal. 1984); In re Marriage of Graham,
574 P.2d 75 (Colo. 1978); Hodge v. Hodge, 520 A.2d 15 (Pa. 1986); O'Brien v.
O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d 712 (N.Y. 1985); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J.
1982).
On the issue of professional goodwill, see Mitchell v. Mitchell, 732 P.2d 208
(Ariz. 1987); In re Marriage of Zells, 572 N.E.2d 944 (Ill. 1991); Prahinski v.
Prahinski, 540 A.2d 833 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1988), affd, 582 A.2d 784 (Md. 1990);
Hanson v. Hanson, 738 S.W.2d 429 (Mo. 1987); Dugan v. Dugan, 457 A.2d 1 (N.J.
1983); Sorensen v. Sorensen, 769 P.2d 820 (Utah App. 1989), affd in part, rev'd in
part, 839 P.2d 774 (Utah 1992); In re Marriage of Hall, 692 P.2d 175 (Wash. 1984);
Allen Parkman, The Treatment of Professional Goodwill in Divorce Proceedings, 18
FAM. L.Q. 213 (1984); Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Valuation of Goodwill in
Medical or Dental Practice for Purposes of Divorce Court's Property Distribution, 78
A.L.R.4th 853 (1990); Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Valuation of Goodwill in Accounting Practice for Purposes of Divorce Court's Property Distribution, 77 A.L.R.4th
609 (1990); Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Goodwill in
Accounting Practice as Property Subject to Distribution on Dissolution of Marriage, 77
A.L.R.4th 645 (1990); Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Valuation of Goodwill in Law
Practice for Purposes of Divorce Court's Property Distribution, 77 A.L.R.4th 683
(1990); Martin J. McMahon, Annotation, Divorce and Separation: Goodwill in Medical
or Dental Practice as Property Subject to Distribution on Dissolution of Marriage, 76
A.L.R.4th 1025 (1990); Dag E. Ytreberg, Annotation, Evaluation of Interest in Law
Firm or Medical Partnershipfor Purposes of Division of Property in Divorce Proceedings, 74 A.L.R.3d 621 (1976).
On the issue of pensions, see In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal.
1976); In re Marriage of Grubb, 745 P.2d 661 (Colo. 1987); Deering v. Deering, 437
A.2d 883 (Md. 1981); Seifert v. Seifert, 354 S.E.2d 506 (N.C. 1987); Bloomer v.
Bloomer, 267 N.W.2d 235 (Wis. 1978); Charles C. Marvel, Annotation, Pension or
Retirement Benefits as Subject to Award of Division by Court in Settlement of Property Rights Between Spouses, 94 A.L.R.3d 176 (1979); Philip Eden, Annotation, Forensic
Economics-Use of Economists in Cases of Dissolution of Marriage, 17 P.O.F.2d 345,
398-411 (1978).
On the issue of business goodwill, see Rogers v. Rogers, 296 N.W.2d 849 (Minn.
1980); Bowen v. Bowen, 473 A.2d 73 (N.J. 1984); Alan S. Zipp. Divorce Valuation of
Business Interests: A Capitalization of Earnings Approach, 23 FAMi. L.Q. 89 (1989);
Annotation, Good Will, 5 P.O.F. 505 (1960 & Supp. 1994).
283. E.g., Graham, 574 P.2d at 77; Ellis, 552 P.2d at 507; Prahinski, 540 A.2d at
843; Hanson, 738 S.W.2d at 433.
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generate income for its possessor and valuation proceeds from
the level and security of the income stream generated.2 "4 By
the first test, most types of human capital are not "property"
and therefore fall outside the domain of equitable distribution in
divorce.28 5 By the second, virtually all human capital may be
considered. Over time, the law has come to rest uneasily somewhere between these two poles.
Law and economics writing increasingly seems to view the
distinction between human capital and more conventional assets
as untenable and unjustified." 6 Commentators argue that the
failure to recognize and compensate accurately the changes in
human capital that occur during a marriage has a broad social
impact, discouraging behavior that is socially valuable and economically efficient." 7 More recent academic argument in both
law and economics literature seeks to move the law in two directions: toward making assessment and compensation for human
capital changes a routine aspect of divorce litigation and toward
measuring more precisely the portion of human capital that constitutes marital property. Moreover, economists argue that to
avoid "distorting incentives" the divorce process should consider
all changes in human capital during marriage-decreases as
well as increases. 8 8

284. E.g., O'Brien, 489 N.E.2d at 718.
285. Although these interests may not be treated as "property," courts may be permitted to consider human capital resources as part of the parties' "economic circumstances" in making division of other marital property. See, e.g., UMDA § 307(b)(4)
(Alternative B), 9A U.L.A. 239 (1987).
Also, in those settings in which business or professional goodwill can be sold, it
is generally counted as marital property. Under the broader definition of property,
however, the same goodwill could be valued at a higher figure.
286. E.g., ALLEN M. PARKMIAN, No FAULT DIVORCE: WHAT WENT WRONG? 38-39
(1992); Allen M. Parkman, The Recognition of Human Capital as Property in Divorce
Settlements, 40 ARK. L. REV. 439, 439-41 (1987).
287. Borenstein & Courant, supra note 277, at 992-93; Krauskopf, supra note 277,
at 395.
288. PARKMAN, supra note 286, at 132-34. The literature on decreases in human
capital in marriage addresses primarily maintenance and alimony issues rather than
property division. These writers' concern lies not so much in protection of divorced
spouses as in encouraging marriage and certain types of behavior within marriage,
e.g., Brinig & Crafton, supra note 65, at 871-73; Ellman, supra note 65, at 49-50, or
discouraging divorce on efficiency grounds, e.g., id. at 41 ("The first goal is to encourage the durability of the relationship.").
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Where courts attempt directly to value human capital assets,
they employ a variety of methods. All of these methods require
the use of expert testimony and difficult judgments about such
matters as (1) the earning capacity of both partners at the time
of their marriage and at its end, (2) the value of educational or
career opportunities given up by the other spouse, and (3) where
education is concerned, the amount invested in tuition, fees,
books, supplies, and living expenses, as well as the amount of
income sacrificed in the pursuit of further education.28 9
In some jurisdictions, divorce law sidesteps these problems by
addressing human capital issues with other remedies. Courts
may compensate one partner's contributions to another's career
through the division of other marital assets or through an award
of maintenance. 2 ° Alternatively, courts may consider estimates
of one partner's "future earning capacity" in making property
and support orders.2 ' Some jurisdictions permit division of only the more readily valued aspects of human capital, such as
pensions and business goodwill. 2 2 Academic degrees have
raised the most troublesome problems because these remedies
may not be available when divorce occurs at the threshold of

289. For proposed methodologies, see Borenstein & Courant, supra note 277; Albert
A. Fitzpatrick & Robert E. Doucette, Can the Economic Value of an Education Really Be Measured? A Guide for Marital Property Dissolution, 21 J. FAM. L. 511, 516-23
(1983); Leslie F. Burns & Gregg A. Grauer, Note, Human Capital as Marital
Property, 19 HOFSTRA L. REV. 499, 513-41 (1990).
290. In cases in which such compensation was ordered, courts considered estimates
of one spouse's future earning capacity in making alimony awards. See Krauskopf,
supra note 277, at 399-409. Professor Krauskopf argued in 1980 that the use of alimony in gross was a "far preferable method" to valuation and division of human
capital assets themselves. Id. at 416. As she notes, however, some jurisdictions limit
or prohibit awards of alimony or maintenance in ways that prevent this solution. Id.
at 409-10.
291. E.g., In re Marriage of Horstmann, 263 N.W.2d 885 (Iowa 1985); Mahoney v.
Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982); Stevens v. Stevens, 492 N.E.2d 131 (Ohio 1986);
In re Marriage of Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d 918 (Wis. 1982).
292. See Archer v. Archer, 493 A.2d 1074, 1079 (Md. 1985) (determining that a
pension is marital property, while a professional degree is not); Mahoney, 453 A.2d
at 532 (holding that a professional degree is not marital property subject to division
because its value is "nothing more than the possibility of enhanced earnings"). Compare In re Marriage of Grubb, 745 P.2d 661, 665 (Colo. 1987) (permitting division of
unmatured pension rights) with In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 679 (Colo.
1987) ("We find that the value of an educational degree is too dependent upon the
attributes and future choices of its possessor to be fairly valued.").
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293
a career.

The literature in this area suggests two directions for career
valuation practices. One approach is to attempt a property division whenever there has been an increase in income-earning
capacity during the marriage.2 9 4 At its simplest, this method
requires only a comparison of premarital and postmarital earnings. On the other hand, it may involve comparing postmarital
earnings with a projection of what the individual's earnings
would have been but for the human capital investments made
during the marriage. Attempting to identify the portion of human capital causally attributable to the marriage is, at best, extremely difficult. 5 The goal of both methods is to identify how
much of present earning ability represents a return on marital
investment, 6 and the problem with both methods is that the
change in earning ability during a marriage may include a return on other factors, such as the investing spouse's talent and
premarital education. 97
An alternative method is to measure and reimburse the investment itself.298 This approach is reflected in statutes requiring that the marital estate be reimbursed for its contributions to
the direct costs of education during the marriage 299 and in decisional law allowing compensation for these costs, sometimes
characterized as a restitutionary award."' Formulated in this

293. The difficulty posed when a court cannot fall back on these other remedies is
sometimes described as the "diploma dilemma." Estin, supra note 85, at 757-59.
294. Krauskopf, supra note 277, at 409-16.
295. Several Oregon cases attempt to separate the portion of the income disparity
between husband and wife caused by their division of labor during the marriage and
use this as a factor in determining spousal support after divorce. See In re Marriage
of Helm, 813 P.2d 52 (Or. 1991); In re the Marriage of Graf, 776 P.2d 46 (Or. Ct.
App. 1989).
296. Borenstein & Courant, supra note 277, at 993; Krauskopf, supra note 277, at
382.
297. E.g., PARKAIN, supra note 286, at 131-36. Parkman argues for separating the
"separate property" and "marital property" components of human capital. Id.
298. Parkman describes this method as giving the marital estate a debt interest
rather than an equity interest in human capital assets. Id at 134; Parkman, supra
note 286, at 454-57.
299. E.g., CAL. FAA. CODE § 2641 (West 1994); IND. CODE § 31-1-11.5-11(d) (Supp.
1991).
300. E.g., Inman v. Inman, 648 S.W.2d 847 (Ky. 1982); De La Rosa v. De La Rosa,
309 N.W.2d 755, 757-59 (Minn. 1981); Mahoney v. Mahoney, 442 A.2d 1062 (N.J.
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way, the reimbursement method can be criticized on the basis
that the cost of a degree has little relationship to its value." '
The analysis is much more complex when "investment" is defined to include a period of lost income for the trained or educated spouse, the value of household services, and the other
partner's lost opportunities for education or career development. 2 It is still more difficult if the full range of alternative
investment issues are factored in.3°3
For lawyers, applying any of these methods to the division of
human capital assets in divorce raises problems. At the most
practical level, retaining experts to perform the analysis these
computations require will be prohibitively expensive in most
cases. Moreover, if the analysis is sufficiently complex to be
accurate it may be too complex to be readily understood by the
key players in the divorce process. 0 4 At a more conceptual levSuper. Ct. App. Div.), rev'd, 453 A.2d 527 (N.J. 1982); Hubbard v. Hubbard, 603
P.2d 747, 752 (Okla. 1979); Washburn v. Washburn, 677 P.2d 152, 159-60 (Wash.
1984); Hoak v. Hoak, 370 S.E.2d 473 (W. Va. 1988); Haugan v. Haugan, 343 N.W.2d
796 (Wis. 1984); In re Marriage of Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d 918 (Wis. 1982).
301. E.g., Mahoney, 442 A.2d at 1068-69. Failure to consider the value of the human capital accumulation allows for an enrichment of one spouse. In two cases
which attempted to measure both the cost and present value of education, the difference was dramatic. See, e.g., De La Rosa, 309 N.W.2d at 758 n.7, 759 n.9 (finding
that the present value of completed professional education was $246,478 and the
cost of contributing to that education was $11,400); Haugan, 343 N.W.2d at 802-03
(finding that the present value of enhanced earning capacity was $266,000 and the
cost of wife's contribution was $13,000).
302. E.g., Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 534 (N.J. 1982); Haugan, 343
N.W.2d at 802-03; PARKMAN, supra note 286, at 131-35; Burns & Grauer, supra note
289, at 518-19 ("cost of acquisition" approach).
303. E.g., Hubbard, 603 P.2d at 752.
Borenstein and Courant developed a theoretical microeconomic model of the investment decision during marriage and propose that the supporting spouse should be
reimbursed for support during education compounded at the supporting spouse's marginal interest rate during the investment period. Borenstein & Courant, supra note
277, at 1000. They acknowledge, however, that putting their analysis into practice is
quite difficult. Id. at 999, 1006. In particular, they note three problems: determining
the value of the supporting spouse's contributions, fixing an appropriate interest
rate, and the overly simplified model they use. Id. at 1006-07. Of these, three,
Borenstein and Courant discuss the interest rate the most fully, although they note
that, at a practical level, this is the easiest factor to determine. Id. at 1007; see also
Daniel D. Polsby & Martin Zelder, Risk-Adjusted Valuation of Professional Degrees in
Divorce, 23 J. LEGAL STUD. 273 (1994) (including "risk premiums" in the valuation of
professional degrees).
304. Cf supra notes 167-80 and accompanying text (discussing forensic economic
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el, drawing a distinction between the various components of one
individual's human capital presents an extremely difficult problem. Similarly, making a precise measurement of marital investment puts serious strains on the fragile boundary between altruism and self-interest in our understanding of marriage.
The human capital approach to the financial remedies in marriage defines the entitlements of marriage based on norms of
investment, exchange, and maximization. The institution of marriage is changed by this definition because the "intangible benefits" of marriage-sharing and sacrifice, love and obligation, "for
better and for worse"-have all been pushed to the periphery.30 5 Instead, marriage is held to an economic standard of
rationality. The effort to quantify changes in human capital also
alters our view of the individuals within a marriage, requiring
that we define and distinguish the components of their incomeearning potential. Because there are serious measurement problems when the intangible aspects are added to the calculus, they
06
are simply eliminated in favor of more monetizable factors."

experts' approaches to tort litigation).
305. Robert Levy opposes property division approaches intended to compensate human capital changes during a marriage, arguing that the "investment" approach violates basic values and moral norms of marriage. Robert J. Levy, A Reminiscence
About the Uniform Marriage and Divorce Act--and Some Reflections About Its Critics
and Its Policies, 1991 B.Y.U. L. REV. 43, 64.
306. Thus Ira Ellman's proposal suggests 'reformulating alimony as compensation
for economically rational sharing behavior, and he defines this formulation substantially in financial terms. Ellman, supra note 65, at 49-51. Note that Professor
Ellman constructs the remedy for human capital changes as spousal support rather
than property division. This characterization eases some of the commodification problems discussed in the text. Professor Ellman's effort is impressive, because it attempts to locate a morally neutral basis for divorce rules in economic theory. He
rejects contract, restitution, and partnership approaches because each requires moral
judgments about parties' behavior during marriage. See id. at 23-24, 27-28, 36-39.
But see Schneider, supra note 128, at 235-36.
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2. Commodification
There are two aspects to the commodification. 7 problem created by human capital assets in marriage. The first arises from
treating personal capacities as if they could be purchased and
sold, and the second arises from thinking about marital interactions as exchanges between husband and wife.08 One recurring theme in the case law and commentary on career assets is
that it is difficult to distinguish the results of education and
career development from the results of personal qualities such
as talent, intelligence, ambition, and hard work. Economists
note this problem, and some use it to argue for more limited,
investment-based measures of compensation in divorce." 9
Judges also worry about it, and their concern is apparent in the
published decisions.310 Another consistent thread is the concern
not to commercialize marriage by treating it as a business or financial venture.
Courts are extremely resistant to the commodification of education and professional credentials because of what these accomplishments mean about personhood. Thus, in refusing to hold
that a professional degree could be considered property, the
Colorado Supreme Court wrote: "An advanced degree is a cumulative product of many years of previous education, combined
with diligence and hard work. It may not be acquired by the
mere expenditure of money. It is simply an intellectual
achievement that may potentially assist in the future acquisition
of property."311 Revisiting the issue nine years later, the court
repeated this language and added a discussion of valuation problems, concluding that "the value of an educational degree is too
dependent upon the attributes and future choices of its possessor
to be fairly valued."312

307. For a definition of commodification, see supra notes 199-202 and accompanying
text.
308. Margaret Radin notes that the determination of whether an academic degree,
pension, or professional practice can be considered "property" in divorce is a contest
over commodification. Radin, supra note 141, at 1856-57.
309. See supra notes 296-97 and accompanying text.
310. See infra notes 311-12 and accompanying text.
311. In re Marriage of Graham, 574 P.2d 75, 77 (Colo. 1978).
312. In re Marriage of Olar, 747 P.2d 676, 679 (Colo. 1987). See also Mahoney v.
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Given the understanding of academic and professional success
as highly individualized, valuation presents substantial practical
problems. Some judges object on this basis to the use of aggregate statistical data as the basis for awards in divorce.313 Projections based on such data seem to be "little more than guesswork." " If the valuation proves to be either too low or too
high, one of the spouses may suffer significant financial loss.
As with the complex formulas for valuation of homemakers in
tort, these issues cast doubt on whether the legal system can or
should attempt to structure remedies that require such precise
measurement.3 15 Judges express the concern that the routine
use of experts adds significant expense to the divorce
process." 6 From an economic viewpoint, precise valuations of
many "career assets" create large additional transaction costs in
the divorce process. 1 This expense might be justifiable if it
led to substantial reductions in other individual or societal costs
of divorce-an unlikely result that is not argued in the litera318
ture.
These concerns also echo Professor Radin's argument regard-

Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 532 (N.J. 1982) ("Valuing a professional degree . . . would
involve a gamut of calculations that reduces to little more than guesswork.").
313. E.g., Moss v. Moss, 639 S.W.2d 370, 374 (Ky. Ct. App. 1982) (arguing that
economic studies can tell us only about "Mr. Average Pharmacist").
314. E.g., Mahoney, 453 A.2d at 532; In re Marriage of Lundberg, 318 N.W.2d 918,
925 (Wis. 1982) (Callow, J., concurring).
315. See supra notes 167-80 and accompanying text (concerning problems in the
tort recovery context); see also Levy, supra note 305, at 63 (arguing that the determination of whether professional degrees should be deemed "property" depends in
part on efficiency concerns, such as the difficulty of valuation).
316. E.g., In re Marriage of Grubb, 745 P.2d 661, 668 (Colo. 1987) (Erickson, J.,
dissenting).
317. Litigated divorce cases involving human capital issues or other complex
property valuation problems are already quite expensive. Although data from fee
award decisions underestimates the expenses of the process, it indicates that these
costs are substantial. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Huff, 834 P.2d 244 (Colo. 1992)
(holding that $40,000 was "reasonable and necessary" amount of wife's fees in case
involving valuation of law firm partnership interest).
318. This problem is recognized in Calabresi's treatment of the costs of accidents,
which discusses the uncertainty and expense of individual damages valuations where
nonmarket interests are in question. CALABRESI, supra note 193, at 198-235. One
response to these difficulties is to recognize that estimating these values may be
"the best we can do" and to focus on how best to estimate these losses. Id. at 20809.
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ing the "risk of error" that the process of monetization entails.
She argues that the "rhetoric of commodification might lead
imperfect practitioners to wrong answers," especially when the
analysis requires consideration of many different people and
"interests they hold dear" or when many of the "costs" to be
evaluated are not readily monetizable 19 She argues that, in
these settings, important costs tend to be undervalued.3 2
Another risk of these methods is that the attempt to value
investments in human capital pushes the institution of marriage
from a relationship based on love and obligation toward one
based on self-interest. Even those courts allowing for compensation are careful to reject the discourse of markets and exchange.
In a widely quoted passage, the New Jersey Supreme Court
commented that "[miarriage is not a business arrangement in
which the parties keep track of debits and credits, their accounts
to be settled upon divorce."321
The human capital cases illustrate Radin's argument that
market and exchange discourse may be antagonistic to "the
'
interests of personhood."3 22
These interests include context, or
the particulars of family, love, experience, and moral commitment.3 23 Although Professor Radin's writing focuses on the
dangers to personhood, these judicial opinions are animated by a
similar worry about the dangers to marriage. 24

319. Radin, supra note 141, at 1878.
320. Id.
321. Mahoney v. Mahoney, 453 A.2d 527, 533 (N.J. 1982). See generally Estin,
supra note 85, at 765-66 (discussing cases resisting "commercializing" marriage).
322. Radin, supra note 141, at 1879-81. Radin writes:
Systematically conceiving of personal attributes as fungible objects is
threatening to personhood, because it detaches from the person that
which is integral to the person. Such a conception makes actual loss of
the attribute easier to countenance. For someone who conceives bodily
integrity as "detached," the same person will remain even if bodily integrity is lost; but if bodily integrity cannot be detached, the person cannot
remain the same after the loss. Moreover, if my bodily integrity is an
integral personal attribute, not a detachable object, then hypothetically
valuing my bodily integrity in money is not far removed from valuing me
in money.
Id. at 1881.
323. Id. at 1905-06.
324. The literature on financial remedies for human capital changes in divorce
opens the door for another type of valuation. Professor ElIman and others assert
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It is deeply disturbing to our relationships to attempt to separate their moral and financial aspects, and speaking as if they
can be detached diminishes the quality of our connections to
each other. This separation may have broader social effects as
well. Radin argues that when market rhetoric is extended universally, it "transforms our world of concrete persons, whose
uniqueness and individuality is expressed in specific personal
attributes,
into a world of disembodied, fungible, attribute-less
entities. " "=
In the economic analysis of divorce and its financial consequences, there are signs that the messy, flesh and blood reality
of marriage and family life has been transformed into cleaner,
simpler, more manageable forms. This work uses a model of
marriage with roots in Becker's model of efficient specialization
and in the functionalist sociology of the 1950s. 26 In this model,
the causes of divorce are rational,327 and the problems of divorce are solvable by economic and psychological expertise."'
Primarily, the economic problem of divorce is a problem of wives
who have specialized in household production and who are left
by husbands at the threshold of their career success." 9 There
is no domestic violence,3 30 there is no male unemployment, and

that compensation for a spouse's reduced marriageability may be important, particularly because the empirical evidence suggests that women's prospects decline more
quickly than men's. See PARKMAN, supra note 286, at 131-32; Cohen, supra note 60,
at 278-87; Ellman, supra note 65, at 80-81. It is difficult even to imagine how reduced marriageability might be measured, and, for now, the proposal lives only in
the realm of theory.
325. Radin, supra note 141, at 1884-85.
326. See supra notes 50-60 and accompanying text; see also TALCOTr PARSONS &
ROBERT F. BALES, FAMILY, SOCIALIZATION AND INTERACTION PROCESS 3-26 (1955).
327. BECKER, supra note 2, at 327-28; PARSONS & BALES, supra note 326, at 19-20,
24-25; Cohen, supra note 60, at 267.
328. E.g., PARKMAN, supra note 286, at 25-27; Gary S. Becker et al., An Economic
Analysis of Marital Instability, 85 J. POL. ECON. 1141, 1144 (1977); Landes, supra
note 79, at 36-39.
329. Becker, supra note 73, at 396 ("[N]o-fault divorce hurts women with children
whose marriages are broken up by their husbands."). Divorce is also a problem because it discourages women from leaving the work force to care for children. Gary S.
Becker, Finding Fault With No-Fault Divorce, BUS. WK., Dec. 7, 1992, at 22.
330. Both Gary Becker and Allen Parkman, in their recommendations to replace
no-fault divorce with a mutual consent law, ignore the situation of a spouse who is
a victim of abusive behavior but who cannot persuade his or her partner to agree to
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there are no breadwinning wives to confuse the picture.
D. Child Support
Providing for children's needs requires enormous commitment
from responsible adults in all varieties of families: single-parent
families, two-parent families, formal and informal families, and
divorcing families. Some children are fortunate to have deep
sources of love and support from adults; others struggle to grow
to adulthood with much less."' Making the best of difficult
family situations and protecting a child's resources of love and
support is an enormously complex project for the law. Conflicts
over children abound in family law, particularly where financial
support and the rights of custody are concerned.33 2 The economic understanding of the family suggests reasons why these
issues are so important for children and society and reasons why
they have proved so difficult to address in divorce.
1. Investment
Much of the economic theorizing about the family centers
explicitly on children, who are described as both the output and
the raison d'6tre of marriage.3 33 At the same time, although
much of this literature refers to spending on children as "investment," the contemporary economic reality for adults seems to be

divorce. Becker's only exception to consent would permit arbitration after a separation of "several years." Becker, supra note 329; see also PARKMAN, supra note 286, at
139; Brinig, supra note 128, at 2468-69 (discussing Parkman's recommendations and
arguing that a return to recognition of fault in certain circumstances is needed to
protect battered spouses).
331. As described by Michael Walzer:
[S]ome families will be warmer and more intimate than others. Some
children will be better loved than others. Some men and women will
move into the spheres of education, money, and politics with all the selfconfidence that parental affection and respect can produce; while others
will step forward hesitantly, full of self-doubt.
MICHAEL WALZER, SPHERES OF JUSTICE 231 (1983).

332. The law also indirectly affects the care children receive as a result of the
rules that affect the financial treatment of caregivers in tort or divorce actions. See
generally Estin, supra note 85 (arguing that caregiving is a value in need of "rehabilitation" in the financial aspects of divorce law).
333. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
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that spending on children is viewed as the price of consuming
the experience of parenthood.3 34 Children cannot depend on the
same level of "investment" where a preference for parenthood
fades or where it never comes fully into existence. Perhaps the
most significant investments in children are not made in money,
but in the combination of physical nurture and emotional connection. We have no methods for valuing this care, just as we
have no technique to measure the value of a mother's pregnancy
and childbirth.3 35
Economic theories suggest that bearing and rearing children
is facilitated greatly by the existence of a stable, two-parent
family.33 6 Such a household can achieve the efficiencies of a division of labor that traditionally permitted mothers to develop
expertise in child care while fathers specialized in the role of
provider. Although other patterns of labor division are increasingly common, with various advantages and disadvantages,33 7
the marital family at its best allows children to share in a wide
range of material and emotional benefits.
Spending on children varies widely, but recent empirical research has explored how children share in the financial resources of a household in both absolute and relative terms.3 3 A series of studies by Thomas Espenshade have estimated total
parental expenditures on children from birth to age eighteen,

334. See supra notes 91-98 and accompanying text.
335. See WARING, supra note 1, at 27-28, 187-223. Our laws suggest that as a society we view the creation of life with deep disagreement; the intensity of debate over
abortion, surrogacy, parental leave, prenatal care, and alcohol and cocaine use during
pregnancy suggests ambivalence as well. Efforts to apply economics and exchange
principles to the beginning of human life are especially divisive. See, e.g., Elisabeth
M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, The Economics of the Baby Shortage, 7 J. LEGAL
STUD. 323 (1978). For a sense of the controversy that Landes and Posner's article
provoked, see Richard Posner, The Regulation of the Market in Adoptions, 67 B.U. L.
REV. 59 (1987), and other articles collected in that issue as Forum: Adoption and
Market Theory, 67 B.U. L. REV. 59 (1987).
336. See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text; see also ANDREA H. BELLER &
JOHN W. GRAHAM, SMALL CHANGE: THE ECONOMICS OF CHILD SUPPORT 57 (1993).
337. See Estin, supra note 85, at 781-91.
338. THOMAS J. ESPENSHADE, INVESTING IN CHILDREN (1984); LAZEAR & MICHAEL,
supra note 28. For the most part, these studies consider only money spent and not
the opportunity costs of time spent with children. See ESPENSHADE, supra, at 1; see
also LAZEAR & MICHAEL, supra note 28, at 202-04 (discussing studies of time use in
the household).
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excluding the costs of college education. His data vary, depending on the parents' socioeconomic status and on whether the
wife is employed. In 1981 dollars, the prices ranged from a low
of $58,300 per child to a high of $135,700 per child.33 9 In comparative terms, data analyzed by Lazear and Michael suggest
that spending on each child in a household averages thirty-eight
percent of the amount spent on each adult in the household.34
In post marital or nonmarital families, the resources of parental time and money are reduced. In post marital families, even
where child support is paid dependably, children's material
living standards drop significantly. 34 1 Children of never-married mothers fare even worse, for their mothers are dramatically
less likely to receive child support payments.34 2 Average
awards in both categories fall significantly below the estimates
of parental spending on children in intact marital families, and
often below the poverty level set by the Social Security Administration.3 43 In addition, because financial pressures require a
greater labor force commitment, these families usually face
greater. difficulty in investing time in their children.3 44
Child support rules have become an area of increasing interest in economics. Espenshade's empirical work has been the
basis for "income shares" models for child support guidelines
used in many states. However, recent studies have concluded
that, even with these guidelines, child support awards are too

339. ESPENSHADE, supra note 338, at 3. At average 1981 prices, a four-year public
college education would add another $15,492 to these figures. Id. at 32-33.
340. LAZEAR & MICHAEL, supra note 28, at 111-12. This percentage decreases as
more children or adults are added to the household. Id. at 112. The data also indicate that adults with more education allocate greater percentages of income to their
children. Id.
341. BELLER & GRAHAM, supra note 336, at 38-39; Another interesting empirical
study is ELEANOR E. MACCOBY & ROBERT H. MNOOKIN, DIVIDING THE CHILD: SOCIAL
AND LEGAL DILEMMAS OF CUSTODY 128 (1992). The economic analysis of spousal and
child support included in the Maccoby-Mnookin book was performed by Professor
Elizabeth Peters.
342. BELLER & GRAHAM, supra note 336, at 91-92 (finding that 15.7% of neveT-married mothers versus 71.6% of mothers married at least once have child support
awards).
343. Id. at 39, 138, 142 (discussing receipt rates and amounts for never-married
mothers). For a discussion of policy recommendations, see id. at 253-55.
344. Id. at 237-38.
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low. 45 In their research on income allocation within households, Professors Lazear and Michael suggest that child support
payments should be tied to predivorce allocations. 46 Their
analysis, however, recognizes that this problem goes beyond the
realm of microeconomic theory, for they comment that "many of
the surrounding issues are noneconomic," requiring "value
judgments by society."347
In a different study, Professors Beller and Graham argue that
payment of support has benefits beyond the value of the money
received&8" and note that the average new award is far below
the average estimates of parental spending on children.3 49
Beller and Graham developed an economic analysis to explain
why support awards and receipts fall short of predivorce levels.350 They assume that, "even after divorce, most parents still
care about their children's well-being" 5 1 and explain the failure of fathers to pay (and mothers to insist on payment) with a
microeconomic model. According to this model, there are four
determinants of award and receipt outcomes: "the ability and
desire of the father to pay support and ... the expected costs
and benefits of support to mothers."35 2 Although Beller and

345. A large empirical study of custody orders and agreements in two California
counties discovered a significant decline in the economic well-being of divorced mothers and children, even assuming full payment of support orders. MACCOBY &
MNOOKIN, supra note 341, at 259-65. This study suggests that fathers could afford
to pay more, and points out a significant irony: the only reallocation of gender roles
that results from divorce is that mothers become primarily responsible for both care
and financial support of their children. Id. at 271.
346. LAZEAR & MICHAEL, supra note 28, at 153-65. After reviewing four different
models, they concluded that income should be allocated between postdivorce households according to family size and composition. Id.
347. Id. at 150.
348. BELLER & GRAHAM, supra note 336, at 212, 246.
349. Id. at 38-39.
350. Id. at 60-81.
351. Id. at 60.
352. Id. at 81. Beller and Graham note that:
Child support presents problems for both mother and the father. She
worries that he may not pay what he owes, and that if he does pay, he
may try to exert too much control over her and the children. He worries
that she will spend the money on herself rather than the children or
that she will spend it on the children in a different way than he prefers.
Id. at 59.
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Graham use socioeconomic data to approximate these determinants, they acknowledge that none of these factors can be measured sufficiently to explain the variations they observed in
support outcomes. Moreover, they note that each of these "may
also be influenced by certain relevant social and psychological
factors." 53
Economic theory suggests that the law imposes an obligation
for support where parental altruism proves insufficient." In
the United States, the legal system has begun to devote substantial resources to the establishment and enforcement of child
support obligations. Federal and state legislation, a bureaucracy
devoted to collecting support, and a dramatic increase in paternity determinations for children born to unmarried mothers
have increased support collections to record levels.355
Although generally applauded, the increase in collection has
also brought controversy. The primary purpose of the federal
legislation was to reduce the costs of public support for families
through the AFDC program. 35 As a result, AFDC program
participants now face an obligation to participate in the process
as a condition of benefits.57 Still, at the poverty level, statistics demonstrate that the costs of the support collection bureaucracy are barely equal to the amounts collected from low income
fathers.358 Given the wide array of enforcement procedures now
available, including devices for collection of potentially enormous
"arrearages" in support, the result of the program can be to
impoverish a second family.359

353. Id. at 81.
354. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 149-50; Becker & Murphy, supra note 120.
355. See Harry D. Krause, Child Support Reassessed: Limits of Private Responsibility and the Public Interest, 24 FAM. L.Q. 1, 6-11 (1990).
356. Id. at 6. See generally CLARK, supra note 37, at 262-63, 735-39.
357. To encourage participation, $50 of the amount collected each month goes directly to the child's household; the rest is used to offset the cost of benefits. 42
U.S.C. § 657(b)(1) (1988).
358. Krause, supra note 355, at 12-14.
359. Professor Harry Krause has argued that we need to reconsider whether, at
this level, it is reasonable to expect absent fathers to foot the entire bill. Instead, he
suggests we search for a 'level of responsibility commensurate with the social reality
of the situation." Id. at 21; see also Harry D. Krause, "Family Values" and Family
Law Reform, 9 J. CONTEMP. HEALTH L. & PoLY 109, 120-22 (1993). As Professor
Krause points out, the strict enforcement of support obligations is ironic given the
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Support issues are perceived differently in the case of divorce.
Here as well, the setting and enforcement of support orders has
increased substantially in recent years.3 60 The tone of this debate is far different, however, and there is evidence of growing
political pressure in the opposite direction, toward limits on the
obligations of divorced parents. Support for college education is a
particularly controversial point.
Educational expense is a significant aspect of the investment
in children's human capital. Although public education is available through the secondary level, 6' college education typically
requires major expenditures by parents, often at a considerable
sacrifice to their own consumption.3 62 Data suggest that paying
for children's education increasingly has become the primary
form of wealth transfer between generations; this development
parallels the emergence of professions and occupations as a
form of "wealth" in society.3 63 This puts children of divorced
and nonmarital families at a significant disadvantage, particularly in states with laws that define eighteen as the age of
majority or deny courts the authority to order post majority

massive deregulation of sexual conduct and the changing legal treatment of legitimacy in the past decades. Id. at 117-18; see also J.R. Levesque, The Role of the Unwed
Fathers in Welfare Law: Failing Legislative Initiatives and Surrendering Judicial
Responsibility, 12 LAW & INEQ. J. 93 (1993); Paula Roberts, Child Support Enforcement for Low-Income Children: Part of the Problem or Part of the Solution?, 1 D.C.
L. REV. 143 (1992); cf Gary S. Becker, Unleash the Bill Collectors on Deadbeat
Dads, Bus. WK., July 18, 1994, at 18 ("More men will hesitate to father -children if
they know they'll have a tougher time evading the duty to support them.").
360. See generally BELLER & GRAHAM, supra note 336, at 124, 156-60 (documenting
the changes in award and receipt rates).
361. Public schools can be understood as a social investment in children's human
capital that benefits society as well as individual children. See Becker & Murphy,
supra note 120, at 6; Stout, supra note 92, at 1947, 1953, 1955.
362. These costs have not been included in the major studies of parental spending
on children. See ESPENSHADE, supra note 338, at 76; LAZEAR & MICHAEL, supra note
28, at 50, 96. Espenshade's research did suggest that the average cost of post secondary school increases these numbers substantially. ESPENSHADE, supra note 338, at
76-86.
363. See John H. Langbein, The Twentieth-Century Revolution in Family Wealth
Transmission, 86 MICH. L. REV. 722, 729-36 (1988) (suggesting that educational support is the primary wealth transfer for the middle class); see also MARY A.
GLENDON, THE NEW FAMILY AND THE NEW PROPERTY 192-205 (1981); Charles A.
Reich, The New Property, 73 YALE L.J. 733 (1964) (defining profession or occupation
as a form of wealth in society).
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educational support.3 64
Laws providing for emancipation at age eighteen and limiting
the obligation for post secondary support appear causally linked
to downward mobility of children of divorce, more than half of
whom end up in lower socioeconomic strata than either of their
parents. 6 5 Judith Wallerstein and Shauna Corbin write:
Thus, at the point of entry into college, when the young
person's need for financial support and parental encouragement to pursue goals commensurate with his or her intellectual capacity customarily increases, financial support ceased
altogether or was maintained at minimal levels, conveying a
lack of emotional investment in the youngster's education
strangely at odds with the father's social position and expressed values.366

In many states, a battle over support for college-aged children
has been fought in the courts.3 67 Some divorced fathers' groups
have challenged the obligation to pay support on various constitutional grounds.3 6

364. The decrease from 21 to 18 in the age of majority in most states provoked
considerable litigation over educational support orders. See Annotation, Responsibility
of Noncustodial Divorced Parent To Pay For, or Contribute to, Costs of Child's College Education, 99 A.L.R.3d 322 (1980). A few states have retained a 21-year-old age
of majority for support purposes. See, e.g., IND. CODE ANN. § 31-1-11.5-12 (West
1987). Others permit the award of post majority educational support either by statute, e.g., OR. REV. STAT. § 107.108 (1989), or by court decision, e.g., Ex parte
Bayliss, 550 So. 2d 986 (Ala. 1989).
365. Judith S. Wallerstein & Shauna B. Corbin, Father-Child Relationships After
Divorce: Child Support and Educational Opportunity, 20 FAM. L.Q. 109, 122-23
(1986).
366. Id. at 125.
367. E.g., In re Marriage of Plummer, 735 P.2d 165 (Colo. 1987) (rejecting obligation for post majority support except in cases of physical or mental disability);
Newburgh v. Arrigo, 443 A.2d 1031, 1037-39 (N.J. 1982) (recognizing obligation to
provide post majority educational support in some situations).The difference in state
laws on this point triggers significant choice of law and jurisdictional trouble as
well. See, e.g., Williams v. Williams, 387 S.E.2d 217 (N.C. Ct. App. 1990) (enforcing
the father's obligations under his Canadian divorce decree); West v. West, 419
S.E.2d 804 (S.C. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that the law of the daughter's place of residence, rather than father's, controls the obligation for educational support).
368. See, e.g., Parents Opposed to Punitive Support v. Gardner, 998 F.2d 764, 768
(9th Cir. 1993). In Gardner the plaintiffs argued that support payments under guidelines "alienate noncustodial parents from their children" and discriminate against the
interests of the support obligor's new children. Id.; see Fender v. Fender, 20 Fain. L.
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In other states, the skirmishes have been legislative. One
illustration is Colorado where the statutory child support guideline, adopted in 1986, has been revised almost annually. " 9
Some of the changes have been proposed by Colorado's state
Child Support Commission in order to revise the guidelines on
issues such as health insurance premiums and tax dependency
exemptions or to update the figures used to reflect inflation and
changes in federal tax law."' However, a number of highly sig-

Rep. (BNA) 1355 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1994) (same); see also (Byrnes v. Caldwell, 21 Fam.
L. Rep. (BNA) 1200 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1995) (holding that Pennsylvania's educational
support act does not violate parents' equal protection rights); Curtis v. line, 20
Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1232 (Pa. Ct. C.P. 1994) (holding Pennsylvania's College Expenses Act violates the equal protection rights of divorced parents).
The constitutional attack is a regular response to changes in family law; for a
constitutional challenge to no-fault divorce legislation, see In re Marriage of Franks,
542 P.2d 845 (Colo. 1975). Mr. Franks represents an extreme case; he was a lawyer
whose contributions to the field of family law include two books: MAURICE FRANKS,
WINNING CUSTODY: A No-HOLDS-BARRED GUIDE FOR FATHERS (1983), and MAURICE
FRANKS, HOW TO AVOID ALIMONY (1975). Franks was disbarred in Colorado in 1990
for charging excessive fees, converting client funds, filing claims for the purpose of
harassment and abandoning his practice. State v. Franks, 791 P.2d 1 (Colo. 1990).
369. The Colorado guideline follows the "income shares" model. COLO. REV. STAT. §
14-10-115 (1987 & Supp. 1993). See generally Ray L. Weaver, New Child Support
Guideline Adopted, 15 COLO. LAW. 1662 (1986). The guideline has been amended as
follows: House Bill 87-1263, §§ 5, 6, 7, 8, 9, 38, 1987 COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 113
(repealing § (7)(b)(II)); House Bill 89-1180, §§ 14, 15, 1989 COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch.
140 (adding § (7)(d.5) and amending § (17)); House Bill 90-1254, §§ 9, 10, 1990
COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 113 (adding §§ (7)(b)(III), (18) and amending §§ (7)(c),
(13)(a)(III)); House Bill 90-1160 § 35, 1990 COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 62 (amending
§ (7)(a)(I)(A)); House Bill 91-1049, § 1, 1991 COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 38 (adding
§ (1.5) and amending §§ (7)(b), (13), (14)(b), (18)); Senate Bill 91-0144, § 21, 1991
COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 60 (amending § (18)(a)); Senate Bill 92-0156, § 1, 2, 1992
COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 33 (adding §§ (1.5)(d), (16.5) and amending §§ (1.5)(b)(I), (2),
(7)(e), (10)(a)(II), (18)(a)); House Bill 92-1230 §§ 1, 2, 3, 1992 COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch.
39 (adding §§ (13.5), (14.5) and amending §§ (2), (3)(a), (3)(b), (7)(a), (8), (10)(a)(II),
(10)(c), (14)(c)(1) (18) and revising and reenacting § (10)(b) and repealing § (7)(e));
House Bill 92-1232, § 9, 1992 COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 40 (amending § (15)(b)(1));
House Bill 92-1359, § 18, 1992 COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 313 (amending § (17)); Senate
Bill 93-0154, §§ 1, 7, 8, 1993 COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 270 (adding §§ (1.5)(e), (2)(b),
(3.5), (18)(e) and amending §§ (1.5)(b)(I), (2)(a), (10)(c)); House Bill 94-1029, § 107,
1994 COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 345 (amending § (18)(a)); Senate Bill 94-088, § 5, 1994
COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 266 (amending §§ (1.5)(b)(I), (1.5)(e), 7(a)(I)(A), (7)(b)(III),
(7)(d)(I), (18)(e)).
370. These are all aspects of the 1992 amendments cited supra note 369. For
health insurance premiums, see Senate Bill 92-0156 § 1 (1992), and House Bill 921230 § 1 (1992). For tax dependency exemptions, see House Bill 92-1230 § 1 (1992).
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nificant changes in the law are the result of lobbying by "fathers'
rights" groups or individual unhappy constituents seeking to
reduce their obligations to pay support." 1 The laws governing
obligations for postsecondary educational support were weakened in 1991 and 1993 and eliminated in 1994.372
2. Altruism
In theory, the justification for treating family members as an
economic entity arises in part from the fact that they act altruistically rather than selfishly toward each other. 3 Differently
stated, they have shared utility functions because what is beneficial to one family member will automatically benefit the others.374 In the context of divorce, however, this assumption no
longer holds. As a result, the law of child support reflects a ten-

For the updated support guideline amounts, see House Bill 92-1230 § 2 (1992).
371. In some of the more political cases, amendments that pass in late session maneuvering are revisited in the following year, keeping the statute constantly in flux.
The issue of "voluntary underemployment" by a support obligor was addressed three
times in five years (1987, 1990 and 1991). The original guideline allowed for determination that a parent's potential income from employment was higher than his or
her actual income, unless that parent was "gainfully employed on a full time basis."
COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(7)(b)(II) (1987 replacement volume). In 1987, this exception was deleted, in House Bill 87-1263 § 38 (repealing COLO REV. STAT. § 14-10115(7)(b)(II)). In 1990, the concept of "voluntary underemployment" was deleted entirely, in House Bill 90-1245, § 9, 1990 COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 113, (adding
§ (7)(b)(III)). In 1991 the provision was re-revised to permit a limited consideration
of this issue. See COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10-115(7)(b)(III) (Supp. 1993); House Bill 911049, § 1, 1991 COLO. SESS. LAWS, ch. 38 (amending § 14-10-115(7)(b)(III)).
372. In 1991, the age of majority was reduced from 21 to 19. See COLO. REV. STAT.
§ 14-10-115(1.5) (Supp. 1993). Although subject to an exception for certain
postsecondary education expenses, this change was made in a manner to terminate
even contractually assumed obligations for support after age 19 pursuant to separation agreements signed prior to the effective date of the new law. The amended statute provides for an end to support at age 19 except for "costs of a program of
postsecondary education" in cases in which the court deems it "appropriate" to require parents to make such a contribution. Id.
In 1993, the guideline was amended to put a ceiling on the amount of post secondary support at a figure equal to the amount the obligor "was required to pay
annually under the most recent child support order." COLO. REV. STAT. § 14-10115(1.5)(b)(I) (Supp. 1993). In 1994, the original version of Senate Bill 94-88 would
have eliminated all provisions for post secondary support. See Colorado Senate Bill
94-88 (1994).
373. See supra notes 103-13 and accompanying text.
374. BECKER, supra note 2, at 278.
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sion between the ideal of family relationships based on altruism
and the reality that individual self-interest is also a strong motive, particularly after a divorce." 5
In the case of divorce and the needs of children in post marital families, many of the assumptions about family life built into
economic theory begin to fail dramatically. The determination of
child support requires an explicit trade-off between spending on
adults and spending on children in a context where bargaining,
consensus, and altruistic decisionmaking are rarely feasible. In
many cases, the decision maker is by necessity a judge or legislature, and, although these institutions may express sympathy
and concern for one party or another, they do not act out of any
form of altruism. Even for a support payor motivated by love or
altruism, the fact of a court order and the difficulty of maintaining a sense of family and connection shift the analysis to a more
complex matrix.
When economic analysis enters this terrain, children are conceived as "public goods," subject to bargains between parents
with varying levels of altruism and varying interests in support,
nurture, control, and connection. 6 Applying this model, economists view allocation of children and resources between parents
after divorce as a bargaining problem, suggesting that failure to
pay adequate support is tied to the noncustodial parent's loss of
control
over how resources are allocated by the custodial par37 7
ent.
A different economic model views children not as objects but

375. In the common, emotion-laden linkage between financial support and parental
right, there is an implicit commodification problem. See supra notes 199-202 and
accompanying text. Does child support-the amounts ordered and the amounts actually paid-reflect the value of a child?
376. Weiss & Willis, supra note 100, at 272. See POSNER, supra note 1, at 143-44.
377. Weiss and Willis write:
The problem arises because of difficulties in monitoring the allocation of
the custodians' expenditures when they live separately. If, for instance,
the wife has custody, then the husband is unable to determine whether
the custodian spends a dollar on herself or on the children. She in turn
treats all sources of her income (i.e., earnings, alimony, child support) as
fungible. There is therefore no self-enforcing mechanism in the divorce
state that will induce the custodian to internalize the impact of his
choice of child quality on his ex-partner.
Weiss & Willis, supra note 100, at 272.
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as subjects-participants in the exchange processes of the family. Gary Becker and Kevin Murphy have argued that the law of
parent-child obligations furthers efficiency goals by substituting
for the exchanges that might be made between parents and children if children had the capacity to enter into long-term agreements."' In one example, they suggest that state regulation of
divorce may "mimic the terms of contracts between husbands
and wives and parents and children that are not feasible."37' 9
The traditional reciprocity of parental obligations and rights
seems to suggest an exchange model very similar to the arguments of these economists,38 but the conception of parent-child
relations as an exchange is highly problematic for the law. For
one thing, to the extent that family values are measurable, the
exchange is highly unequal. Raising children requires an enormous investment of time and energy as well as purchased commodities such as food, clothing, shelter, health care, entertainment, and transportation.3 8 ' To conceive of this investment as
something to be reciprocated or returned is a risky premise. In
the event that the relationship proves disappointing, or insufficient, or its costs are perceived as too great-a not unlikely
event amid the trauma of divorce-the logic of exchange suggests two solutions: either putting an end to the relationship or
attempting to pay less.
Virginia Held addresses this problem, pointing out that the
issue is not whether we can theoretically treat human relations
as contractual, but whether it is plausible to do so.382 She argues that most aspects of the paradigm of a mother-child relationship differ fundamentally from the paradigm of the economic
man in contractual relationships.38 3 Mother-child relationships
are not voluntary, and they are permanent and

378. Becker & Murphy, supra note 120, at 1; see also POSNER, supra note 1, at 144
n.2.
379. Becker & Murphy, supra note 120, at 14.
380. See Katharine T. Bartlett, Re-expressing Parenthood, 98 YALE L.J. 293, 297-98
(1988) (examining "parenthood as exchange").
381. See supra notes 338-40 and accompanying text.
382. Virginia Held, Mothering Versus Contract, in BEYOND SELF INTEREST, supra
note 143, at 287, 293.
383. Id. at 297.
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nonreplaceable." Although there may be reciprocity, it is not
35
enforceable and is not considered a goal of the relationship.
The relationship involves significantly different understandings
of power and equality and assumes the fact and necessity of
dependence rather than autonomy." 6 Privacy is an unusual
state, with mother and child continually subjected to the needs
or demands and expectations of others.38
Given these differences, applying economic models to parentchild relationships may be affirmatively dangerous. Even in the
economists' own terms, an obvious problem exists. When children are conceived of as goods or as participants in exchanges,
there is less room for altruism. Neither love nor obligation connects consumers to their stereo equipment or creditors to their
debtors. The problem is all the more serious because it gives
intellectual validation to a growing social trend away from love
and obligation and toward contractual understandings of parenthood.
In the academic and popular literature, there is an elaboration of these themes and undercurrents.8 8 The story of the divorced father oppressed by the burden of support payments now
gets regular play alongside the story of destitute divorced mothers and their children.8 9 One issue regularly raised is the connection between payment of financial support and the ongoing
relationship between father and child.9 Not surprisingly, cus-

384: Id. at 298.
385. Id.
386. Id. at 298-99.
387. Id. at 297-99.
388. See Krause, supra note 355; see also DAVID CHAMBERS, MAIUNG FATHERS PAY:
THE ENFORCEMENT OF CHILD SUPPORT (1979); HARRY D. KRAUSE, CHILD SUPPORT IN
AIERICA: THE LEGAL PERSPECTIVE (1981); Charles Brackney, Battling Inconsistency
and Inadequacy: Child Support Guidelines in the States, 11 HARV. WOMEN'S L.J. 197
(1988); David L. Chambers, Comment, The Coming Curtailment of Compulsory Child
Support, 80 MICH. L. REV. 1614 (1982).
389. E.g., Ann Carnahan & Linda Castrone, System Bludgeons Men, Fathers Say,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Apr. 2, 1992, at 8 (responding to a four-part series on "The
Child Support Crisis"); Glenn Collins, Why Fathers Don't Pay Child Support, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 1, 1983, at C1, C8.
390. For example, Professor Krause comments thoughtfully on the traditional social
and legal reciprocity of parent-child relations, observing that divorce today often
effectively terminates a father's parental status. Krause, supra note 355, at 21-22.
Beyond the potential loss of legal authority, a noncustodial parent loses most oppor-
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tody issues have also become much "hotter" in the last decade.391
Various studies, both empirical and clinical, have documented
the connection between the parent-child relationship and child
support.3

92

This research suggests that parental involvement

with a child is correlated with compliance with support orders.
It is not clear, however, whether there is a causal connection or
a sequence between the two;

93

the explanation may be simply

that committed parents are more likely to visit and to pay.394
Although surprising to parents in many divorce cases, the law
generally requires a custodial parent to adhere to visitation orders whether or not the other parent is making regular support
payments and, correspondingly, requires the supporting parent
to continue paying despite interference with visitation. 95 The
trend toward disconnecting the two has accelerated with the
enactment of more stringent child support collection laws.396

tunities for a daily personal relationship with the child, which Krause refers to as a
"social link." Id.; see also JANET FINCH, FAMILY OBLIGATIONS AND SOCIAL CHANGE,
154-62 (1989) (study of role played by norms of duty, obligation, or responsibility in
practices of financial assistance and support within kin groups in adult life).
391. E.g., Katherine T. Bartlett & Carol B. Stack, Joint Custody, Feminism and the
Dependency Dilemma, 2 BERKELEY WOMEN'S L.J. 9 (1986); David L. Chambers, Rethinking the Substantive Rules for Custody Disputes in Divorce, 83 MICH. L. REV.
477 (1984); Martha Fineman, Dominant Discourse, Professional Language, and Legal
Change in Child Custody Decisionmaking, 101 HARV. L. REV. 727 (1988).
392. E.g., Wallerstein & Corbin, supra note 365; Jessica Pearson & Nancy
Thoennes, Supporting Children After Divorce: The Influence of Custody on Support
Levels and Payments, 22 FAM. L.Q. 319 (1988).
393. Pearson & Thoennes, supra note 392, at 331, 337.
394. See Wallerstein & Corbin, supra note 365, at 115-16 (noting "[a] high correlation . . . between the psychological intactness of the father and good or adequate
economic support for the children").
395. CLARK, supra note 37, at 746-47; see, e.g., Hayes v. Hayes, 303 P.2d 238 (Colo.
1956); Kane v. Kane, 391 P.2d 361 (Colo. 1964). See generally Karen Czapanskiy,
Child Support and Visitation: Rethinking the Connections, 20 RUTGERS L.J. 619, 62129 (1989) (summarizing a variety of laws connecting or disconnecting support and
access); Krause, supra note 355, at 24 nn.93-94 (listing unusual cases and statutes
which have linked the enforcement of child support with the issue of visitation
rights).
396. REVISED UNIFORM RECIPROCAL ENFORCEMENT OF SUPPORT ACT (RURESA) § 23,
9B U.L.A. 484 (1968). This section provides that inquiries into custody or visitation
conflicts may not be litigated in a support enforcement proceeding under RURESA.
See generally Greg Geismann, Note, Strengthening the Weak Link in the Family Law
Chain: Child Support and Visitation as Complementary Activities, 38 S.D. L. REV.
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Some recent commentary supports a move in the opposite direction-arguing that visitation and child support should be linked

explicitly together in the law

9 7-or

suggests that our society
8

already is moving in that direction. ' Many cases have emphasized the importance of protecting the continuing relationship
between the child and the noncustodial parent.3 99 The connec-

568, 583-85 (1993) (discussing RURESA).
As Czapanskiy points out, disconnection rules have more dramatic effects on
those families in which children are in the AFDC program. Czapanskiy, supra note
395, at 627 n.39, 635, 657-58.
397. E.g., Geismann, supra note 396, at 604-08 (recommending abatement or termination of child support and tort remedies for interference with visitation rights).
398. See, e.g., Krause, supra note 355, at 23-24; see also Chambers, supra note 388,
at 567 (arguing that informal agreements linking visitation and child support should
be enforced under any new legislation). In jurisdictions with "disconnecting" rules, a
custodial parent cannot condition visitation with the child on receipt of support, and
a support-paying parent must provide financial support whether or not there is regular access to the child. Czapanskiy, supra note 395, at 619-24. Jurisdictions that
permit the conditioning of rights and duties of support and visitation do so in a
variety of ways. Id. at 624-29; Carolyn E. Taylor, Note, Making Parents Behave: The
Conditioning of Child Support and Visitation Rights, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 1059 (1984).
In some jurisdictions, the law allows a paying parent a self-help remedy-withholding support without prior court approval; in others, an appropriate order
is required. Czapanskiy, supra note 395, at 624-25. In a wider range of states, visitation denial is a basis for excusing the payment of support arrearages, especially in
extreme cases. See, e.g., Damico v. Damico, 20 Fam. L. Rep. (BNA) 1319 (Cal. 1994)
(resolving split among California appellate courts in holding that active concealment
of custodial parent and child until child's adulthood may be a defense to action for
collection of support arrearages). Czapanskiy, supra note 395, at 624 n.19. According
to Czapanskiy, the most extensive interconnections exist in New York law. See id. at
625-29.
Rules that permit the failure to pay support to lead to loss of visitation time
are more unusual because denial of visitation is understood to be an extraordinary
remedy. See id. at 621 n.7 (Cal.); id. at 624 nn.16 & 18 (Pa.); id. at 625 nn.23-24
(Fla. & Or.); id. at 628-29 nn.45-46 (N.Y., Ala., Ariz., Ark., Md., Utah, Nev., N.J. &
W. Va.); id. at 643 n.94 (N.Y.). Given the nature of the remedy it is not tolerated
as a matter of self-help, but instead requires a court order. Id. at 651 nn.129-30;
see, e.g., Reardon v. Reardon, 415 P.2d 571, 574 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1966).
399. Professor Czapanskiy argues that although this language is often formulated
in terms of the child's interests, it is actually a defense of the parent's rights.
Czapanskiy, supra note 395, at 643. As she notes, however, protecting a parent's
access to a child is not the same as requiring a parent to maintain a presence in a
child's life. Id. The rules, in effect, give a nonresidential parent the option of having
a role in raising a child, id. at 644, an option many divorced parents forego. Id. at
637. Czapanskiy is critical of the implicit compartmentalization of financial and
caretaking roles in these rules. She argues that, even with disconnecting rules, a
nonresidential parent's time is conceived in terms of social and entertainment activi-
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tion between visitation and child support presents a serious dilemma for a world in which a large percentage of children will
experience their parents' divorce."'
Research by Judith Wallerstein and Shauna Corbin suggests
that the child support/relationship issues are heightened for
older children, particularly those involved directly in negotiations between their parents over support for college." 1 This is
clearly not an isolated phenomenon, given the highly charged
political atmosphere around issues of the divorced parents' obligation to provide college support. °2
These difficult problems express a fundamental tension between two different models of parenthood. In one, raising children requires a massive investment of time and money and a
commitment to carry through with the venture for twenty years
or more, despite changes in individual utility or preference. In
the other, children represent a "stream of satisfactions" to their
parents, and enjoyment of this stream is apparently essential to
sustaining the commitments children require. Our society seems
to have shifted increasingly toward a consumer approach to parenthood, in which children are viewed as increasingly similar to
homes and hi-fi sets. The risk of a linkage between child support
and the parent-child relationship is that it serves to validate
self-interest as the basis for legal obligation. Such a rule permits
the treatment of children as consumer goods, a source of satisfaction for their parents, and replaces the norms of parent-child
relationships with the rhetoric of exchange."'

ties rather than emotional or physical caretaking and notes particularly that the
rules ignore the double burden of responsibility that falls on a caretaking parent. Id.
at 656.
400. Regular visits are often impossible because of the long distances between
parents' homes. In some conflict-ridden families, visits may create or contribute to a
painfully tense atmosphere that is certainly harmful for children. The clinical evidence suggests that in many cases, support payments have a significant effect on
the child's relationship with a nonresidential parent. Wallerstein & Corbin, supra
note 365, at 114-18. Particular problems arise when a parent uses financial resources to control the behavior of children or an ex-spouse. Id. at 117-18, 121. Problems
also arise when a parent supports two sets of children at significantly different standards. Id. at 120.
401. Id. at 118-24.
402. See supra notes 367-72 and accompanying text.
403. See supra notes 96-98 and accompanying text.
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This is not to argue that self-interest plays no legitimate role
in parental behavior. Jane Mansbridge argues that institutions
or environments that "generate some self interest return to
unselfish behavior create an 'ecological niche' that helps sustain
that unselfish behavior."4" 4 As she puts it, "If nice guys always
finished last, the cost of niceness would be intolerable."4 5
Mansbridge emphasizes that providing protections for altruism
is not the same thing as converting altruism into self-interest.06 But because of the assumptions on which family economic theory has been based, this tension has not been well
explored. Economic theory has not paid sufficient attention to
the economic and legal struggles of post divorce or nonmarital
families, in which one adult routinely bears the burdens of both
breadwinner and homemaker. Moreover, economic theory is not
much help in deciding what is to be done for children whose
consumption value to their parents has diminished.
Other models are possible. Katharine Bartlett has argued that
norms of responsibility, rooted in the relationship between parent and child, offer better grounds for handling family disputes.40 ' She suggests that taking responsibility is more complex than making an exchange because it requires a "personal
commitment to how the child 'turns out'."40 ' In her view, responsibility is a better basis for norm-building, because it helps
to focus our attention on what kinds of parent-child relationships we want to foster.0 9 Along the same lines, Karen
Czapanskiy proposes rethinking the linkage of finances (child
support) and relationship (visitation) in order to promote responsibility rather than exchange norms.4 10

404. Mansbridge, Altruism, supra note 143, at 137.
405. Id.
406. Id.
407. Bartlett, supra note 380, at 298-300.
408. Id. at 300.
409. Id. at 303-04.
410. Czapanskiy, supra note 395, at 658-65. Czapanskiy's discussion also reveals
the hidden linkages between gender roles and the responsibility for child care when
the parent-child exchange has failed. Id. at 644-58.
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E. Problems of Love and Obligation
Law and economics have traditionally exaggerated the ways
in which family life is separate and distinct from other social
institutions. In both disciplines, the present trend is toward
denying those differences. Although the insight that family behavior has qualities of economic rationality is extremely useful,
the simplification of human behavior and emotion that characterizes economic analysis creates different problems when imported uncritically into legal theory. Language that accords
economic significance to household work helps immensely to
legitimate its value and importance to society. Conversely, language that reduces the spectrum of ideas available for understanding family life to market and exchange metaphors presents
serious risks.
The problems of sustaining family relationships and of creating safe places for love and obligation to flourish are complex
and mysterious. There are no longer the tidy alignments of law,
economics, and social mores that led us to assume that neatly
rational solutions of family issues were within our grasp. The
variables that economists treat as external to their systems are
surely not trivial for law's understanding of family behavior. The
effort to rationalize and quantify the family should not be permitted to eclipse our knowledge that the specifics of values and
preferences are also important. We cannot understand the family without a theory that can also embrace love, obligation, pride,
anger, jealousy, guilt, sacrifice, and faith. In addition, theory
cannot be built on a single model of efficient family life. What is
most important about the family as an institution is precisely
that it allows for the expression of sharing and commitment in
an enormous range of forms. Increasingly, "family" includes both
nonmarital and post marital families for which few channels
have developed. These untraditional "families" struggle to fulfill
the same social and economic functions of their more familiar
counterparts. The goal should not be to implement an economic
master plan for "The Family," but to allow love and obligation to
find a foothold in the landscape of self-interest.
Rebecca Blank points out that although mainstream economic
models have many important strengths, they are only a "partial
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picture of reality."4 1 ' She argues that economists may be
tempted to draw sweeping conclusions from "uncomfortably
narrow evidence" because they have not been trained to understand the limits of their models,412 and she characterizes the
assumption of "empowered, in-control Westernized individuals"
as the central limitation of rational choice models.4 "' In the effort to bring useful insights from economics into family law, the
limitations of these behavioral models are particularly important.
Economic analysis has a clear role where rules of compensation and questions of distributive justice must be determined. In
tort and divorce law-controversies both outside and within the
family-the recognition that marriage and family life have a
significant economic component is essential. It is not necessary
to quantify precisely the value of a homemaker, a professional
license, or a life's lost opportunities. Nor can we seek to appraise
or divide academic achievement or children. However, we must
recognize the emotional connections of the family as deeply
meaningful in life, and we must value and support the human
relationships that give rise to these goods, both morally and
financially, whenever possible.
The challenge of this goal is apparent in each of the settings
discussed above. The work of a homemaker is valuable, but its
measure does not lie in the other work the homemaker could
perform or the price paid in the market for cleaning or child care
services. The methods that rely on these measures are rife with
value judgments that reflect the biases and constraints of market life. On the other hand, failure to compensate a family for
the loss of a care giver would be a far worse result. Tort law
rules can be part of a social support system for the love and
sense of commitment that make the homemaker's work unique.
In the context of career assets and divorce, similar problems
occur. With the attempt to separate and place a monetary value
on an individual's personal qualities and achievements, we see
Homo economicus at his evolutionary extreme. But the effort

411. Blank, supra note 135, at 133.
412. Id. at 134.
413. Id. at 140.
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demands judgments based on a range of factors that fall outside
the ordinary bounds of economic analysis. Who is this person?
What real opportunities lie before him? To what extent is his
success or failure the result of family relationships? What is the
role of particular preferences or talents? Here, the problems of
alienation and commodification extend to both the individual
and the marital relationship.
Because of the risks that this sort of approach entails for noncontractual aspects of the marital relation, many commentators
outside of economics (including most courts that have considered
these issues) have rejected attempts at quantification of nonmarket "assets." Instead, the law has moved toward a system
that recognizes the role played by altruism and relationship in
individual success without trying to monetize it. The remedies
applied and recommended in this literature allow for a "self interest return" to unselfish behavior, but without allowing that
return to convert acts of love and obligation into acts of self-interest and exchange.
Controversy surrounds the use of contract and restitution
principles in family relationships because of the same delicate
balance. Economic analysis requires that we recognize that services within a household are valuable, just as services between
strangers are. At the same time, relationships within a family
are far more complex and contextual than what economic analysis can embrace. These disputes require more than a theory
based on individual rationality. They require consideration of
broader institutional problems and the specific contexts of family
life: the nature and duration of the relationship; attention to the
presence of selfish and unselfish behavior; and an equal concern
with fostering autonomy and preventing exploitation.
The problem of balancing selfishness and altruism is difficult
enough where adult relationships are involved, but it is far
worse once children are recognized as having a large stake in
family life. The law of parent-child relationships cannot be based
on a theory which views children as objects of exchange or subjects of bargaining. Instead, the law needs theory that can recognize and support the expression of love and the assumption of
obligation.
Neoclassical economists have extended the reach of their theo-
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ry by expanding its premises. Where utility maximization is understood to include all of the goals and interests of family life,
and self-interest is broadened to include a broader range- of motivations for behavior, economic analysis appears unconstrained,
no longer tied to a framework of explicit markets. Broadening
these premises has made possible the impressive theoretical and
empirical achievements of the new family economics, but it has
also tended to obscure many of the internal tensions and paradoxes of family life. The theoretical leap has not reconstituted
the household, which is still marked by social structures that
are entirely distinct from those of the marketplace.
When cut loose from its moorings in the structures of the market, economic theory is less versatile. The examples in this Article illustrate different aspects of this problem. The analysis of
tort claims, contract and restitution, and property division in
divorce all reveal the limitation which economics encounters in
the setting of the family and the difficulties that arise from the
application of market principles to nonmarket behavior. Without
a framework of well defined commodities, explicit prices, and
fully elaborated exchange norms, family economic theory is far
more constrained than traditional market economics.4 14
In each of the areas this piece has reviewed, economic analysis is useful in part because it leads toward a set of deeper questions about how and whether family relations can be understood
to be about exchange and choice. The characterization of these

414. See Ronald H. Coase, Economics and Contiguous Disciplines, 7 J. LEGAL STUD.
201 (1978). Coase observes that:
Economics, it must be admitted, does appear to be more developed than
the other social sciences. But the great advantage which economics has
possessed is that economists are able to use the "measuring rod of money." This has given a precision to the analysis, and since what is measured by money are important determinants of human behavior in the
economic system, the analysis has considerable explanatory power . ...
If it is true that the more developed state of economics, as compared to
the other social sciences, has been due to the happy chance (for economics) that the important factors in determining economic behavior can be
measured in money, it suggests that the problems faced by practitioners
in these other fields are not likely to be dissipated simply by an infusion
of economists, since in moving into these fields, they will commonly have
to leave their strength behind them.
Id. at 209.

1086

WILLIAM AND MARY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 36:989

as problems of love and obligation locates them at the boundary
line between family and market and suggests that definition of
these boundaries poses a large and complex moral problem. An
economics without boundaries may not be much help in establishing a healthy working relationship between these spheres.
The economic analysis of child support reflects all of these
difficulties and a deeper moral problem as well. Economic theory, along with many other modes of thought, puts children at
the center of family life. But while the theory can plausibly treat
adults as participants in exchange processes, that premise cannot be applied to parent-child relationships without eroding the
theoretical base of the enterprise. There is no analogue in mainstream economics for this problem; the market is simply not
"about" guns or butter or cars. The problem this poses is not at
the boundaries, but at the very core of our thinking about the
family.
CONCLUSION

This Article has contrasted the "new home economics" with an
older paradigm which treated the family as a unitary entity and
largely ignored its economic functions. The Article argues that
the insights of those theorists linking household economic production into the sphere of the market have been useful in areas
of the law that relate to household production. Their work has
advanced our discussion with a range of vocabulary and concepts
that have helped to move the legal debate beyond its traditional
paradigms, which also disregarded the work that occurred within households.
At the same time, these economic theories are limited in their
scope. Because they seek neutrality where individual choices are
concerned, these theories cannot address values that are important in family life. Moreover, because the theories assume certain goals and organization of marriage, they are not as helpful
in understanding the full range of family types that law must
comprehend. Finally, the theories place rationality and individual autonomy at the analytical center, ignoring the importance of
social institutions and the constraints of social/market life, as
well as the presence of factors beyond self-interest and altruism.
None of these limitations abrogates the power of the economic
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methods or insights. Rather, they suggest that economic insights
are most useful when incorporated into a larger framework of
legal analysis. The goal of the framework is to sustain love and
obligation, both of which are essential to family life.
Thus, computation of tort recoveries when homemakers are
injured or killed presents a problem that goes beyond the question of economic measurement. The process requires first that a
set of entitlements be defined in law, with attention to the importance of redress as well as the risks of commodification. Similarly, enforcement of household exchange relations in contract or
restitution is not feasible without a set of norms that structure
and interpret the meaning of family relationships. Although
those norms are, in part, individually determined, they are also
importantly social in nature and effect, drawing on a wide variety of economic and noneconomic purposes. Even in the specific
context of property division upon divorce, the economic model of
marriage has its limits. The insight of economic theorists that
human capital changes have significant and long-term effects
during and after marriage is important. But efforts to value and
divide precisely the particular aspects of changes in human capital that have occurred during marriage have the effect of
objectifying both husband and wife and their relationship.
Most problematic of all is the economic understanding of parent-child relationships. Here, the danger is that parents in fact
see their children primarily as consumer goods-that self-interest and exchange have come to widely replace the norms rooted
in love and obligation that once governed these relations. This
problem is especially serious because the family is the place in
which skills, talents, values, morals, and rationality are generated. If the inventory is reduced here, it may be forever lost.
The family is who we are and who we become. We can no
more hope to separate the equity and debt investments in human flourishing than we could determine the optimal balance of
work and leisure or the socially efficient number and spacing of
children. What we may hope to do is to find means of sustaining
both the fragile possibilities of human love and the sense of obligation and commitment that sustain it.

